Abstract
Machery and Mallon [The moral psychology handbook (pp. 3–47). New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010] argue that existing evidence does not support the claim that moral cognition, understood as a specific form of normative cognition, is a product of evolution. Instead, they suggest that the evidence only supports the claim that a general capacity for normative cognition evolved. They argue that if this is the case, then the prospects for evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) of morality are bleak. A debunking argument which relied on the fact that normative cognition in general evolved seems like it would debunk all areas of normative belief, including the epistemic norms upon which the argument relies. For the sake of argument, we accept their claim that specifically moral cognition did not evolve. However, we reject their contention that this critically undermines EDAs of morality. A number of strategies are available to solve what we call the “containment problem” of how to effectively debunk morality without thereby debunking normative cognition tout court. Furthermore, the debunking argument need not rely even on the claim that normative cognition in general evolved. So long as at least some aspects of moral cognition have evolved, this may be sufficient to support an EDA against many of our moral beliefs. Thus, even if Machery and Mallon are right that specifically moral cognition did not evolve, research in evolutionary psychology may have radical implications for moral philosophy.
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Notes
- 1.
For example, Behrends (2013), Brosnan (2011), Carruthers and James (2008), Clarke-Doane (2012), Cline (2014), Copp (2008), De Cruz and De Smedt (2012), De Lazari-Radek and Singer (2012), Enoch (2010, 2011), FitzPatrick (2013, 2014a, 2014b), Fraser (2014), Griffiths and Wilkins (2010), Jong and Visala (2014), Joyce (2006, 2013, 2014), Kahane (2011), Mason (2010), Peters (2012), Schafer (2010), Shafer-Landau (2012), Skarsaune (2011), Street (2006, 2008), Talbott (2014), Toner (2011), Vavova (2014), Visala (2011), Wielenberg (2010), and Wilkins and Griffiths (2012).
- 2.
Throughout the paper, we equivocate between the influence of evolution and the influence of natural selection. Without offering a full-fledged defense of adaptationism, we assume that the influence of evolutionary mechanisms other than natural selection (e.g., genetic drift) can only enhance EDAs since none of these mechanisms seem suited to producing truth-tracking capacities.
- 3.
- 4.
Prinz (2009) only considers these the steps necessary to establish a particular form of moral nativism he calls “immodest moral nativism” (p. 168). Thus, Prinz acknowledges that there are other means by which one could establish some form of moral nativism.
- 5.
Turiel (1983) also disputes whether the developmental evidence supports nativism.
- 6.
By mind-independent, we don’t mean to say that moral facts cannot mention mental states. For example, causing unnecessary pain might be morally wrong, but it is not wrong in the realist sense if its truth depends on how people regard that prohibition. For example, whether evolution occurred does not depend on how people regard the theory. On the other hand, whether something is money depends crucially on whether people regard that thing as a medium of exchange.
- 7.
An illustrative analogy is the pseudo-scientific use of scientific concepts. When new age healers talk about quantum uncertainty or the vibration of strings, the healers intend to support their theories by illustrating their coherence with or basis in established science. Closer inspection reveals (of course) that the notions employed by healers bear little resemblance to their scientific counterparts. Once one has substituted the genuine notions for the fakes, the theories of pseudo-scientists generally lose whatever apparent plausibility they once enjoyed. Of course, this is an extreme example, but similar problems may exist in philosophy. Ladyman et al. (2007) levy a similar critique against the dubious use of physical concepts by metaphysicians (pp. 25–27).
- 8.
In general, when we speak about moral judgments, we intend to include what philosophers call “moral intuitions.” In ordinary language, “intuition” often refers to a gut decision or feeling. While moral intuitions may frequently take this form, philosophers typically see intuitions as including judgments that involve more explicit reasoning or consideration.
- 9.
Kant (in)famously argues that one should not lie to a murderer to protect the innocent. This is an unsettling consequence of his deontological ethics, but one he appears willing to accept. Others have not been as willing to follow Kant in accepting this implication, with some insisting that Kant’s own principles do not require that one always tell the truth (Korsgaard, 1986) and others accepting that it does (Constant, 1776) and concluding that this is a deeply problematic implication for Kant’s ethical system.
- 10.
Obviously more needs to be said here, but a lengthy digression into the evolution of perception seems inappropriate.
- 11.
It’s important to note that this debunking account would only undermine those property-related normative judgments that depend (directly or indirectly) on the relevance of possession or occupation to ownership (e.g., approving of adverse possession as a means of acquiring property).
- 12.
Exactly what murder means would have to be fleshed out. It would be crucial to see which forms of killing are permitted and under what circumstances.
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Millhouse, T., Bush, L.S., Moss, D. (2016). The Containment Problem and the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality. In: Shackelford, T., Hansen, R. (eds) The Evolution of Morality. Evolutionary Psychology. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19671-8_5
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