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On the Psychological Absurdity of a War on Terror

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Abstract

The view that a war on terror is footless is based on two suppositions: First, the use of terror is always predicated on a division of population into two subgroups—based on a criterion of identity, such as race, class, religion, or nationality. Second, terrorism is always tactical rather than strategic. Terrorism is used by one side in order to induce a disabling fear in the other side. The tactic of terror is supported by a symmetrical rhetoric—both sides regard the other side as evil. No war on a tactic can be won. The use of terror can only be reduced by diminishing the hatred that supports it—and this can be done.

“No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.”

Carl von Clausewitz (1984/1932), p. 223

“There’s only one thing I need to know. Whose side are you on?”

Paul Simon , Paranoia Blues

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Notes

  1. 1.

    DrugWarFacts.org asserts that around 350,000 people were incarcerated in the United States for drug offenses in 2005. Fifty-three percent of federal prisoners and 20% of state prisoners were serving time for drug offenses.

  2. 2.

    In Mirrors, Masks, Lies, and Secrets I develop arguments about the use of a variety of tactics of detecting and concealing information in the context of strategic interactions.

  3. 3.

    See, for example, the account of this bombing in The Match King, by Frank Partnoy (2009).

  4. 4.

    Tip-off phrases for this rhetoric are “They hate us,” or “They have no regard for human life,” or “This conflict will never be resolved because people never change,” or “The only language they understand is the language of power, of force,” or “They do not recognized our legitimacy.”

  5. 5.

    Barrett and Sarbin (2007) suggest that the use of war rhetoric made members of the Bush Administration prisoners of their own language.

  6. 6.

    See Barrett and Sarbin (2007)

  7. 7.

    Andrea Elliott, “A call to Jihad, answered in America.” New York Times, June 11, 2009.

  8. 8.

    See Sageman (2008).

  9. 9.

    In Ricks (2007, p. 233).

  10. 10.

    In Ricks (2007, p. 204).

  11. 11.

    Alexander Solzenyitsen’s (1973) Gulag Archipelago is a brilliant description of this system in action.

  12. 12.

    See Scheibe (1983).

  13. 13.

    See Russell (1951).

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Scheibe, K.E. (2017). On the Psychological Absurdity of a War on Terror. In: Deep Drama. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62986-5_8

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