Abstract
The postulates of rational preference suggested by Von Neumann and Morgenstern have been defended as descriptive or empirical generalizations and as normative principles. It is argued that the postulates are inaccurate empirical generalizations and unacceptable normative principles.
Michalos, A.C.: 1967. Postulates of rational preference. Philosophy of Science, 34, pp. 18–22. © Reprint from Philosophy of Science—Printed in USA.
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Notes
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It should be mentioned that Anatol Rapoport has defended roughly the same position for a different reason in Rapoport (1964, 1965), pp. 19 ff. Rapoport claims that the Von Neumann and Morgenstem postulates lead to a “useless” normative utility theory because the theory “assumes as given what, according to the theory of decision under risk, is supposed to be calculated from other givens.” (Rapoport 1964, p. 21). In short, the “completeness” assumption renders the resulting utility theory “useless” according to Rapoport.
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I wish to thank the referees for their helpful suggestions.
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Michalos, A.C. (2017). Postulates of Rational Preference. In: Philosophical Foundations of Quality of Life. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50727-9_7
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