Abstract
Basing the analysis on a thorough discussion of the concepts of deterrence and extended deterrence, the chapter examines the implications of the nuclear first-use option and presents possible ways to overcome the potentially catastrophic consequences of this high-risk strategy. Indeed, once one side adopts a strategy for the possibility of waging a nuclear war, the opposite side cannot but feel itself subject to at least potential threats. A strong case is therefore made that the abolition of the first-use option would be a major positive step towards the longer-term objective of complete nuclear disarmament.
Originally published in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf, eds., The Arms Race in an Era of Negotiations (London: Macmillan and New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991): 20–25.
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Notes
- 1.
Reprinted in George F. Kennan, The Nuclear Delusion: Soviet-American Relations in the Atomic Age (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982): 3–4.
- 2.
Ibid., 106.
- 3.
Ibid., 4.
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Liru, C. (2018). The Problem of the Nuclear First-Use Option. In: Foradori, P., Giacomello, G., Pascolini, A. (eds) Arms Control and Disarmament. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62259-0_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62259-0_12
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Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
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