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Approaching the Mind

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The Non-Reificatory Approach to Belief

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Abstract

In this chapter I introduce the project, clear up some of the terminology (explaining what I mean by the term “reification” in particular), and sketch some of the arguments. To reify beliefs is to treat them as some sort of thing, in the same sense that to reify an object’s centre of gravity would be to treat it as an object in its own right, rather than a mere location. The majority of mainstream theorists reify mental states. After explaining this I run through some of the problems with this kind of view, give a rough sketch of the alternative, non-reificatory approach, and explain how things will proceed.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Lancaster, Lancaster, Lancashire, UK

    Richard Floyd

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  1. Richard Floyd
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Correspondence to Richard Floyd .

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Floyd, R. (2017). Approaching the Mind. In: The Non-Reificatory Approach to Belief . Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59873-4_1

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