Abstract
The paper examines three innovative issues in the Byzantine commentator which seem to reflect his own views on the common sense power. First, he perceives a gap in Aristotle’s explanation of the double nature of representational images. He points to the common sense power as the factor responsible for our ability to connect representational images to things represented by them. This kind of activity is called additional perception. Second, the identification of the common sense power with touch can be explained with reference to the thesis that animal life is a life of perception and touch is the principle of this life. It may lead to the conclusion that the basic pattern of all sense perception is to be equated with the general way that touch works. Third, Michael endorses the view that the regulative force of the common sense power extends to the ability to stop the individual senses working altogether, as it is clear from the explanation of sleep. In this process, the role of sense organs—both those of the individual senses and the first sense organ—is especially important, which—along with other observations—allows us to conclude that the Byzantine commentator is committed to hylomorphic explanations.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
See the introduction by the editor (Wendland 1903b, v–x).
- 4.
Sophonias also claims that the common sense relies on memory in grasping the things, see his In De anima 107.30–1. References are to page and line of Hayduck (1883).
- 5.
He also follows Aristotle in saying that the first sensory faculty (πρώτη αἰσθητικὴ ψυχή) is settled around the heart (32.25–6).
- 6.
Following Aristotle (450a9–14).
- 7.
ὡς οὖν ἐπὶ τούτων, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ ἐγκατάλειμμα καὶ ζωγράφημα, ὅπερ αὐτὸς φάντασμα εἶπε, δεῖ ὑπολαβεῖν, ὡς ἔστι καὶ αὐτό τι καθ’ αὑτὸ καὶ φύσις τις καὶ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἄλλου φάντασμα, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ τοίχῳ γεγραμμένον· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο αὐτό τι καθ’ αὑτὸ καὶ φύσις τις καὶ προσέτι ἄλλου εἰκών. ὅταν οὖν ἐνεργῇ περὶ αὐτὸ ᾗ αὐτό, θεώρημα τοῦτο ἢ φάντασμα· ὅταν δὲ ἐνεργοῦσα περὶ αὐτὸ ἡ κοινὴ αἴσθησις προσαισθάνηται καὶ ὅτι καὶ ἄλλου ἐστὶν εἰκών, ἤδη τοῦτο καὶ μνημόνευμα, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἐνέργεια τῆς ψυχῆς μνήμη (underlined by me, P. L.). References are to page and line in Wendland (1903a).
- 8.
Aristotle may also use it in 450a21 without specifying its meaning. A further complication is that some mss of the De memoria have προαισθάνεται in 450a21. To judge from Wendland’s critical apparatus, Michael wrote προσαισθάνηται in 15.23. He also probably read προσαισθάνεται in 450a21, although the variant προαισθάνεται occurs.
- 9.
The line of thought is illustrated by a fine diagram in the MSS of Sophonias’ paraphrase of the Parva naturalia (Wendland 1903b, 13) and with some variations in Michael, too, more accessible in the critical apparatus to Wendland’s edition of Michael’s work (1903a, 36), and in Ross (1955, 250). On the various possibilities of interpreting the diagram, see King (2004, 136–138).
- 10.
… ἡ διάνοια καὶ τὸν ΚΘ ΚM προσῃσθάνετο χρόνον.
- 11.
… ἡ γὰρ διάνοια οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ νοῦ μετὰ φαντασίας ἐνέργεια.
- 12.
Or φαντασίαι, since the commentator sometimes uses the term φαντασία to refer to images (12.15, 24; 52.3; In De animalium motione 103.7).
- 13.
In Aristotle, see De memoria 1, 450a8–15, 451a17. In 8.5–6 Michael also stresses that time cannot be perceived directly, only through the object which is in time.
- 14.
I owe this point to Pavel Gregoric.
- 15.
As an exposition of the problem, one may think of the distinction we find in Thomas Aquinas (ST 1a q.85 a.2) between id quo intelligit and id quod intelligitur. It seems that Michael occupies a kind of representationalist position.
- 16.
See, e.g., Feola’s contribution to this volume (Chap. 2).
- 17.
On the other hand, memory is a ἕξις φαντάσματος in so far as it refers to the object in which it originates, see In De animalium motione 103.12–13. That ἕξις means “possession’ here is corroborated by the other definition of memory, to be found in the commentary on De memoria 4.14–15, where we find κατοχή instead of ἕξις. The thesis can be discerned in Aristotle, too, since he also claims (449b24–25) that memory is πάθος or ἕξις of sense-perception or conception (ὑπόληψις). For an interesting parallel, see Theodore Metochites’ Paraphrase of the De memoria. As Bloch shows (2005, 4), Metochites also relies heavily on Michael’s work. He also claims that a φάντασμα is an affection of the common sense (ibid., 15–16). Consequently, he also denies that memory is a capacity of the intellectual faculty. His thesis is that intellectual activities do not involve time, whereas memory does. His main argument seems to be that if memory were a capacity of the intellect, there would be memories of intelligible objects per se and (since intelligible objects are not in time) without a time lapse.
- 18.
References are to page and line in Hayduck (1904).
- 19.
Among them, Michael Psellos also claims that the sense of touch is common to all animals (see his Ἀποριῶν λύσις τελεία καὶ ἀναγκαία (Opuscula 12) in O’Meara (1989, 27.10–11), but he may not want to claim that touch is to be identified with the common sense.
- 20.
As he says in 48.7–8: εἰ δὲ χρὴ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, ἁφὴ καὶ κοινὴ αἴσθησις ταὐτό ἐστιν. On this interpretation see Wiesner (1978, 244–247).
- 21.
