Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

A Comparison with the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the European Union

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
International Development Organizations and Fragile States

Part of the book series: Governance and Limited Statehood ((GLS))

  • 430 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter analyses how the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the European Union have adapted their legal and policy frameworks for engaging with fragile states, and compares the relevant rule-making processes, instruments, and outcomes with those of the World Bank. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the factors that may influence how different international development organizations engage with fragile states.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    For an overview, see already supra Sect. 3.2 in Chap. 3.

  2. 2.

    On fundamental commonalities in the legal frameworks of international development organizations, see supra Sect. 2 in Chap. 4.

  3. 3.

    Dann distinguishes between specialized, technocratic organizations on the one hand, and organizations with a ‘diplomatic-heteronomous’ focus on the other hand. See Dann, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, pp. 200–202.

  4. 4.

    Next to the World Bank, the AfDB and the ADB, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) belong to the group of MDBs.

  5. 5.

    The African Development Fund is the concessional lending arm of the AfDB, which thus has the same dual structure as the World Bank (consisting of the IBRD and the IDA). The Asian Development Bank provides both loans to middle-income countries and concessional loans to developing countries, but uses ‘Special Funds’ for the latter, which are held separate from its ordinary capital.

  6. 6.

    AfDB Agreement, Art. 17 (1) lit. j; ADB Agreement, Art. 14 (xiv).

  7. 7.

    ADB Agreement, Art. 36 (2); AfDB Agreement, Art. 38 (2).

  8. 8.

    ADB’s Operations Manual contains operational policies that are similar to the World Bank’s OPs, but called Bank Policies (BPs). ADB’s Operational Procedures (OPs) spell out procedural requirements like the World Bank’s Bank Procedures.

  9. 9.

    AfDB has no Operations Manual, though all policy and legal documents are available online on its website. These include sectoral policies and policies on cross-cutting issues, financing policies, and guidelines and procedures. Which of these are considered binding for staff is not clear from their designation. AfDB’s Independent Review Mechanism (the equivalent of the World Bank’s Inspec tion Panel), however, is mandated to review staff compliance with its “operational policies and procedures”, which suggest that they are meant to be internally binding. See the Board Resolution instituting the Independent Review Mechanism, Resolution B/BD/2010/10—F/BD/2010/04 (June 16, 2010), para. 11 (i).

  10. 10.

    Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, ‘Partnerships, Emulation, and Coordination: Toward the Emergence of a Droit Commun in the Field of Development Finance’, in Hassane Cissé, et al. (eds), The World Bank Legal Review. Volume 3. International Financial Institutions and Global Legal Governance (The World Bank, 2012).

  11. 11.

    This is true even without considering the fact that the EU is an international organization with a supranational character. In fact, its supranational character does not matter much for EU development cooperation, since it is a policy field where EU institutions and member states exercise their competences in parallel (see TFEU, Art. 4 IV).

  12. 12.

    For a comprehensive account of the EU as a provider of development assistance, its historical origins, applicable legal framework, and specific characteristics in comparison with the World Bank and Germany, see Dann, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany.

  13. 13.

    For an overview of the different instruments, see EU Directorate-General for External Policies, European Parliament, ‘EU Development Cooperation in Fragile States: Challenges and Opportunities’ (April 2013), Figure 4. While often seen as an important comparative advantage of the EU in fragile states, the range of instruments that can be used in parallel also makes the delimitation, coordination, and coherence between them particularly challenging. See, for instance, Panos Koutrakos, ‘The Nexus Between the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy and Development’, in Anthony Arnull, et al. (eds), A Constitutional Order of States? Essays in EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Oxford University Press, 2011).

  14. 14.

    TFEU Art. 4 (4), establishes the competence of the EU in the field of development cooperation, whereas Art. 208-211 contain more specific provisions. At the institutional level, competences are divided between “Development and Cooperation—EuropeAid”, which is mainly responsible for concrete implementation, and the European External Action Service (EEAS), a functionally autonomous body whose staff consists one-third each of former employees of the Commission, of the Council and national diplomats. On the organizational structure and legal framework of EU development cooperation in detail, see Dann, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, pp. 170–180.

  15. 15.

    The Internal Agreement on the 11th EDF (OJ L 210, 6.8.2013) is an agreement between EU member state governments that determines the contributions of each member state to the EDF. In addition, Regulation (EU) 2015/322 determines the budgetary and procedural regime for the implementation of the EDF.

