Skip to main content

“Philosophical” Intermezzo

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Making Sense of Quantum Mechanics
  • 3206 Accesses

Abstract

Inasmuch as quantum mechanics is often claimed to have put the human subject back into science and to have discredited determinism, we review traditional philosophical notions such as idealism and realism, then discuss what determinism means. We also explain how probabilities are used in deterministic physical theories.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 49.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 64.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 69.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    For defences of realism more or less related to the content of this section, see, e.g., Boghossian [60], Devitt [126], Ghins [207], Haack [251], Maudlin [324], Psillos [408], Sankey [431], and Stove [461, 462]. In [354], Norris defends realism in quantum mechanics from a philosophical perspective.

  2. 2.

    In [396], the assistant of Bohr , Aage Petersen stresses the role of language in Bohr’s approach to the problems of quantum mechanics. For Bohr , we are “suspended” in language. For example, Petersen quotes Bohr as saying: “We are suspended in language in such a way that we cannot say what is up and what is down.” [396, p. 188].

  3. 3.

    The ones from Berkeley , Kant, and Poincaré are quoted by David Stove [462]. We refer to his work for a further discussion of these statements. We do not want here to discuss the whole philosophy of these authors, but only to examine those statements critically.

  4. 4.

    The reader is invited to re-read the other quotes above and to verify that they all have the form of a gem.

  5. 5.

    Here Bell refers to some versions of logical positivism (or of the Vienna circle) that were trying to reduce the outside world to a series of impressions of the senses. Positivism will be discussed further in Sect. 7.7 and in Chap. 8. (Note by J.B.).

  6. 6.

    This argument can be expressed in many different ways. Descartes already suggested that we might be manipulated by an evil demon [123]. For a modern discussion, see Putnam [409, Chap. 1].

  7. 7.

    And the last one, called the mind –body problem, may lie beyond the reach of our understanding.

  8. 8.

    Euclidean geometry being probably the most famous example of this process, since it was thought to be a necessary truth before the invention of non-Euclidean geometries in the 19th century; and the latter even became relevant to physics because of their role in Einstein’s general theory of relativity .

  9. 9.

    See the discussion by Maudlin in [325] of Einstein’s 1952 letter to Maurice Solovine [171].

  10. 10.

    It is sometimes argued that tables and the like do not really exist because they are just an assembly of atoms. That will be discussed at the end of Sect. 3.2.

  11. 11.

    This section is in part already in [82, 454]; see also [453, Chap. 4].

  12. 12.

    This is often called the Duhem–Quine thesis . In what follows, we will use Quine’s version, which is more radical than Duhem’s . The latter emphasized the theory dependence of observations or, as Einstein said to Heisenberg [261, p. 63]: “It is the theory which decides what we can observe.” For Duhem’s views, see [139]. We will return to the discussion between Einstein and Heisenberg in Sect. 3.2.3.

  13. 13.

    This means statements that depend on premises that are not realized. For example, one could say: “if that population had been infected by the virus, many people would have been sick.” This can be considered as a true statement, even if the population in question has not been infected.

  14. 14.

    In his famous paper quoted here, Quine allows himself even to “plead hallucination” or to change the rules of logic, in order to show that any statement can be held true, “come what may” [411]. Of course, if one is willing to change the rules of logic then, “proving” underdetermination of theories by data becomes even easier. On the other hand, Quine said that he did not want to encourage radical relativism, although this is what a “naive” reading of what he wrote leads to.

  15. 15.

    This expression shows that people who use it are aware of the fact that, by making enough ad hoc assumptions, one could always reject the evidence no matter how strong it is.

  16. 16.

    The adjectives “moderate” and “immoderate” may refer to different ways to read Kuhn, the immoderate one having become popular among some sociologists of science. What the real Kuhn thought is a separate question.

  17. 17.

    See Krivine and Grossman [297] for a critique of relativism based on the history of the atomic theory .

  18. 18.

