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Reforming the Fiscal Constitution: Holding Politicians Accountable Through Greater Transparency

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Law and Economics in Europe and the U.S.

Part of the book series: The European Heritage in Economics and the Social Sciences ((EHES,volume 18))

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Abstract

In this chapter, we argue that in order to restore relevance to the executive phase of the budget process, it needs to provide better information to citizens regarding the options available for closing the gap between revenues and expenditures. We outline a proposal whereby the executive would have to make clear his/her priorities by designating spending as either revenue or deficit financed, and submitting a 5-year balanced budget plan within his/her budget recommendation. The legislative body (or bodies) would then be required to enunciate how their preferences differ from those of the executive in their respective budget resolutions. We contend that such a process would be more transparent, better enabling citizens to hold politicians accountable.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC, USA

    James W. Douglas

  2. Ragnar Nurkse School of Innovation and Governance, Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia

    Ringa Raudla

  3. School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA

    Robert S. Kravchuk

Authors
  1. James W. Douglas
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  2. Ringa Raudla
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  3. Robert S. Kravchuk
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to James W. Douglas .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Universitè de Montpellier, LAMETA-CNRS, Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  2. Università del Piemonte Orientale , Alessandria, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

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Douglas, J.W., Raudla, R., Kravchuk, R.S. (2016). Reforming the Fiscal Constitution: Holding Politicians Accountable Through Greater Transparency. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G. (eds) Law and Economics in Europe and the U.S.. The European Heritage in Economics and the Social Sciences, vol 18. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47471-7_5

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