  16. 16.

    EU Regulation No. 233/2014 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation for the period of 2014–2020, 11 March 2014 (hereinafter DCI Regulation). The DCI Regulation constitutes the basic act that is the precondition for EU budget appropriations, covering the objectives and principles, processes and procedures of cooperation. Of the four other regulations, of particular interest in the context of the present study are Regulation (EU) No 235/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 on establishing a financing instrument for democracy and human rights worldwide (OJ L 77/85); and Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 establishing an Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP).

  17. 17.

    In general, however, soft law plays a less important role in the legal framework for EU development cooperation, since it has such a plurality of formal legal acts at its disposal.

  18. 18.

    On basic ideas in the law of international development organizations in general, see already supra Sect. 2 in Chap. 4.

  19. 19.

    TFEU Art. 208 (2).

  20. 20.

    Cotonou Agreement, Art. 11 (2). See also Art. 1 (Objectives), and Art. 11 (1), which was amended in 2010 to explicitly acknowledge the interdependency between development and poverty reduction on the one hand, and peace and security on the other hand.

  21. 21.

    DCI Regulation, Art. 3 (3) and Annex I on the Areas of Cooperation under Geographic Programmes.

  22. 22.

    TFEU Art. 208 (1), referring to TEU Title V, Art. 21 (1), the principles of EU External Action. Also Cotonou Agreement, Art. 9 (1) and DCI Regulation Art. 3 (1). On the EU’s political mandate, see also Dann, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, 178–179.

  23. 23.

    Cotonou Agreement, Art. 2 and Art. 58 (2) lit (a).

  24. 24.

    See Cotonou Agreement, Art. 2, where the principle of ownership was for the first time included in a binding international legal treaty; and Art. 4, whereby “The ACP States shall determine the development principles, strategies and models of their economies and societies in all sovereignty.” Somewhat less prominently, the principle of ownership is also included in the DCI Regulation, Art. 3 (8) lit. a).

  25. 25.

    Cotonou Agreement, Art. 2; DCI Regulation, Art. 3 (8) lit. c); and the European Consensus on Development, recognizing participation of civil society as a common principle (para. 4 (3)).

  26. 26.

    For example, Cotonou Agreement, Art. 58 (2), according to which local authorities, private enterprises, “decentralised cooperation and other non-State actors from the ACP States” are eligible for EU financing only subject to the consent of the ACP state. The EU typically funds civil society organizations only when their activities are identified in the country’s national development strategy.

  27. 27.

    DCI Regulation, Art. 6 (2) lit. a).

  28. 28.

    Cotonou Agreement, Art. 2. Also DCI Regulation, Art. 3 (2); and the European Consensus on Development, paras. 56–66.

  29. 29.

    In detail, see infra Sect. 3.3 of this chapter.

  30. 30.

    The EU is required to treat all its member states equally, but this principle of equal treatment does not extent to its cooperation with developing countries, which are not member states of the organization.

  31. 31.

    For instance, the principles of participation and differentiation were all introduced with the 2000 Cotonou Agreement. On the changing political relations between the EU and ACP states since the 1990s and the according legal modifications introduced to their cooperation agreement, see Karin Arts, ‘ACP-EU Relations in a New Era: The Cotonou Agreement’, 40 Common Market Law Review, 95 (2003), and Bernd Martenczuk, ‘From Lomé to Cotonou: The ACP-EC Partnershp Agreement in a Legal Perspective’, 5 European Foreign Affairs Review, 461 (2000).

  32. 32.

    For example, the Cotonou Agreement was signed in 2000 for a 20-year period and has been updated several times. The Regulations that inform the EU’s cooperation with non-ACP states were adopted in 2006 and updated in 2014. Even in usually static, EU primary law, there are provisions that allow for an adaptation over time. A case in point is Art. 208 (2) of the TFEU, whereby the objectives of EU development cooperation may evolve with the EU’s commitments to new, internationally agreed objectives

  33. 33.

    See supra Sect. 2 in Chap. 5 for an analysis of OP 2.30 and OP 7.30.

  34. 34.