    We raised the same objection above, when discussing idealism . It applies to all skeptical arguments based on empirical statements, as opposed to a priori reasonings.

  19. 19.

    The article from which this quote is taken was only published in a French translation [320]. We thank Tim Maudlin for providing us with the original English version and for giving us the permission to quote it.

  20. 20.

    In [320], Maudlin distinguishes three different senses of the word “incommensurability”, which is the fundamental Kuhnian concept applied to the relations between “paradigms”: “differences over which problems a theory must solve and over the standards of solution; the unnoticed shifts in meaning that occur when a new theory takes over the vocabulary of an old one; and changes in one’s fundamental perception of the world that come from accepting a new paradigm.” It is the “changes in one’s fundamental perception of the world that come from accepting a new paradigm” that characterizes the radical Kuhn and that is discussed here. (Note by J.B.).

  21. 21.

    One might argue that one could replace forces, for example, by potentials or by Hamiltonians , but that would just introduce other unobservable entities . We will not enter into this rather technical discussion.

  22. 22.

    See [207, 408, 431] for more critical discussions of Laudan’s pessimistic induction.

  23. 23.

    We will see in Chap. 5 that the de Broglie–Bohm theory has, from this point of view, a status comparable to that of classical mechanics: particles have “representable ” trajectories, but they are guided by a much less representable wave function.

  24. 24.

    This point is also made by Feynman in his Lectures on Physics. Referring to a lady who is given a ticket for speeding, he wrote:

    Many physicists think that measurement is the only definition of anything. Obviously, then, we should use the instrument that measures the speed – the speedometer – and say, “Look, lady, your speedometer reads 60.” So she says, “My speedometer is broken and didn’t read at all.” Does that mean the car is standing still? We believe that there is something to measure before we build the speedometer. Only then can we say, for example, “The speedometer isn’t working right,” or “the speedometer is broken.” That would be a meaningless sentence if the velocity had no meaning independent of the speedometer. So we have in our minds , obviously, an idea that is independent of the speedometer, and the speedometer is meant only to measure this idea.

    Richard Feynman [183, Sect. 8.2]

  25. 25.

    Heisenberg says [261, p. 64]: “I was completely taken aback by Einstein’s attitude, though I found his arguments convincing.” However, it is not clear that Heisenberg really incorporated Einstein’s attitude in his views on quantum mechanics.

  26. 26.

    This “old descriptive language” is at the basis of the idea, in quantum mechanics, that a “measurement” measures some real property of the quantum system. As we emphasized in Sect. 2.5, this is untenable; we will come back to this question in Sect. 5.1, where we will explain what measurements really are, in the framework of the de Broglie–Bohm theory. (Note by J.B.).

  27. 27.

    “To be is to be perceived”, which is a standard motto of idealism , as we saw in Sect. 3.1. The science writer John Horgan quotes John Wheeler as saying [273]: “[...] quantum phenomena are neither waves nor particles but are intrinsically undefined until the moment they are measured. In a sense the British philosopher Bishop Berkeley was right when he asserted two centuries ago that ‘to be is to be perceived’.” This is a surprising position to hold for a physicist, but maybe not that surprising, given Wheeler’s views on quantum mechanics, and in particular on the delayed choice experiment, discussed in Chaps. 1 and 2. (Note by J.B.).

  28. 28.

    One might call this the “renormalization group view of the world”, after the work in statistical mechanics and quantum field theory carried out during the 1970s (but too technical to be explained in detail here).

  29. 29.

    See Weinberg [504] and Bohm [68, Chap. 5] for in-depth discussions of this issue, reaching different conclusions.

  30. 30.

    These equations govern the motion of electromagnetic waves. (Note by J.B.).

  31. 31.

    See the example of Einstein’s boxes in Sect. 4.2 for a further discussion of this problem.

  32. 32.

