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How to Complete a Union that Is Built to Last

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Sustainable Growth in the EU

Abstract

This paper assesses the proposals in the 5 Presidents’ Report on the future of the EMU. The evolution of EU institutions during the crisis is assessed along with the proposals concerning in particular fiscal policy and economic policy decisions. A discrepancy in the concreteness of the mapping for the final move towards common decision taking is documented, with the path towards common decision taking in the dimension of fiscal policy being spelled out in more detail. An effort to eliminate this disparity with respect to economic policies is proposed, as is a deadlock breaking rule that will affect the formation of expectations and that is compatible with the evolution of the Community Method and the Principle of Subsidiarity.

The views expressed are not necessarily those of the employer.

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Acknowledgements

We thank participants at the XXVIII (2016) Villa Mondragone International Economic Seminar for their comments and input. Remaining errors and omissions are ours.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, 5 Xenofontos str., Athens, 105 57, Greece

    Michael Mitsopoulos

  2. University of Piraeus, 21 Lambraki Ave., Piraeus, 185 33, Greece

    Theodore Pelagidis

  3. Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., USA

    Theodore Pelagidis

Authors
  1. Michael Mitsopoulos
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  2. Theodore Pelagidis
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Michael Mitsopoulos .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. FUET, Economics Foundation, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Rome, Italy

    Luigi Paganetto

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Mitsopoulos, M., Pelagidis, T. (2017). How to Complete a Union that Is Built to Last. In: Paganetto, L. (eds) Sustainable Growth in the EU. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52018-6_4

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