    African Development Bank Group’s Strategy for Enhanced Engagement in Fragile States (ADB/BD/WP/2008/37-ADF/BD/WP/2008/10), approved by the Board of Directors in March 2008. Before, the AfDB had already approved non-binding Policy Guidelines for Post-Conflict Assistance in 2001, just after the World Bank had approved OP 2.30. Unlike OP 2.30, however, the Guidelines did not regulate how to engage in countries with no government in power, or in non-member states territories.

  35. 35.

    AfDB Operations Guidelines of the Fragile States Facility (hereinafter FSF Operations Guidelines), Annex 1: Legal Note on the Fragile States Facility and the Operations Guidelines (hereinafter FSF Legal Note).

  36. 36.

    On the World Bank’s use of trust fund arrangements in fragile states, see supra Sect. 2 in Chap. 5. The FSF also resembles the World Bank’s State- and Peacebuilding Fund, which can be used to channel resources directly to non-state actors.

  37. 37.

    FSF Operations Guidelines, para. 3.1.3 [emphasis added]. AfDB staff should therefore candidly assess “the composition of the transitional government, whether it has support from the international community and the timetable for holding parliamentary and presidential elections”. Moreover, post-conflict countries should have signed an “internationally recognized Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) or a post-crisis or reconciliation agreement.”

  38. 38.

    FSF Operations Guidelines, para. 3.3.1.

  39. 39.

    FSF Operations Guidelines, para. 3.3.5 (ii). The targeted support window is the only window for which the AfDB has issued specific guidelines, the Guidelines on Administration of the Technical Assistance and Capacity Building Program of Pillar III Operations.

  40. 40.

    African Development Fund, ‘Strategy for Enhanced Engagement in Fragile States’, para. 2.3 and Figure I; and the FSF Operations Guidelines, para. 3.3.5 on service delivery through non-sovereigns. The AfDB has channelled resources through non-sovereigns such as NGOs, private sector organizations, or UN agencies particularly to support service delivery in fragile states.

  41. 41.

    AfDB Agreement, Art. 17 (1) lit. b).

  42. 42.

    AfDB, Revised Policy Guidelines and Procedures for Emergency Relief Assistance, para. 3.1. Emergency relief is financed through a small Special Relief Fund, which is mostly an instrument of solidarity as it only provides grants of US$1 million. Implementing agencies can be either the government, a UN specialized agency, or NGOs.

  43. 43.

    In contrast, the World Bank did not deal directly with the Transitional Federal Government, but only later with Somalia’s Federal Government established in 2012. On the World Bank’s engagement in Somalia under OP 2.30, see also supra Sect. 2.1 in Chap. 5.

  44. 44.

    ADB Disaster and Emergency Assistance Policy, OM Section D7/BP (June 15, 2004), para. 26 (i) and the according Operational Procedures (OM Section D7/OP), para. 7 (ii).

  45. 45.

    See ADB Disaster and Emergency Assistance Policy, paras. 20–25 on the scope and conditions of Emergency Assistance Loans (EALs). Notably, though a portion of ADB’s resources can also be provided in the form of grants, EALs are still loans for which the government or the “legitimate governing authority” would need to assume financial liability.

  46. 46.

    ADB Agreement, Art. 14 (iii) and 36 (2).

  47. 47.

    AfDB Presidential Directive No.03/2010 concerning Continuity of Operations and Engagement with De facto Governments in Regional Member Countries, issued by the President on October 20, 2010. Some smaller differences concern, for instance, the requirement for AfDB’s Management to inform the Board, which is not spelled out but practiced by the World Bank under OP 7.30. Moreover, the Directive states that new operations with a de facto government could also be implemented by the UN or another emergency assistance agency, which would again reduce the role that the de facto government would play during implementation (para. 13).

  48. 48.

    AfDB De Facto Governments Directive No.03/2010, para. 9.

  49. 49.

    Memo of the General Counsel re De Facto Governments, dated 16 August 2000, with attached ADB Guidelines on Dealings with De Facto Governments.

  50. 50.

    African Development Fund, ‘Strategy for Enhanced Engagement in Fragile States’.

  51. 51.

    Asian Development Bank, ‘Operational Plan for Enhancing ADB’s Effectiveness in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations’ and Asian Development Bank, ‘Working Differently in Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations—The ADB Experience: A Staff Handbook’.

  52. 52.

    Approved in August 2016, the World Bank’s new “Environmental and Social Framework” consolidates pre-existing requirements in the areas of environmental and social protection. It is expected to take effect in early 2018.