    Some no hidden variables theorems do not prove what they actually claim. This holds, in particular, for the most famous of them, the one due to von Neumann [496], which will be discussed in Sect. 7.4.

  33. 33.

    In Sect. 7.7, we will discuss further the relationship between Marxist philosophy and various views of quantum mechanics. For the relationship between Bohr and positivism, see also Beller [50] and Howard [275].

  34. 34.

    See Earman [156] for a detailed discussion of determinism, in particular in physics. His views do not exactly coincide with those defended here, at least about quantum mechanics.

  35. 35.

    The content of this section comes partly from [83].

  36. 36.

    This intelligence is often referred to as the “Laplacian demon ”. (Note of J.B.).

  37. 37.

    Laplace was expressing in words the fact that differential equations have a unique solution for given initial conditions. This was discussed in Appendix 2.A for linear differential equations. Here he is referring to the more general case of (2.A.1.4), where conditions have to be imposed on f for the existence and the uniqueness of the solution.

  38. 38.

    Quoted, e.g., by Reichl [414, p. 3] and by Prigogine and Stengers [405, pp. 93–94] and [406, pp. 41–42].

  39. 39.

    Which is related to idealism , since the latter tends to identify what exists and what is in our mind .

  40. 40.

    This idea is essentially the one proposed by Bertrand Russell in [426]; see [156] for a discussion.

  41. 41.

    Except that he was speaking in terms of “continuous time”, i.e., of differential equations, rather than “discrete time”, which is chosen here because it is more intuitive.

  42. 42.

    In fact, one never observes a sufficiently large set of data taking twice the same values, so that the condition that this set of data take two different sets of values at a later time is not really necessary; it is added only because of the theoretical possibility of “eternal return”. But, even if that were true, it would not refute the existence of our function F, since the complete state of the world would then simply be a periodic function of time.

  43. 43.

    In [214], Nicolas Gisin thinks that he has shown that quantum mechanics offers an example of true randomness. But his example, based on the nonlocal effects to be discussed in Chap. 4, does not prove this claim, as we will see in Sect. 5.2.1.

  44. 44.

    In classical physics, non-deterministic processes are often modeled by Markov chains or more general stochastic processes in which an element of pure chance always enters. Of course, if one thinks of these models as describing non-isolated systems, then that chance may simply model the effect of unknown outside forces. But if we were to look for a fundamental theory using the same mathematics (like the spontaneous collapse theories discussed in Sect. 6.2), then that pure chance would be postulated to be just there, with no further justification.

  45. 45.

    The philosopher Colin McGinn has developed the interesting idea that the problem of “free will” may lie beyond the limits of human understanding [329].

  46. 46.

    Write \(f^{(n)}(x)\) for the \(n\,\)th iterate of f applied to x. Then, if \(x=0.a_1 a_2 a_3 \dots a_n a_{n+1} a_{n+2} \dots \), we have \(f^{(n)}(x)=0. a_{n+1} a_{n+2} \dots \). So if we take, say, \(x=0.a_1 a_2 a_3 \dots a_n a_{n+1} a_{n+2} \dots \) and \(y=0.a_1 a_2 a_3 \dots a_n b_{n+1}a_{n+2} \dots \), then \(|x-y| \le 10^{-n}\), while \(|f^{(n)}(x)-f^{(n)}(y)|= |a_{n+1}- b_{n+1}|/10\) which, by suitable choice of \(b_{n+1}\), given \(a_{n+1}\), can be greater than or equal to 1/2.

  47. 47.

    To be precise, that window increases only logarithmically with the improvement in the precision of the initial data. Indeed, if the uncertainty grows like \(\exp (an)\), then, if the precision in the initial data increases by a factor of, say, \(1000 \sim 2^{10}\), the additional time over which our predictability remains the same as before is given by \(\exp (an)= 1000\), i.e., \(n= (1/a)\ln 1000\sim (10/a)\ln 2\).

  48. 48.

