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A Sea of Troubles: International Law and the Spitsbergen Plus Approach to Conflict Management in the South China Sea

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Power Politics in Asia’s Contested Waters

Part of the book series: Global Power Shift ((GLOBAL))

Abstract

The chapter illustrates actors’ claims in the South China Sea dispute from the perspective of international law and subsequently discusses approaches to conflict management. After examining the historical background of the dispute including its major actors and their respective interests, the chapter assesses the claims of the actors involved under international law. Of particular interest in this regard is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Finally, the chapter introduces what might by called the “Spitsbergen Plus Approach” and thus offers an innovative approach to conflict management in the South China Sea.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Cited in Bland (2012).

  2. 2.

    Rudd (2013).

  3. 3.

    Sommer (2014).

  4. 4.

    Taylor (2014).

  5. 5.

    Bader et al. (2014, p. 4), Poling (2013, p. 2), Tønnesson (2012, p. 8).

  6. 6.

    See below.

  7. 7.

    Lam (2013, p. 13).

  8. 8.

    For general information on the “pivot“ and its (unintended) consequences see Glaser (2012b), Manyin et al. (2012), Ross (2012), Lieberthal (2011). For a detailed discussion of the U.S. rebalancing strategy and its impact on the South China Sea dispute see Emmers (2013).

  9. 9.

    Fravel (2011, p. 292).

  10. 10.

    Poling (2013, p. 1).

  11. 11.

    Dutton (2011, p. 42).

  12. 12.

    Hong (2012, p. 6).

  13. 13.

    Beckman (2013b, p. 143).

  14. 14.

    Bader et al. (2014, p. 4).

  15. 15.

    While all islands and other features in the South China Sea (as well as the South China Sea itself) have various names in different languages, the author throughout the text uses the commonly applied English names.

  16. 16.

    Bader et al. (2014, p. 4).

  17. 17.

    Poling (2013, pp. 21–2).

  18. 18.

    Beckman (2013b, p. 145), Poling (2013, p. 27).

  19. 19.

    For the (legal) significance of the distinction between islands, rocks, and other features see below.

  20. 20.

    Beckman (2013b, pp. 143–4), Bader et al. (2014, p. 4).

  21. 21.

    Beckman (2013b, p. 144).

  22. 22.

    Xinhua.net (2012).

  23. 23.

    Bader et al. (2014, p. 4).

  24. 24.

    Beckman (2013a, p. 18).

  25. 25.

    Cited in Fravel (2011, p. 296).

  26. 26.

    For a discussion of ASEAN’s role in the South China Sea dispute sea Collinson and Roberts (2013).

  27. 27.

    Taylor (2014, p. 102).

  28. 28.

    Buszynski (2013, p. 4).

  29. 29.

    For a more detailed history of the dispute see Buszynski (2013), Hong (2012, pp. 12–41), Tønnesson (2008), Tønnesson (2002).

  30. 30.

    Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2011, p. 141).

  31. 31.

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (2013).

  32. 32.

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (2013). By way of comparison, the EIA lists 297 billion barrels in proved crude oil reserves for Venezuela and 1688 trillion cubic feet in proved natural gas resources for Russia as the respective globally leading countries; see U.S. Energy Information Administration 2015.

  33. 33.

    For an estimation of future developments in energy demands see British Petroleum (2014).

  34. 34.

    Beckman (2013b, p. 152).

  35. 35.

    Beckman (2013b, p. 143).

  36. 36.

    Fravel (2011, p. 296), Buszynski (2013, p. 5).

  37. 37.

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (2013).

  38. 38.

    Glaser (2012a).

  39. 39.

    Bader et al. (2014, p. 4).

  40. 40.

    Pham (2014).

  41. 41.

    U.S. Department of State (2010).

  42. 42.

    Schofield (2013, p. 9), Tønnesson (2012, p. 14).

  43. 43.

    Tønnesson (2012, p. 7).

  44. 44.

    Mutual Defense Treaty Between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America, August 30, 1951.

  45. 45.

    Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, January 19, 1960.

  46. 46.

    For the influence of the dispute on the respective allies see Cruz de Castro (2013), Smith (2013), Rowan (2005).