  53. 53.

    FSF Legal Note, para. 1.1.

  54. 54.

    Supra Sect. 2.1 of this chapter.

  55. 55.

    FSF Legal Note, para. 6.1 and 2.2.

  56. 56.

    African Development Fund, ‘Strategy for Enhanced Engagement in Fragile States’, para. 3.10.

  57. 57.

    See the Report from the African Development Fund’s 13th Replenishment, ADF-13 Report on Supporting Africa’s Transformation, para. 4.21. The importance of the CPIA-based classification of a country as fragile in the eligibility criteria has thus been further reduced, and merely acts as one possible reference point for staff.

  58. 58.

    See Asian Development Bank, ‘Achieving Development Effectiveness in Weakly Performing Countries. The Asian Development Bank’s Approach to Engaging with Weakly Performing Countries’, para. 48, whereby relaxations to business process requirements require would require an approval of Management or the Board of Directors.

  59. 59.

    ADB’s Bank Procedures for Disaster and Emergency Assistance (OM Section D7/ BP), paras. 16, 18, 19.

  60. 60.

    ADB’s Staff Handbook (supra note 51) therefore explicitly states that it does not propose any changes at the level of operational policies and procedures. The recommendations in the Handbook rather concern the provision of policy advice, capacity-building and implementation assistance through ADB staff around the design of projects in fragile states, as well as recommendations concerning the implementation of projects in weak-capacity, high-risk environments.

  61. 61.

    In 2012, the EU provided US$5599 Million to fragile states. OECD, ‘States of Fragility. Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions’, p. 119, Figure B.5.

  62. 62.

    Dann, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, pp. 339, 384, describes the EU’s law for planning and implementing development cooperation as being “diplomatically oriented”.

  63. 63.

    Political principles entered into the Cotonou Agreement despite the reservations of ACP states, an expression of power asymmetries. See the Communication to the Council and the European Parliament: Guidelines for the Negotiation of New Cooperation agreements with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Countries, COM (97) 537 final, 29 October; and on the EU’s motivation for introducing stronger political conditionality, Lorand Bartels, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements (Oxford University Press, 2005), 12–17.

  64. 64.

    Supra Sect. 2.1 in Chap. 3. Dann argues that the explicit commitment of EU development cooperation to political values marks a decisive change after the Cold War, when it became increasingly accepted to limit recipients’ sovereignty by linking aid to political goals. Dann, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, pp. 178–179.

  65. 65.

    Council Conclusions on a EU Response to Situations of Fragility, 2831st External Relations Council meeting in Brussels, 19–20 November 2007, para. 2. The Conclusions further outline the basic functions of the state in terms of “rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, security and safety of its population, poverty reduction, service delivery, the transparent and equitable management of resources and access to power”.

  66. 66.

    For the EU, “difficult partners” are countries where cooperation has been suspended, national authorities are not committed to poverty reduction and basic political principles, and where the dialogue on participation of non-state actors in development is very limited. See the Commission Communication on the Thematic Programme “Non-State actors and local authorities in development cooperation”, COM(2006) 19 (25 January 2006).

  67. 67.

    Cotonou Agreement, Art. 8 (6). The format of the Dialogue is very flexible, and formal or informal according to what is appropriate and required.

  68. 68.

    Cotonou Agreement, Art. 8 (2) and (3). The objective of facilitating mutual understanding concerns all aspects of the Agreement and basically any other question of common interest. See also the guidelines for the Political Dialogue established in the Resolution on the ACP-EU political dialogue (Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement), OJ C 80/17 (1.4.2005).

  69. 69.

    Cotonou Agreement, Art. 8 (4) and Art. 9 (4). Similar commitments are included in Art. 3 (1) of the DCI Regulation, and in separate partnership and cooperation agreements concluded with non-ACP-countries.

  70. 70.

    Cotonou Agreement, Art. 8 (5).

  71. 71.

    Communication from the Commission to the Council, Towards an EU Response to Situations of Fragility, para. 4.7, stating that addressing fragility demands “promoting political will for reform through dialogue and incentives, rather than through conditionality and sanction”.

  72. 72.