    It is important to add one qualification: for some chaotic systems, the fixed amount that one gains when doubling the precision in the initial measurements can be very long, which means that in practice these systems can be predictable much longer than most non-chaotic systems. For example, one knows that the orbits of some planets have a chaotic behavior, but the “fixed amount” is here of the order of several million years [304].

  49. 49.

    This was of course Laplace’s main point, as discussed in Sect. 3.4.1.

  50. 50.

    For a good exposition of Bayesian reasoning, see, e.g., [282, 284].

  51. 51.

    See, e.g., Jaynes [284] for detailed arguments.

  52. 52.

    Of course, when we say that we repeat the “same” experiment, or that the results of different experiments are “independent” of each other, we also try to quantify the knowledge that we have, i.e., the fact that we do not see any differences or any causal connections between those experiments.

  53. 53.

    See Appendix 3.A for a proof and more general statements.

  54. 54.

    See, e.g., [80, 225, 307] for more details.

  55. 55.

    It may be easier to think of the set of states as being countable. Otherwise, one has to introduce a probability density.

  56. 56.

    There is a school of thought, called QBism , that tries to give a purely Bayesian interpretation of the quantum state. That will be discussed in Sect. 6.4.

  57. 57.

    One assigns to “cylinder sets” of the form \(\omega _1= a_1, \dots , \omega _N=a_N, \omega _i \in E, i>N\) the probability (3.A.2) and then it is standard to extend this probability to the sigma-algebra generated by the cylinder sets.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jean Bricmont .

Appendices

Appendix

3.A The Law of Large Numbers

Consider first a finite set of real numbers \(E=\{ a_k \}^n_{k=1}\) and a random variable \(\omega \) taking values in E, with probability distribution \(P(\omega =a_k)=p_k\), \(k=1,\dots , n\), with \(p_k \ge 0\), \(\sum ^n_{k=1} p_k=1\). Then, take N independent variables \(\omega _i\), \(i=1,\dots , N\), with the same distribution as \(\omega \), and define the frequency \(\rho _N ({\Omega }, k)\) with which the variables \( \Omega = (\omega _1, \dots , \omega _N)\) take the value \(a_k\) by

$$\begin{aligned} \rho _N (\Omega , k)= \frac{\big |\big \{i= 1,\dots , N | \omega _i= a_k \big \}\big |}{N} = \frac{\sum _{i= 1}^{N} \delta ( \omega _i= a_k)}{N}, \end{aligned}$$
(3.A.1)

where | E | is the number of elements of the set E and \(\delta \) the Kronecker delta. The set of frequencies \(\{\rho _N (\Omega , k) \}^n_{k=1}\) is called the empirical distribution of the variables \(\omega _i\), \(i=1,\dots , N\). In the language of Sect. 3.4.4, and of statistical mechanics , the variables \(\{ \rho _N (\Omega , k)\}_{k=1}^n\) define the macrostate of the system, while the variables \( \Omega = (\omega _1, \dots , \omega _N)\) define its microstate . In the example of coin tossing in that subsection, we have \(n=2\), \(a_1=0\), \(a_2=1\) and \(\rho _N (\Omega , 1)= N_0/N\), \(\rho _N (\Omega , 2)= N_1/N\).

Let \(\mathcal{P}_N\) be the joint probability distribution of the variables \(\omega _i\), \(i=1,\dots , N\):

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{P}_N (\omega _1= a_1, \dots , \omega _N=a_N)= \prod _{i= 1}^{N} p_i. \end{aligned}$$
(3.A.2)

Then, the law of large numbers says that, \(\forall \epsilon >0\),

$$\begin{aligned} \lim _{N\rightarrow \infty } \mathcal{P}_N (\max _{k=1, \dots , n} |\rho _N (\Omega , k)- p_k| \ge \epsilon )=0. \end{aligned}$$
(3.A.3)

To prove (3.A.3), let \(A_k=\big \{ \Omega | |\rho _N (\Omega , k)- p_k| \ge \epsilon \big \}\), and write

