The Concept of Anxiety and Kant

Abstract

In this chapter, I will outline the beginnings of Kierkegaard’s or Haufniensis’ solution to a problem faced by Kant—the problem of how it is possible freely to do wrong. Kant has difficulty, as many have suggested, explaining the possibility of freely doing wrong, for he frequently argues that freedom and the moral law reciprocally imply one another (See Alison Assiter, “Kant and Kierkegaard on Freedom and Evil,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 72 (July 2013): 275–296 for some discussion of attempts to solve this problem for Kant).I will suggest that Kierkegaard, or Haufniensis, in The Concept of Anxiety offers an approach to freedom that does not lead to Kant’s problem but that maintains Kant’s conception of freedom. The Concept of Anxiety displays the influence of Schelling. In The Concept of Axiety, Haufniensis refers to Schelling a number of times. I would like to look, in this chapter, at The Concept of Axiety and the story of Adam and Eve.