    Cotonou Agreement, Art. 96 (2) lit. a), which also establishes some procedural requirements for consultations. Good governance is not an essential element, but only a ‘fundamental element’ of the Agreement, and violations in this regard—namely cases of corruption—are dealt with under Art. 97 of the Agreement, establishing a similar procedure that has rarely been used. Specific suspension clauses are also included in partnership and cooperation agreements with non-ACP countries.

  73. 73.

    There are Council Conclusions for each case under Article 96, so what countries are subject to special measures is publically available information.

  74. 74.

    Cotonou Agreement, Art. 96 (2) lit. c).

  75. 75.

    Cotonou Agreement, Art. 8 (2) and Art. 96 1a and (2) lit. a).

  76. 76.

    James Mackie & Julia Zinke, European Centre for Development Policy Management, Discussion Paper No. 64A, ‘When Agreement Breaks Down, What Next? The Cotonou Agreement’s Article 96 Consultation Procedure’ (2005), 5. Since the mid-term review of the Cotonou Agreement in 2005, the ACP group as a whole can assume a role in the consultations, so that individual ACP states are no longer alone in negotiating with the EU.

  77. 77.

    Article 96 procedures were used mostly in response to alleged violations of democratic principles (often coup d’états) and human rights, for instance, in Zimbabwe and Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia, Guinea, Togo, Haiti and the Fiji Islands. See Evaluation Services of the EU, Evaluation of Co-ordination and Coherence in the Application of Article 96 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, 2007; and with an overview and discussion of cases between 1996 and 2004, Andrew Bradley, European Centre for Development Policy Management, Discussion Paper No. 64D, ‘An ACP Perspective and Overview of Article 96 Cases’ (August 2005).

  78. 78.

    The case of Zimbabwe, for instance, is often cited as a negative example. In Zimbabwe, the EU invoked Art. 96 in 2002, but its measures have remained without impact and only negatively affected EU-Africa relations prior to the 2002 elections. On the factors that are seen to contribute to successful consultations, see Mackie & Zinke, ‘When Agreement Breaks Down, What Next? The Cotonou Agreement’s Article 96 Consultation Procedure’, 8.

  79. 79.

    For a detailed analysis and evaluation of OP 7.30 see supra Sect. 2 in Chap. 5.

  80. 80.

    Further latitude consists in the fact that World Bank staff can practically invoke OP 7.30 without making a final decision on the continuation of operations for indefinite times. Somewhat similarly, the EU is not required to establish the duration of ‘appropriate measures’ ahead, to provide an exit plan, or to resume consultations before measures are prolonged.

  81. 81.

    For a detailed reconstruction and analysis of the EU’s engagement in Somalia, see Emma Visman, European Center for Development Policy Management, ECDPM Working Paper Number 66, ‘Cooperation with Politically Fragile Countries: Lessons from EU Support to Somalia’ (1998).

  82. 82.

    On the National Authorising Officer, see Cotonou Agreement, Art. 35. During the 1995 mid-term amendment of Lomé IV, a provision was added to enable Somalia to accede the Convention as soon as it had formed a government—and in that case, to postpone the application of certain rights and obligations under the Convention in the interest of Somalia. See Agreement Amending the Fourth ACP-EC Convention of Lomé, November 1995, Art. 364a.

  83. 83.

    Cotonou Agreement, Art. 93 (6).

  84. 84.

    Cotonou Agreement, Annex IV (Implementation and Management Procedures), Art. 3 (3). In fact, this arrangement was not only used in the absence of a central government in Somalia, but also in Sudan, where the EU was unwilling to engage with the government for political reasons. See Sophie Gomes, et al., European Center for Development Policy Management ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 31, ‘The EU’s Response to Conflict Affected Countries Operational Guidance for the Implementation of the Cotonou Agreement’.

  85. 85.

    ACP-EC Council of Ministers Decision No 3/2001 on the allocation of resources to Somalia from the 8th and 9th European Development Fund, OJ L 56, 27.2.2002, p. 23.

  86. 86.

    Cotonou Agreement, Annex IV, Art. 4 (5).

  87. 87.

    The World Bank has adopted OP 2.30 to enable engagement in the absence of a government, at the request of the international community, and OP 10.00 to permit the use of alternative implementation arrangements in weak-capacity environments. See supra Sects. 2.1 and 3.1 in Chap. 5.

  88. 88.

