Abstract
I focus on the two uses of quotation marks illustrated by The word ‘car’ expresses the idea “automobile,” in which the single quotation marks are used “auto-reflexively” to mark reference to the word quoted and the double quotation marks are used “ideo-reflexively” to mark reference to the idea expressed by the word quoted. I account for the difference between auto- and ideo-reflexive reference within my theory of meaning and indexical reference. Meaning consists in the expression of mental states, principally thoughts and their parts. Indexicals express a type of thought part that links to another mental state that determines its referent. Determinants can be other concepts (as in the anaphoric use of indexicals) or presentations (as in their deictic use). On my account, the idea “automobile” expresses the indexical concept expressed by the idea (a definite noun phrase used restrictively) linked to an introspective presentation of the idea expressed by the word in quotes. The word ‘car’ expresses the indexical concept expressed by the word linked to a perceptual presentation of the word in quotes. The quotation marks are optional punctuation marks, with no referents of their own. I observe that a word ‘w’ can also be used elliptically to mean “the word ‘w.’” I show that my deictic indexical theory avoids the defects of other accounts, including the demonstrative theory and Davidson’s theory.
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Notes
- 1.
So in the act sense, thoughts and beliefs are different. But in the object sense, beliefs are thoughts (though not all thoughts are beliefs).
- 2.
For more on conventions in this sense, see Davis (2003: chapter 9).
- 3.
The terms ‘anaphoric,’ ‘demonstrative,’ and ‘deictic’ are common in linguistics, but there is little consensus on their usage.
- 4.
- 5.
Since seeing-that entails knowing-that, Dretske (1969) called it “epistemic” perception. Seeing a lemur is “non-epistemic” perception.
- 6.
See Davis (2017b) for more on sortal components.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
Background facts: Washington and Jefferson were both Virginians; Adams was from Massachusetts.
- 10.
Note that thought is not the same as inner speech. Tom said to himself “All cars is vehicles” is grammatical and may be true.
- 11.
‘Say’ differs markedly from ‘utter’ in having an illocutionary as well as locutionary sense. In the former, Sue said “A car is a vehicle” is equivalent to Sue said that a car is a vehicle, and does not entail that Sue uttered an English sentence. If my grasp of French is correct, ‘prononcé’ corresponds to ‘uttered,’ ‘dit’ and ‘declaré’ to ‘said.’
- 12.
As noted in Sect. 3, the idea “φ” and the idea of φ may not be synonymous when ‘φ’ is an indexical like him. Note too that (b) can be used transparently, as in The idea of a sedan is the idea of an automobile. When it is transparent, it is not synonymous with (a), which has no transparent interpretation. For further complexities, see Davis (2003: section 7.6).
- 13.
‘Automobile’ means “of or pertaining to cars” (as an adjective) as well as “car” (as a noun).
- 14.
I develop a theory of saying reports based on my account of auto- and ideo-reflexive designators in Davis (2016a).
- 15.
‘Idea of a car’ is a general term, however, when ‘idea’ means “conception” rather than “thought part.” There are many conceptions of a car.
- 16.
- 17.
The parallel for ‘expression’ implies that the expression ‘car’ is ambiguous in English, most commonly referring to the word for automobiles, but also possibly referring to the expression consisting of that word surrounded by single quotation marks. Whereas ‘car’ (a word in quotation marks) is not a word, it is an expression.
- 18.
Each token of the sentence type contains eight word tokens but no word types. The sentence type contains eight occurrences of word types, but no word tokens. Occurrences are subtypes, not tokens. Occurrences of types in types are often mistaken for tokens. See Wetzel (2009: chapter 7) and Davis (2014).
- 19.
- 20.
- 21.
Wertheimer (1999: 518–9) observes the appositive interpretation of (47), but erroneously thinks that it is the only interpretation.
- 22.
Cf. Wertheimer (1999: 515).
- 23.
- 24.
- 25.
- 26.
- 27.
- 28.
- 29.
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Davis, W.A. (2017). Ideo- and Auto-reflexive Quotation. In: Saka, P., Johnson, M. (eds) The Semantics and Pragmatics of Quotation. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 15. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68747-6_11
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