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Practical and Provably Secure Distance-Bounding

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Book cover Information Security

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7807))

Abstract

From contactless payments to remote car unlocking, many applications are vulnerable to relay attacks. Distance bounding protocols are the main practical countermeasure against these attacks. At FSE 2013, we presented SKI as the first family of provably secure distance bounding protocols. At LIGHTSEC 2013, we presented the best attacks against SKI. In this paper, we present the security proofs. More precisely, we explicate a general formalism for distance-bounding protocols. Then, we prove that SKI and its variants is provably secure, even under the real-life setting of noisy communications, against the main types of relay attacks: distance-fraud and generalised versions of mafia- and terrorist-fraud. For this, we reinforce the idea of using secret sharing, combined with the new notion of a leakage scheme. In view of resistance to mafia-frauds and terrorist-frauds, we present the notion of circular-keying for pseudorandom functions (PRFs); this notion models the employment of a PRF, with possible linear reuse of the key. We also use PRF masking to fix common mistakes in existing security proofs/claims.

The full version of this paper is available as [8].

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Due to space constraints, we refer to these papers for an overview of DB protocols.

  2. 2.

    As far as we know, there exists only one other protocol with full provable security. It was presented at ACNS 2013 [12] and compared with SKI at PROVSEC 2013 [17]. All other protocols fail against at least one threat model. (See [7, Section 2].).

  3. 3.

    In this paper, there is just one common input, i.e., we assume \(x=y\).

  4. 4.

    This is to capture distance hijacking [10]. (See [8].).

  5. 5.

    Here, we deviate from Definition 4 a bit by introducing \(P^*(x)\) in the MiM attack.

  6. 6.

    Secret sharing is used to defeat an attack from [16] which is further discussed in [3].

References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Applied Sciences Western Switzerland, Delémont, Switzerland

    Ioana Boureanu

  2. HEIG-VD, Yverdon-les-bains, Switzerland

    Ioana Boureanu

  3. Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden

    Aikaterini Mitrokotsa

  4. Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Lausanne, Switzerland

    Serge Vaudenay

Authors
  1. Ioana Boureanu
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  2. Aikaterini Mitrokotsa
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  3. Serge Vaudenay
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Serge Vaudenay .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas, USA

    Yvo Desmedt

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Boureanu, I., Mitrokotsa, A., Vaudenay, S. (2015). Practical and Provably Secure Distance-Bounding. In: Desmedt, Y. (eds) Information Security. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 7807. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27659-5_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27659-5_18

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-27658-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-27659-5

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