    On the differences between development and humanitarian aid concerning the role of the state, see Marie von Engelhardt, ‘Reflections on the Role of the State in the Legal Regimes of International Aid’, 71 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 451 (2011); or Paul Harvey, Overseas Development Institute, HPG Report 29, ‘Towards Good Humanitarian Government. The Role of the Affected State in Disaster Response’ (September 2009), pp. 21–24.

  89. 89.

    Cotonou Agreement, Art. 72 (6)

  90. 90.

    Communication from the Commission to the Council, Towards an EU Response to Situations of Fragility, para. 4.2.

  91. 91.

    Cotonou Agreement, Art. 58 (2). Arguably, the above-cited provision in Annex IV of the Cotonou Agreement, Art. 3 (4) could be referred to in order to circumvent the requirement of approval in such situations.

  92. 92.

    Though laid out in the DCI Regulation, Thematic Programmes are cross-cutting and can also be used in cooperation with ACP countries. They are subsidiary to the EU’s Geographic Programmes. See Sandra Bartelt, ‘The Institutional Interplay Regarding the New Architecture for the EC’s External Assistance’, 14 European Law Journal, 655 (2008), 672.

  93. 93.

    DCI Regulation, Art. 6 (2) lit. a) and Annex II B. See also the Commission Communication on the Thematic Programme “Non-State actors and loc al authorities in development cooperation”, which establishes the particular suitability of the Programme for “difficult partnerships”, post-conflict or fragile states.

  94. 94.

    See EU Regulation No. 235/2014 on establishing a financing instrument for democracy and human rights worldwide and EU Regulation No. 236/2014 laying down common rules and procedures for the implementation of the Union’s instruments for financing external action (22 March 2014), Art. 11 on eligibility. The EIDHR is managed by the European Commission and its delegations in the field.

  95. 95.

    E.g. Will Hout, ‘Between Development and Security: the European Union, Governance and Fragile States’ 31 Third World Quarterly, 147 (2010), 154–55, criticizing the EU’s focus on government actors and formal institutions in the context of development cooperation with fragile states.

  96. 96.

    On the challenges of engaging particularly with local non-state actors in Somalia, see Visman, ‘Cooperation with Politically Fragile Countries: Lessons from EU Support to Somalia’.

  97. 97.

    The external evaluation commissioned by the EU Commission, Evaluation of EC Aid Delivery Through Civil Society Organizations” (December 2008), identifies major gaps between the EU’s commitments towards civil society participation and actual implementation practices.

  98. 98.

    For instance, the Communication from the Commission, Towards an EU Response to Situations of Fragility—Engaging in Difficult Environments for Sustainable Development, Stability and Peace, Brussels, 25.10.2007, COM(2007) 643; and Council Conclusions on a EU Response to Situations of Fragility, 2831st External Relations Council meeting in Brussels, 19–20 November 2007. See also supra Sect. 3.2 in Chap. 3.

  99. 99.

    For instance, the World Bank’s regime for project lending is particularly front-loading in terms of requirements that concern the institutions and policies of potential recipient countries, requirements that have proven unrealistic and inadequate for engaging with fragile states. See supra Sect. 3 in Chap. 5.

  100. 100.

    This is true both for the Cotonou Agreement and the Regulations that govern EU assistance to non-ACP states. For a comprehensive analysis of the EU’s legal regimes for project lending and budget assistance, see Dann, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, pp. 383–397.

  101. 101.

    Eligibility criteria for budget assistance broadly refer to the “relevance” and “credibility” of a proposed government strategy. See the EU Commission’s Budget Support Guidelines, Executive Guide (September 2012).

  102. 102.

    See supra Sect. 3.1 of this chapter, where I elaborate how the EU makes use of the discretion accorded under Art. 96 of the Cotonou Agreement.

  103. 103.

    Cotonou Agreement, Art. 2. Also DCI Regulation, Art. 3 (2); and the European Consensus on Development, paras. 56–66. On the meaning and scope of differentiation in EU development cooperation, see also ECDPM, European Centre for Development Policy Management, Discussion Paper No.134, ‘Differentiation in ACP-EU Cooperation. Implications of the EU’s Agenda for Change for the 11th EDF and Beyond’ (October 2012).

  104. 104.

    Cotonou Agreement, Annex IV, Art. 3 (1) and DCI Regulation, Art. 3 (2).

  105. 105.

