Abstract
Investment equilibrium analysis constitutes a useful framework for regulators to gain insights into the behavior of strategic producers and the evolution of generation investment in an electricity market. Such a perspective enables regulators to design better market rules, which in turn may contribute to increasing the competitiveness of the market and to stimulating investment in generation capacity. This chapter provides a methodology based on optimization and complementarity modeling for identifying generation investment equilibria in a network-constrained electricity market.
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Conejo, A.J., Baringo, L., Kazempour, S.J., Siddiqui, A.S. (2016). Investment Equilibria. In: Investment in Electricity Generation and Transmission. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29501-5_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29501-5_6
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