  47. 47.

    Dutton (2011, p. 42).

  48. 48.

    Schofield (2013, p. 10).

  49. 49.

    Dutton (2011, p. 42).

  50. 50.

    United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 516, p. 205.

  51. 51.

    United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 450, p. 11.

  52. 52.

    United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 559, p. 285.

  53. 53.

    United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 499, p. 311.

  54. 54.

    United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1833, p. 3, cited as UNCLOS or Convention.

  55. 55.

    United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (2012).

  56. 56.

    United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (2013a).

  57. 57.

    Schwartz (2014, p. 2), Beckman (2013b, p. 142), Beckman and Bernhard (2011, p. 3).

  58. 58.

    Poling (2013, p. 18).

  59. 59.

    Beckman (2013a, p. 19).

  60. 60.

    Beckman (2013a, p. 19).

  61. 61.

    Taiwan represents a special case in this regard. While Taiwan took part in negotiations of UNCLOS I, the People's Republic of China took its place at negotiations of UNCLOS III in 1982. Under Article 1 (2) UNCLOS, Taiwan cannot become a member of the Convention. However, considering the fact that UNCLOS represents in large parts codification of customary law and enjoys almost universal acceptance, the Convention remains the core point of reference among all claimant states; see Park (2000, p. 14).

  62. 62.

    ASEAN (2014).

  63. 63.

    Rothwell (2013, p. 14).

  64. 64.

    The following is merely a brief overview over the different maritime zones as they are crucial for the dispute in the South China Sea from the perspective of international law. Detailed accounts can be found in Crawford (2012, pp. 255–330) and Tanaka (2012).

  65. 65.

    Art. 5 UNCLOS.

  66. 66.

    Art. 7 UNCLOS.

  67. 67.

    Arts. 8 and 2 (1) UNCLOS.

  68. 68.

    Arts. 46–54 UNCLOS.

  69. 69.

    Art. 3 UNCLOS.

  70. 70.

    Art. 2 (1) UNCLOS.

  71. 71.

    Art. 33 (2) UNCLOS.

  72. 72.

    Art. 33 (1) (a) UNCLOS.

  73. 73.

    Art. 57 UNCLOS.

  74. 74.

    Art. 55 (1) (a) UNCLOS.

  75. 75.

    Art. 60 (1) UNCLOS.

  76. 76.

    See below.

  77. 77.

    Crawford (2012, p. 270).

  78. 78.

    Poling (2013, p. 16).

  79. 79.

    Art. 76 (8) in conjunction with Annex II Art. 4 UNCLOS.

  80. 80.

    United Nations (2001).

  81. 81.

    Tønnesson (2012, p. 8).

  82. 82.

    Art. 78 (1) UNCLOS.

  83. 83.

    Art. 83 UNCLOS.

  84. 84.

    For example, see North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands & Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark), ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3 (February 20, 1969) or the Dispute concerning delimitation of the maritime boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), ITLOS Case No. 16 (March 14, 2012).

  85. 85.

    Art. 87 (1) UNCLOS.

  86. 86.

    Art. 1 (1) UNCLOS.

  87. 87.

    Art. 136 UNCLOS.

  88. 88.

    Art. 140 (1) UNCLOS.

  89. 89.

    Perhaps for this reason, Part XI was one of the most fiercely debated items in the entire negotiation and only an Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (July 7, 1994), UN Doc A/RES/48/263, provided remedy.

  90. 90.

    Crawford (2012, pp. 294–5).

  91. 91.

    For a comprehensive analysis of Art. 121 (3) UNCLOS see Elferink (1998). See also Song (2010).

  92. 92.

    Crawford (2012, pp. 262–3).

  93. 93.

    Hong (2012, p. 50).

  94. 94.

    Art. 13 (1) UNCLOS.

  95. 95.

    Art. 13 (2) UNCLOS.

  96. 96.

    Art. 13 (1) UNCLOS.

  97. 97.

    Art. 60 (4) UNCLOS.

  98. 98.

    Art. 60 (8) UNCLOS.

  99. 99.

    Art. 60 (1) UNCLOS.