    A similar pattern can be found in the Cotonou Agreement. Art. 56 (1) lit. b) contains, first, a general commitment to flexibility and adaptability for all ACP states, Art. 56 (2) requires, second, special treatment specifically for LDCs, and third, acknowledges and differentiates with regards to the specific needs of post-conflict countries.

  106. 106.

    E.g. DCI Regulation, Art. 3 (2), whereby “countries most in need”, including in particular countries in fragile situations, “shall be given priority in the resource allocation process”; and Art. 12, establishing special provisions for programming in countries or regions in crisis, post-crisis, or situations of fragility.

  107. 107.

    Regulation No. 230/2014 establishing an Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (March 11, 2014), OJ L77/1, hereinafter IcSP Regulation. The IcSP succeeds the Instrument for Stability (IfS) of 2006. The EU has further established an African Peace Facility, under which development funds of the EDF are used to support African-led peacekeeping operations and capacity-building initiatives on the African continent.

  108. 108.

    IcSP Regulation, Art. 1 (4) and Art. 3 specify the objectives and types of support in response to situations of crisis, emerging crisis, or to prevent conflicts. It is complementary to the EU’s other financial instruments, and applicable where other instruments cannot be used within the necessary timeframe.

  109. 109.

    See the 2011 EU Agenda for Chan ge; and the Instructions for the Programming of the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) and the Development Cooper ation Instrument (DCI)—2014–2020 (Brussels, 15 May 2013), prepared by the EEAS and EuropeAid. Both documents highlight that EU support in the future will focus on those countries most in need, including fragile states, and therefore increase the flexibility and context-specific differentiation of aid levels, instruments, and modalities.

  110. 110.

    See the Communication (October 2011) and corresponding Council Conclusions (May 2012) on “The Future Approach to EU Budget Support to Third Countries”, which is reflected in the Commission’s Budget Support Guidelines (supra note 101), p. 10.

  111. 111.

    On the World Bank’s approach to risk-management particularly in fragile states, see supra Sect. 3 in Chap. 5.

  112. 112.

    EU Agenda for Change, p. 5.

  113. 113.

    Supra note 44.

  114. 114.

    Boisson de Chazournes, ‘Partnerships, Emulation, and Coordination: Toward the Emergence of a Droit Commun in the Field of Development Finance’, 175.

  115. 115.

    Fernanda Faria & Andrew Sherriff, European Centre for Development Policy Management, ‘EU Policies to Address Fragility in Sub-Saharan Africa. European Report on Development Background Paper’ (2009), 11.

  116. 116.

    Sub-national conflicts are, however, widespread in the region, and considered to lead to regionally confined situations of fragility. See Thomas Parks, et al., The Asia Foundation, ‘The Contested Corners of Asia—Subnational Conflict and International Development Assistance’ (2013).

  117. 117.

    For example, Asian Development Bank, ‘Working Differently in Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations—The ADB Experience: A Staff Handbook’, para. 22. On the ADB’s institutional culture, see also J. Jokinen, Balancing between East and West. The Asian Development Bank’s Policy on Good Governance, in: Morten Boas & Desmond McNeill (eds), Global Institutions and Development. Framing the World? (Routledge, 2004), pp. 137–150. The authors show how the ADB’s approach to good governance was influenced by its specific political and institutional environment, and the importance given to its apolitical mandate in particular.

  118. 118.

    The culture of risk-aversion is so dominant at the World Bank and other MDBs that it hardly matters that fragile states most often receive funding from the IDA, which does not invest on global financial markets itself, or from other sources such as trust funds.

  119. 119.

    Moreover, the EU maintains a strong focus on security aspects in development cooperation with fragile states. See Will Hout, ‘EU Statebuilding Through Good Governance’, in David Chandler & Timothy Sisk (eds), Routledge Handbook on International Statebuilding (Routledge, 2013).

  120. 120.

    In contrast, the AfDB has “a large and dispersed ownership with no single member or group playing a pivotal role”, which can also be said for the ADB. E. Philip English & Harris M. Mule, The African Development Bank (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), pp. 1, 39–48.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Berlin, Germany

    Marie von Engelhardt

Authors
  1. Marie von Engelhardt
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

von Engelhardt, M. (2018). A Comparison with the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the European Union. In: International Development Organizations and Fragile States. Governance and Limited Statehood. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62695-6_6

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation