Abstract
Since the 1980s, regulation gained a central place among the repertoire of approaches used by the government to influence, orient, steer and—in some sense—control sectors of the economy and portions of the society. After discussing the rise of regulatory capitalism, this chapter reviews the main theories of regulation, namely the public interest theory, the private interest and capture theory and interest-group politics theory. A more complete understanding of regulation also requires attention to the role of complexity, ideas, institutions and conflicting interests around the conduct of infrastructure and utilities monopolies. The chapter concludes with the discussion of the regulation of the water sector in Cochabamba, Bolivia, in 1999–2000.
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Asquer, A. (2018). Theories of Regulation. In: Regulation of Infrastructure and Utilities. Studies in the Political Economy of Public Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67735-4_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67735-4_2
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