Abstract
In the liberal legal system of the Republic of Croatia, the Constitutional Court affirmed that even extremely serious public interests cannot justify interference with the core area of private life, which is protected as absolutely inviolable by the guarantee of human dignity. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia holds that human dignity is absolutely protected and nonderogable and cannot be compared. The principle of human dignity serves as protection against aggression from and domination by other subjects. The understanding that human dignity constitutes a limitation on each individual’s liberty is not accepted.
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Notes
- 1.
Consel d’Etat conveys this as the thrust of its judgement KA and AD v Belgium of 17 February 2005 (No 42758/98), in which the primacy of the principle of self-determination over that of the protection of human dignity was clearly asserted.
- 2.
The French Constitutional Council made the protection of human dignity a principle of constitutional value, the basis of which was found in the Preamble of the 1946 Constitution (CC, No 94-343/344 DC of 27 July 1994 and No 94-359 DC of 19 January 1995). Meanwhile, in Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge of 27 October 1995 (No 136727) the Conseil d’Etat made human dignity a component of public policy.
- 3.
Furthermore, ‘It would therefore appear to be difficult to base a system of prohibition on grounds that may lend themselves to a range of different interpretations. In practice, such interpretations are inevitably subjective, being influenced inter alia by circumstances of time and place, as demonstrated by the different perceptions of the image society projects of the (often naked) female body. The basis of the protection of dignity is therefore legally debatable, given the range of circumstances to be taken into account, and particularly in the event that a person who has reached the age of majority deliberately chooses to wear the full veil’. The Law was nevertheless approved – see Sect. 1, 2, and 3 (w.e.f. 11 April 2011), Law no. 2010-1192 from 11 October 2010, ‘prohibiting the concealment of one’s face in public places’. In S.A.S. v. FRANCE (Application no. 43835/11) from 2014, the ECtHR confirmed the Law’s compatibility with the Convention, even if it did refuse to accept human dignity as the basis for such a confirmation of conventionality for the French prohibition of the face veil.
- 4.
Alexy (2014) emphasizes that ‘Constitutional rights indeed do make a part of positive law, meaning positive law on the constitutional level, but that is not enough to explain their nature. Positivity is only one side to the constitutional rights, namely their real or factual side. Over and above that, they possess an ideal dimension. The reason behind this is that constitutional rights are rights written down in a constitution with the intent to transform human rights into positive law; i.e., with the intent to positivize human rights. This intent is often actually or subjectively possessed by constitution-makers. In addition, this is a claim necessarily uttered by those establishing the constitutional rights catalogue. In this sense, it is an objective intent. Human rights are first and foremost – moral, secondly – universal, thirdly – fundamental, fourthly – abstract rights which, fifthly – enjoy priority in relation to all other norms’.
- 5.
Aharon Barak (2006) states that constitutional judges get their guiding North Star leading them to democratic constitutional values and principles as bases for constitutional interpretation. What is the relationship between the constitutional order and the ethical order of values? ‘A judge’s role is to give effect to democracy by deciding according to democratic values and fundamental principles. In my eyes, fundamental principles (or values) fill the normative world of democracy. They justify legal norms. They are the reasons behind their amendment. They are l’esprit (voluntas) uniting the substance (verba). Every norm created in a democracy was created against the background of these values’.
- 6.
The criterion of lex posterior (chronological principle) is inapplicable here because we are dealing with contemporary principles. Lex superior (hierarchical principle) also cannot be used, since both principles enjoy the same status in the hierarchy of legal sources. Lex specialis is ruled out due to the overlap between the two classes of facts regulated by the constitutional principles.
- 7.
Baer emphasizes that history never points in one single direction, so that Germany invokes dignity against the Holocaust, Canada cites equality against historical disadvantages suffered by groups, and freedom of religion or speech shields against past oppression by authoritarian political regimes.
- 8.
Constitutionality review of amendments to the Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities (Official Gazette No. 80/10), Decision No. U-I-3597/2010, U-I-3847/2010, U-I-692/2011, U-I-898/2011 and U-I-994/2011, 29 July 2011, pt. 30.1.
- 9.
Dreier, in: id. (ed.), GG, vol. 2, 3rd ed., 2015, Art.79 III, para. 26 with further references.
- 10.
Decision of the CCRC No. U-VIIR-1159/2015 of 8 April 2015 (Official Gazette No. 43/15) establishing that the referendum question dealing with ’outsourcing’ is not in compliance with the Constitution: “33.4 In the constitutional legal order of the Republic of Croatia that is in force today, the Constitutional Court decides whether referendum questions are in compliance with the Constitution. However, the framer of the Constitution has not explicitly specified the issues that are under the exclusive competence of a body of representative democracy. They are derived from the Constitution as a whole.
