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Global Rivalry

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The Theory of International Business
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Abstract

Global rivalry is a key element in international business (IB). This is particularly true in high-technology industries where substantial sunk costs are committed to R&D. The same applies to marketing-intensive industries where firms invest in trademarks and brands. When two firms are rivals, success often depends on first-mover advantage. Economists analyse this situation using game theory. This chapter introduces the methods of game theory and illustrates its application to IB. It shows that game theory provides an intellectually rigorous foundation for the analysis of global rivalry in IB.

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Casson, M. (2016). Global Rivalry. In: The Theory of International Business. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32297-1_8

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