  100. 100.

    Beckman (2012, p. 2).

  101. 101.

    Relevant legal provisions adopted by claimant states include for Brunei the Territorial Waters of Brunei Act (1982, revised in 2002); for China the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1992), the Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Baselines of the Territorial (1996), and the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act (1998); for Malaysia the Continental Shelf Act (1966), the Proclamation of the Economic Zone (1978), the Exclusive Economic Zone Act (1984), the Baselines of Maritime Zones Act (2006) and the Territorial Sea Act (2012); for the Philippines the Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines (Republic Act No. 3046, 1961) and An Act to Amend Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as Amended by Republic Act No. 5446, to Define the Archipelagic Baseline of the Philippines and for Other Purposes (Republic Act No. 9522, 2009); for Taiwan the Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of the Republic of China (1998) and the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the Republic of China (1998); and for Vietnam the Statement on the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf (1977) and the Statement of 12 November 1982 by the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam on the Territorial Sea Baseline of Viet Nam (1982), the Maritime Code of Viet Nam (2005), and the Law of the Sea of Viet Nam (2012).

  102. 102.

    Schwartz (2014, p. 1), Poling (2013, p. 2).

  103. 103.

    Schwartz (2014, p. 2).

  104. 104.

    Beckman (2013b, p. 146), Schofield (2013, p. 11).

  105. 105.

    Art. 2 (2) UNCLOS.

  106. 106.

    Roach (2014, p. 36).

  107. 107.

    Schofield (2013, p. 11).

  108. 108.

    Beckman (2013b, p. 146).

  109. 109.

    Dutton (2011, p. 53).

  110. 110.

    Beckman (2013b, p. 148). See also United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (2009a).

  111. 111.

    Beckman (2013b, p. 148).

  112. 112.

    Schofield (2013, p. 11).

  113. 113.

    Beckman (2013b, p. 147).

  114. 114.

    United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (2009b).

  115. 115.

    United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (2009c).

  116. 116.

    United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (2008).

  117. 117.

    Beckman (2013b, p. 148). See also Schofield (2013, p. 11).

  118. 118.

    United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (2009d).

  119. 119.

    Dutton (2011, pp. 44–5).

  120. 120.

    Beckman (2013b, p. 154). The nine-dashed line is also known as the “u-shaped line” or the “nine-dotted line.”

  121. 121.

    Fravel (2011, p. 295).

  122. 122.

    Higgins (2013, p. 54).

  123. 123.

    Tønnesson (2012, p. 9).

  124. 124.

    Beckman (2013b, p. 155), Dutton (2011, p. 50).

  125. 125.

    Beckman (2013b, p. 156).

  126. 126.

    Poling (2013, p. 2), Dutton (2011, p. 45).

  127. 127.

    Tønnesson (2012, p. 10).

  128. 128.

    Beckman (2013b, p. 163); see also Buszynski (2013, p. 7). As shall be argued below, this argumentation is of particular importance regarding the Spratly and Paracel Islands.

  129. 129.

    Supra note 102.

  130. 130.

    For general discussions regarding China’s approach to international law see Saul (2013). Regarding China’s practice in the law of the sea see Xue (2008) and Greenfield (1992).

  131. 131.

    Beckman (2013b, p. 149).

  132. 132.

    Beckman (2013b, p. 151).

  133. 133.

    Beckman and Bernhard (2011, p. 4).

  134. 134.

    Poling (2013, p. 20).

  135. 135.

    Poling (2013, pp. 27–8).

  136. 136.

    Beckman (2013b, p. 151).

  137. 137.

    Beckman (2013b, p. 153).

  138. 138.

    Kivimäki (2002, p. 535).

  139. 139.

    Fravel (2011, pp. 293–4).

  140. 140.

    Supra note 119.

  141. 141.

    Dutton (2011, p. 45).

  142. 142.

    For the following paragraph on possible interpretations of the Chinese notes verbales as well as reactions by other states see Beckman (2013b, pp. 155–6).

  143. 143.

    United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (2011a).

  144. 144.

    United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (2011b).

  145. 145.