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{P}_N (\max _{k=1, \dots , n} |\rho _N (\Omega , k)- p_k| \ge \epsilon ) \le \mathcal{P}_N (\cup _{k=1}^n A_k) \le \sum _{k= 1}^{n}\mathcal{P}_N (|\rho _N (\Omega , k)- p_k| \ge \epsilon ), \end{aligned}$$
(3.A.4)

then use Chebyshev’s inequality to get

$$\begin{aligned} \sum _{k= 1}^{n}\mathcal{P}_N (|\rho _N (\Omega , k)- p_k| \ge \epsilon )&\le n \max _{k=1, \dots , n} \mathcal{P}_N (|\rho _N (\Omega , k)- p_k| \ge \epsilon ) \end{aligned}$$
$$\begin{aligned}&\le n \frac{1}{\epsilon ^2} \max _{k=1, \dots , n} \mathcal{E}_N\big ([\rho _N (\Omega , k)- p_k]^2\big )\,, \end{aligned}$$
(3.A.5)

where \(\mathcal{E}_N\) is the expectation with respect to \(\mathcal{P}_N \). Using (3.A.1), we get

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{E}_N\big ([\rho _N (\Omega , k)- p_k]^2\big )\le \frac{1}{N^2}\sum _{i, j= 1}^{N}\Big [ \mathcal{E}_N \big ( \delta ( \omega _i= a_k) \delta ( \omega _j= a_k)\big )-p_k^2\Big ], \end{aligned}$$
(3.A.6)

where we used \(\mathcal{E}_N \big ( \delta ( \omega _i= a_k)\big )= p_k\).

Now insert \(\mathcal{E}_N \big ( \delta ( \omega _i= a_k)^2\big )= \mathcal{E}_N \big ( \delta ( \omega _i= a_k)\big )= p_k\) and \(\mathcal{E}_N \big ( \delta ( \omega _i= a_k) \delta ( \omega _j= a_k)\big )= p_k^2\) for \(i\ne j\) in (3.A.6). Since \(p_k-p_k^2 \le 1\), we get

$$ \mathcal{E}_N\big ([\rho _N (\Omega , k)- p_k]^2\big )\le \frac{1}{N}. $$

Inserting this in (3.A.5), and combining (3.A.5) and (3.A.4), we get (3.A.3).

Thus, the law of large numbers says that, for N large, the empirical distribution \(\{\rho _N (\Omega , k) \}^n_{k=1}\) of the variables \(\omega _i\), \(i=1,\dots , N\) is almost equal to the numbers \((p_k)^n_{k=1}\), with a probability close to 1. This gives a physical meaning to the probabilities \((p_k)^n_{k=1}\). For a single event, the probability of an outcome can be any number between 0 and 1, since it reflects partly our knowledge and partly our ignorance. But when we have N copies of the same random event, we can make statements about empirical distributions whose probabilities are close to 1, for N large, and which thus become near certainties.

One can even prove a stronger result (the strong law of large numbers ): the probability distribution (3.A.2) can be extendedFootnote 57 to infinite sequences \( \Omega = (\omega _1, \omega _2, \omega _3, \dots )\) and, for that probability distribution, denoted \(\mathcal P\), there is a set of probability equal to 1 on which \(\lim _{N \rightarrow \infty }\rho _N (\Omega _N, k)=p_k\), \(\forall k= 1, \dots , n\), where \(\Omega _N\) denotes the first N elements of \(\Omega \).

Let us define a sequence of events \(\Omega = (\omega _1, \omega _2, \omega _3, \dots )\) to be typical if, for every \(k=1,\dots , n\), \(\lim _{N \rightarrow \infty }\rho _N (\Omega _N, k)=p_k\). Then, the set of typical sequences has \(\mathcal P\)-probability 1.