See also Giuseppe Feola in Chap. 2 of this volume.
- 22.
See also 455a7 and 27. In the former passage he says that all animals have touch and taste. But he considers taste as a form of touch.
- 23.
He uses the term ὑπάρχει to indicate that touch and common sense obtain together. It does not refer to identity (see Gregoric 2007, 97). Touch and common sense cannot be identical in the strict sense because their sense-organs differ and they have different functions. The central sense-organ is around the heart (Somn. 2, 456a4–5; Juv. 3, 469a4) whereas the organ of touch is either the flesh (Part. an. 2.8, 453b19–27) or, following T. K. Johansen’s suggestion (1998, 202), the role of the primary sense-organ of touch is reserved for the heart, whereas flesh is a secondary organ only. Moreover, at this point one may argue that Aristotle talks about, not the sense, but the organ of touch, see Ross’ paraphrase in his edition (1955, 257). I think it is clear that Michael takes it differently since he does not mention any activity characteristic of the sense-organ in this context. Furthermore, the parallel use of ἁφή in the passage may also corroborate the suggestion that Michael takes Aristotle to speak about the sense.
- 24.
See also De anima 2.2, 413b5–6; 2.3, 415a4–5; 3.13, 435a13–14, where the separability of touch from the other senses is also stressed.
- 25.
See Gregoric (2007, 65–68). He argues that the fact that touch is the most common sense does not imply that the other senses are not common, only that they are less common. It seems that on Michael’s interpretation touch is the only common sense properly speaking since it is the only sense which is common to all species of animals.
- 26.
For Michael’s interpretation of τὸ ἁπτικόν, see the final remark in n20 above and the use of ἁπτικὴ δύναμις in 70.7.
- 27.
Michael is commenting on 2.8, 653b19, where Aristotle starts examining the flesh and claims touch is the primary sense.
- 28.
εἰδοποιεῖται γὰρ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων τὸ ζῷον, ἀλλὰ πρώτως ὑπὸ τῆς πρώτης· αὕτη δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ ἁφή, ἁφῆς δὲ αἰσθητήριον ἡ σάρξ.
- 29.
In Part. an. 84.19–20: ὁμοῦ πάσας τὰς πέντε. The specific term for aggregate, ἄθροισμα, must have been known to Michael since he applies the verb ἀθροίζειν in such a context in In Parva nat. 21.18.
- 30.
ἥτις κοινὴ αἴσθησις μία μέν ἐστι τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ πλείους. In the light of the nature of the distinction, I think that the geometrical metaphor illustrating the relation between the common sense and particular senses—the centre of a circle in which the radii meet (47.30–48.2)—has to be interpreted as a metaphor illustrating the functional differences only, not the structure of the perceptual power as a whole. The metaphor seems to originate in Alexander of Aphrodisias (De anima 63.6–28; De anima liber mantissa 96.14–34; Quaestiones 165.12–20) but survives in Byzantine times as well, see also Sophonias’ In De anima paraphrasis 114.24–8. See also Gregoric (2007, 150–151 with n12) for references to the geometrical metaphor.
- 31.
As he says: ἀλλ’ ὅταν ἡ ἀδυναμία τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι μήτε ἔν τινι τῶν αἰσθητηρίων γένηται (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ πηρωθῆναι τὰ αἰσθητήρια, ἀλλ’ ὅμως οὐδὲ ἡ ἀκινησία τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἡ διὰ πήρωσιν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων γινομένη ὕπνος ἐστίν), ὅταν οὖν μήτε ἔν τινι τῶν αἰσθητηρίων μήτε δι’ ἣν ἔτυχεν αἰτίαν γένηται, οἷον δι’ ἐπίληψιν ἢ κατάληψιν τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐχένι φλεβῶν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ αἰσθητηρίῳ καὶ τῇ πρώτῃ αἰσθήσει, τότ’ ἐστὶν ὁ ὕπνος (underlined by me, P. L.).
- 32.
48.9–10. On this, see the short remark with an exposition of the problem in Heller-Roazen (2009, 67).
- 33.
See 455a34–b1: πεπονθότος τι συμπάσχειν ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα.
- 34.
For important implications of this thesis in Aristotle, see Gregoric (2007, 170–171).
- 35.
See also Sophonias, In De anima paraphrasis 7.10–10.12 (with the possible exception of the intellect) and Theodore Metochites, De memoria (in Bloch 2005, 17). It proves that the hylomorphic treatment of certain psychological phenomena was in use in Byzantine philosophy, although it was clearly neglected in most of the commentators in late antiquity, as has been shown by van der Eijk and Hulskamp (2010). They also show (ibid., 74) that Michael was aware that some of Aristotle’s physiological explanations had become obsolete and supplemented them with Galenic material. But that did not override his commitment to hylomorphic explanations.
- 36.
To reconcile Aristotle’s thesis with Galenic theories Michael admits that the sense-organ of sight and hearing may be in the brain, but it does not mean that the principle of these senses is also in the brain (In Part. an. 44.34–45.1).
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Acknowledgements
I owe much to Pavel Gregoric and Katerina Ierodiakonou, who were most generous in reading the paper and commenting on it. Their suggestions led me to revise my thesis in considerable detail. Thanks are also due to the editors for further clarifications. If any shortcoming has remained, which is no doubt the case, it is mine. My research was facilitated by the Hungarian Research Fund (NKFI 104574).
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Lautner, P. (2018). The Notion of κοινὴ αἴσθησις and Its Implications in Michael of Ephesus. In: Bydén, B., Radovic, F. (eds) The Parva naturalia in Greek, Arabic and Latin Aristotelianism. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 17. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26904-7_3
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