    See, for example, Max Huber’s verdict in the Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. USA), Permanent Court of Arbitration 2 U.N. Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 829 (1928).

  146. 146.

    Beckman and Bernhard (2011, p. 5).

  147. 147.

    Beckman (2013b, p. 163).

  148. 148.

    Buszynski (2013, p. 7). For a discussion of the concept of historic waters see Symmons (2008) and Hong (2012, pp. 62–71).

  149. 149.

    United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (2013b).

  150. 150.

    Supra note 102.

  151. 151.

    Buszynski (2013, p. 7).

  152. 152.

    Dutton (2011, p. 50).

  153. 153.

    Buszynski (2013, p. 7).

  154. 154.

    Beckman (2013b, p. 156).

  155. 155.

    Kivimäki (2002, p. 536).

  156. 156.

    Dutton (2011, pp. 51–2).

  157. 157.

    United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (2009e).

  158. 158.

    Beckman (2013b, pp. 152–3).

  159. 159.

    Supra note 11.

  160. 160.

    Taylor (2014, p. 108).

  161. 161.

    Dutton (2011, p. 58).

  162. 162.

    Poling (2013, p. 25).

  163. 163.

    Dutton (2011, pp. 58–9).

  164. 164.

    Poling (2013, p. 2).

  165. 165.

    Beckman (2013b, p. 159).

  166. 166.

    Poling (2013, p. 4).

  167. 167.

    Poling (2013, p. 4).

  168. 168.

    Beckman (2012, p. 2).

  169. 169.

    Cited in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2014a).

  170. 170.

    For general information on dispute settlement and the law of the Sea see Karaman (2012) and Klein (2005).

  171. 171.

    Beckman and Bernhard (2011, p. 10).

  172. 172.

    Art. 74 UNCLOS.

  173. 173.

    Art. 83 UNCLOS.

  174. 174.

    Arts. 279–299 UNCLOS.

  175. 175.

    Art. 123 UNCLOS.

  176. 176.

    Arts. 279–285 UNCLOS.

  177. 177.

    Arts. 286–296 UNCLOS.

  178. 178.

    United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (2013b).

  179. 179.

    Arts. 15, 74, and 83 UNCLOS.

  180. 180.

    For an analysis of the effects of China’s 2006 declaration under Article 298 UNCLOS see Beckman and Bernhard (2011, pp. 14–6).

  181. 181.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2014b).

  182. 182.

    Tønnesson (2012, p. 7).

  183. 183.

    Supra note 161.

  184. 184.

    For proposals towards conflict settlement in the South China Sea see the meanwhile classic Valencia et al. (1999), Gao (1994); as well as the more recent Talmon and Jia (eds.) (2014).

  185. 185.

    I am much obliged to Enrico Fels who suggested to me the idea of drawing on the Spitsbergen Treaty as a precedent in international law.

  186. 186.

    Officially, the treaty is called Treaty between Norway, The United States of America, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Great Britain and Ireland and the British overseas Dominions and Sweden concerning Spitsbergen. The treaty soon became known as the Spitsbergen Treaty or Svalbard Treaty. See League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2, p. 8.

  187. 187.

    For comprehensive histories and interpretations of the treaty see Ulfstein (1995) and Østreng (1977). The following paragraph on the historic overview over the territory and the Spitsbergen Treaty draws on The Governor of Svalbard (2012).

  188. 188.

    Dutton (2011, p. 60).

  189. 189.

    Supra note 161.

  190. 190.

    It is this aspect that led to the designation of the approach as “Spitsbergen Plus” since here applicability reaches its limits. It also induced the author to speak of conflict management rather than settlement since the question of sovereignty is not conclusively settled but rather shelved for the time being.

  191. 191.

    Supra note 124.

  192. 192.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan) (2013).

  193. 193.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan) (2013).

  194. 194.

    Khanna and Gilman (2012).

  195. 195.

    Supra note 11.

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Ohnesorge, H.W. (2016). A Sea of Troubles: International Law and the Spitsbergen Plus Approach to Conflict Management in the South China Sea. In: Fels, E., Vu, TM. (eds) Power Politics in Asia’s Contested Waters. Global Power Shift. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26152-2_2

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