Consider now a continuous variable \(\omega \in {{\mathbb {R}}}\) with a probability density p(x): for \(B\subset {{\mathbb {R}}}\), \(P(\omega \in B)= \int _B p(x) dx\). Let \( \Omega =(\omega _i)_{i=1}^N\) be N independent variables with identical distribution whose density is p(x). We define the empirical distribution of those N variables, for any (Borel) subset \(B\subset {{\mathbb {R}}}\,\):

$$\begin{aligned} \rho _N ( \Omega , B)= \frac{|\{i= 1,\dots , N | \omega _i \in B \}|}{N} = \frac{\sum _{i= 1}^{N} \mathbbm {1}_{B} (\omega _i) }{N}, \end{aligned}$$
(3.A.7)

where \(\mathbbm {1}_{B} \) is the indicator function of the set B.

Let \(\mathcal{P}_N\) be the joint probability distribution of the variables \(\omega _i\), \(i=1,\dots , N\), whose density in \({{\mathbb {R}}}^N\) is \(\mathcal{P}_N (x_1, \dots , x_N)= \prod _{i= 1}^{N} p (x_i)\). Then the law of large numbers says that, for any set B, and \(\forall \epsilon >0\),

$$\begin{aligned} \lim _{N\rightarrow \infty } \mathcal{P}_N \Big ( |\rho _N ( \Omega , B)- P_B | \ge \epsilon \Big )=0, \end{aligned}$$
(3.A.8)

where \(P_B= \int _B p(x) dx\). To prove this result, one argues as in (3.A.4)–(3.A.6), using the fact that \(\mathcal{E}_N ( \mathbbm {1}_{B}^2 (\omega _i))= \mathcal{E}_N (\mathbbm {1}_{B} (\omega _i))= P_B\) and \(\mathcal{E}_N ( \mathbbm {1}_{B} (\omega _i) \mathbbm {1}_{B} (\omega _j))= P_B^2\) for \(i\ne j\).

For continuous variables, it is the family of functions \(\rho _N (\Omega , B)\) which is the empirical distribution of the variables \( \Omega =(\omega _i)_{i=1}^N\) and which defines the macrostate of the system, while its microstate is given by \( \Omega =(\omega _i)_{i=1}^N\).

One can again strengthen this result by extending, as in the discrete case, the probability distribution \( \mathcal{P}_N\) to a probability \( \mathcal{P}\) defined on infinite sequences \( \Omega = (\omega _1, \omega _2, \omega _3, \dots )\) and then considering the family of sets B of the form \(]- \infty , z]\), for \(z \in {{\mathbb {R}}}\). There is a set of probability \( \mathcal{P}\) equal to 1 on which \(\lim _{N \rightarrow \infty }\rho _N (\Omega _N, ]- \infty , z])=P_{]- \infty , z]}\), \(\forall z \in {{\mathbb {R}}}\), where \(\Omega _N\) denotes the first N elements of \(\Omega \). The convergence is even uniform in z, by the Glivenko–Cantelli theorem (see, e.g., [490, p. 266]).

Since \(P_{]- \infty , z]}= \int _{- \infty }^z p(x) dx\), one can consider p(x) as the empirical density distribution of the variables \( \Omega = (\omega _1, \omega _2, \omega _3, \dots )\). One can also define a sequence of events \(\Omega =(\omega _1, \omega _2, \omega _3, \dots )\) to be typical if \(\lim _{N \rightarrow \infty }\rho _N (\Omega _N, ]- \infty , z])=P_{]- \infty , z]}\), \(\forall z \in {{\mathbb {R}}}\). Then the set of typical sequences has \( \mathcal{P}\)-probability 1. So, just as in the discrete case, the empirical distribution \(\rho _N (\Omega , B)\), for B an interval, is, for typical configurations of many variables, close to the probability \(P_B\) of a single variable belonging to B.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Bricmont, J. (2016). “Philosophical” Intermezzo. In: Making Sense of Quantum Mechanics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25889-8_3

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics