Abstract
For years, Boko Haram in Nigeria has engaged in public advocacy for the strict implementation of Islamic Sharia law. This has led many to view the sect as a strictly religious quagmire. This approach seems too narrow, because it is concealed in socio-economic and political façade. Indeed, it is a misunderstanding to reduce the impetus of Boko Haram to religion considering its mammoth support base in the teeming uneducated, jobless, and poor northern youths. We argue therefore that despite the seeming religious appearance of the mission of Boko Haram, the socio-economic drivers are imperative in understanding the root cause of the current terror campaign in Nigeria. Thus, we show that socio-economic indices such as poverty, unemployment, inequality, economic underdevelopment, low education, inter alia, underlie the emergence and persistence of Boko Haram terrorism. These factors, which appear higher in the northern region compared to the south, coupled with the predominance of Islamic religion, makes the region more susceptible to easy manipulation by fundamentalist movements such as the Boko Haram.
“If in global terms Nigeria as a whole was economically the periphery, Northern Nigeria was the periphery of the periphery”.
Ali Mazrui (2002, p. 66)
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Notes
- 1.
Joe Brock, “Nigerian poverty rising despite economic growth,” Reuters, February 13, 2010. Online at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/13/us-nigeriapoverty.
- 2.
These are pupils/students sent to the city from rural areas by their parents to study Islam under the tutorship of Mallams (teachers). Rather than being taken care of by the schools, these pupils depend solely on arms for their tuition and food. There is a startling population of the Al-majiris in Maiduguri. In the words of some respondents in a study on this phenomenon: “We hear that on weekly basis trailers go there with children as Al-major and dump them (cited in Musa 2012, p. 118). Hence, it is not surprising that Yusuf had a large following in Maiduguri reputed as one of the poorest in Nigeria before extending to other impoverished parts in the North-West (Musa 2012, p. 121).
- 3.
It is well known that members of the Islamist sect, Boko Haram, are also from neighbouring countries such as Chad, Niger, and Cameroun.
- 4.
The concept of Shariacracy is defined as “governance according to the norms, principles and rules lay down by Islamic law” (Mazrui 2002, p. 66).
- 5.
Albeit the Sharia debate has always been boiling since the colonial era, the dimension it assumed since the advent of democracy in 1999 is arguably unprecedented. It is on such that Boko Haram has been able to build its stronghold and was also able to attract sponsorship from the northern elites.
- 6.
This system of education promotes a moral affair but had little or no place for social and economic enhancement of the student. Even its moral agenda is arguably hardly attained given that these same children have grown to constitute social ill in their respective societies.
- 7.
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David, O.J., Asuelime, L.E., Onapajo, H. (2015). RC of Boko Haram Terrorism: Socio-Economic Prism. In: Boko Haram. SpringerBriefs in Political Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21230-2_5
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