Indeed, when we speak about amending the Constitution it is the Constitutional Court’s obligation, on the basis of general control powers, not to allow any referendum ‘when it determines such a formal and/or substantive unconstitutionality of the referendum question, or such a grave procedural error that threatens to undermine the structural characteristics of the Croatian constitutional state, i.e., its constitutional identity, including the highest values of the constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia (Articles 1 and 3 of the Constitution) ... In such cases, the Constitutional Court, in its assessment, takes into account the Constitution in its entirety.”
- 11.
National report, Croatia (2017) states: ‘Although the Constitution does not expressis verbis determine the highest values of the constitutional order as principles, functionally they are principles. These are ethical values generally accepted both in society and in law. They are given a regulative role sui generis, and constitutionally defined as the basis for its interpretation, thus making it possible for the Constitutional Court to interpret the constitutional provisions progressively and dynamically in the light of these ‘living’ and conceptually and methodologically complex value concepts. Namely, these principles make it possible for judges to adjudicate not only on the facts but also on points of law and to therefore apply these principles to avoid unacceptable and unforeseeable consequences of the application of some positive law provisions. This provision provides the Constitution with a certain flexibility it would otherwise not have’.
- 12.
Grimm notes that the German Constitutional Court needed the notion of objective values in order to demonstrate that fundamental rights were not restricted to vertical application, but that they contain a duty to protect (Schutzpflicht) which includes all mechanisms for the protection of fundamental rights against threats by not only the state, but also private actors, societal forces or even social developments controllable by state action (Grimm 2003, p. 105).
- 13.
Citation from the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, Decision No. U-I-60/1991, U-I-94/1991, U-I-173/1995, U-I-39/2008 U-I-5089/2016,U-I-5639/2016 and U-I-5807/2016, from 21 February 2017 (Official Gazette No. 25/2017). National report, Croatia (2017, pp. 9–10) notes that ‘The Constitutional Court confirmed this position in its decision and ruling no. U-I-3597/2010 et al. of 29 September 2011 (Official Gazette 93/11) by stating: “38. (…) The Constitutional Court also examined...starting from the structural integrity of the constitutional text from which results the objective order of values that the Constitutional Court has the duty to protect and promote (…)’.
In addition, in its Decision No. U-IP-3820/2009, U-IP-3826/2009 et al. from 17 November 2009 (Official Gazette No. 143/09), the Constitutional Court noted: ‘11. (…) When reviewing the constitutionality of a law, the Constitutional Court starts from a comprehensive approach to the Constitution and it views its provisions as an integral whole. This also means that the Constitutional Court examines two classic groups of rights enshrined in the Constitution (the group of personal, civil and political rights, and the group of social, economic and cultural rights) as an integral whole, i.e., as coordinated and equally important protected goods’.
- 14.
Official Journal of the European Union, C 83/389, 30 March 2010: ‘Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected’.
Art.2 of the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) states: ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail’.
- 15.
A position expressed in Lebach (BVerfGE 35, 202 /Lebach/ - Urteil des Ersten Senats vom 5. Juni 1973 auf die mündliche Verhandlung vom 2. und 3. Mai 1973–1 BvR 536/72): ‘In case of conflict the court must adjust both constitutional values, if possible; if this cannot be achieved, the court must determine which interest will defer to the other in the light of the nature of the case and its special circumstances. In so doing, the court must consider both constitutional values in their relation to human dignity as the nucleus of the Constitution’s value system’.
- 16.
Loi relative à l’interruption volontaire de grossesse et à la contraception. Commentaire de la décision no 2001–446 DC du 27 juin 2001.
- 17.
It deems constitutional the legislative solution whereby termination of pregnancy can be performed upon the woman’s request up to the end of the 10th week of pregnancy (and after that upon consent of a competent body, but only if there are medical indications to conclude that there is no alternative means of saving the woman’s life or preventing deterioration in her health during pregnancy, birth of after birth, if there’s an expectation that the baby will be born with severe physical or mental deformities, if conception was a result of the commission of certain criminal acts [Article 22 of the Act], that is if there is an immediate danger to the life or health of the pregnant woman or if the termination of pregnancy has already commenced [Article 25 of the Act]).
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Kostadinov, B. (2019). Human Dignity in Croatia. In: Becchi, P., Mathis, K. (eds) Handbook of Human Dignity in Europe. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28082-0_7
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