Abstract
The validity within legal systems of entailed norms, that is, those norms that are logically derivable from explicitly issued rules, has been called into question with different arguments. To take two examples from distinguished figures, Joseph Raz has claimed that what he calls the “incorporation thesis” cannot account for law’s claim of authority, and Andrei Marmor believes that the admission of entailed norms in a legal system would imply the mistaken view that it is necessarily coherent. In this paper we show that these two arguments are, at the very least, highly controversial; that the positivist social sources thesis, though not committed to it, is compatible with the validity of entailed norms, and that taking into account the whole set of logical consequences of explicitly issued norms is an unavoidable step in explaining the dynamic character of legal systems .
We are deeply indebted to the editors of this volume and to Stanley L. Paulson, for their careful reading and comments on an earlier version of the manuscript.
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Notes
- 1.
A further problem in Marmor’s view is that, after distinguishing different possible conceptions of entailment, he rejects entailed norms with the argument that all views of entailment share the assumption that the law is necessarily coherent. Now, it seems obvious that under different notions of entailment, “coherence” will mean different things. Consequently, despite the use of the same expression, there is not a unique argument for the rejection of all kinds of entailed norms.
- 2.
Contrary to Marmor, Tecla Mazzarese (1993, 166) suggests that what she calls “the logical criterion of validity” must be rejected because it allows the possibility of incoherent normative systems.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
For a thorough analysis of the differences between validity and institutional force – trying to show that they can be regarded as independent properties, see Moreso and Navarro (1997, 203–204).
- 6.
As Hart (1994, 175–178) has shown, a normative order incapable of deliberate change would not qualify as a legal system.
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Navarro, P.E., Rodríguez, J.L. (2015). Entailed Norms and the Systematization of Law. In: Araszkiewicz, M., Płeszka, K. (eds) Logic in the Theory and Practice of Lawmaking. Legisprudence Library, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19575-9_3
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