Skip to main content

Part of the book series: Ius Comparatum - Global Studies in Comparative Law ((GSCL,volume 3))

Abstract

This chapter discusses how the doctrine of precedent works in the Australian legal system and how the importance placed on this doctrine and the doctrine of the separation of powers prevents retroactivity of judicial decision making. The High Court of Australia has confirmed that judicial decisions are to be prospective in effect. Australia’s system of legislative supremacy is discussed in the context of whether retroactive decision making has the ability to turn judges into undisguised legislators. This chapter includes relevant case law as well as an historical analysis about why Australian courts have resisted retroactivity.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Sir Anthony Mason, “The Use and Abuse of Precedent” (1988) 4 Australian Bar Review 93.

  2. 2.

    Viro v The Queen (1978) 141 CLR 88.

  3. 3.

    (2007) 230 CLR 89.

  4. 4.

    Ibid 151–152 at [135], per the Court.

  5. 5.

    (1999) 95 FCR 553, 561 at [31], per the Court.

  6. 6.

    JD Heydon, “How Far Can Trial Courts and Intermediate Appellate Courts Develop the Law?” (2009) 9 Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 1, 26.

  7. 7.

    SZEEU v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2006) 150 FCR 214, 250 at [148] (Weinberg J).

  8. 8.

    Section 51 of the Constitution vests limited powers with the Commonwealth Parliament while the States retain power to legislate over all other matters.

  9. 9.

    Judicial review of the constitutional validity of legislation has been accepted as axiomatic in the Australian legal system: Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (Communist Party Case) (1951) 83 CLR 1, 262–263 (Fullagar J), following the approach of the United States Supreme Court in Marbury v Madison 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); the High Court has the power and duty to decide if legislation, whether passed by the Parliament of the Commonwealth or the legislature of a State, is in accordance with the provisions of the Commonwealth Constitution.

  10. 10.

    See Sir Owen Dixon, “Concerning Judicial Method” (1956) 29 Australian Law Journal 468, 470.

  11. 11.

    See, e.g., O’Toole v Charles David Pty Ltd (No 1) (1991) 171 CLR 232, 267 (Brennan J); State Government Insurance Commission v Trigwell (1979) 142 CLR 617, 650–651 (Murphy J).

  12. 12.

    Sir Anthony Mason, “Legislative and Judicial Law-Making: Can We Locate an Identifiable boundary?” (2003) 24 Adelaide Law Review 15, 21.

  13. 13.

    Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512, 557 at [99] (Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ) where the majority included public policy in their various considerations as to why the highway authorities’ immunity should be abolished.

  14. 14.

    See generally Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 516, 544 at [73] (Gummow J); R v MJR (2002) 54 NSWLR 368, 375 at [46] where Mason P refers to “the still useful fiction known as the declaratory theory”.

  15. 15.

    A Beever, “The Declaratory Theory of Law” (2013) 33 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 421, 433; Final Report of the Constitutional Commission (AGPS, 1988) [6.287–6.288].

  16. 16.

    A Beever, op. cit., 440–441. See also Sir Owen Dixon, op. cit., 470 and Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986) 225, 228.

  17. 17.

    D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1, 115 at [367] (Callinan J).

  18. 18.

    (1997) 72 FCR 581, 594.

  19. 19.

    Ha v New South Wales (1997) 189 CLR 465.

  20. 20.

    (2012) 245 CLR 355.

  21. 21.

    Sir Anthony Mason, “The Use and Abuse of Precedent” (1988) 4 Australian Bar Review 93, 94.

  22. 22.

    Attorney-General for NSW v Perpetual Trustee Co (Ltd) (1952) 85 CLR 237, 243–244(Dixon J).

  23. 23.

    (1989) 166 CLR 417, 438–439 (Mason CJ, Wilson, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ) and 450–453 (Brennan J); also see Plaintiff M76/2013 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship (2013) 251 CLR 322, 381–382 at [191] (Kiefel and Keane JJ).

  24. 24.

    Western Australia v The Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 201 and Queensland v The Commonwealth (1977) 139 CLR 585.

  25. 25.

    Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR 261, 267 (Dixon CJ); Fisher v Hebburn Ltd (1960) 105 CLR 188, 194 (Fullagar J).

  26. 26.

    George Hudson Ltd v Australian Timber Workers’ Union (1923) 32 CLR 413, 434 (Isaacs J); see also the discussion by French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ in Australian Education Union v General Manager of Fair Work Australia (2012) 246 CLR 117, 133–134 at [26]–[28].

  27. 27.

    Babaniaris v Lutony Fashions Pty Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 1, 15 (Mason J); Torrens Aloha Pty Ltd v Citibank NA (1997) 72 FCR 581, 594 (Sackville J); John v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1989) 166 CLR 417, 450–451 (Brennan J); Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 107, 171 (Toohey J); Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197, 257 (Deane J).

  28. 28.

    Ha v New South Wales (1997) 189 CLR 465, 503–504 (Brennan CJ, McHugh, Gummow & Kirby JJ), 515 (Dawson, Toohey & Gaudron JJ).

  29. 29.

    For a discussion of the main arguments for and against the introduction of prospective overruling before the decision in Ha v New South Wales see K Mason QC (as he then was), “Prospective Overruling” (1989) 63 Australian Law Journal 526, 530.

  30. 30.

    Ha v New South Wales (1997) 189 CLR 465. The decision has recently been relied on by Heydon J in Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1, 194; at [485] and explored in slightly more detail by Gageler J in New South Wales v Kable (2013) 252 CLR 118, 138 at [51]. Compare the position in the United Kingdom recognising the theoretical possibility of prospective overruling, discussed in In re Spectrum Plus Ltd (in liq) [2005] 2 AC 680.

  31. 31.

    Ha v New South Wales (1997) 189 CLR 465, 503–504 (Brennan CJ and McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ). The minority, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ, expressly agreed on this point at 515.

  32. 32.

    K Mason QC, op. cit., 527–529.

  33. 33.

    In re Spectrum Plus Ltd (in liq) [2005] 2 AC 680.

  34. 34.

    There is some Australian academic consideration. See, for example, A Palmer and C Sampford, “Judicial Retrospectivity in Australia” (1995) 4 Griffith Law Review 170; E Campbell, “The Retrospectivity of Judicial Decisions and the Legality of Governmental Acts” (2003) 29 Monash University Law Review 49; and R Hinchy “Judicial Method and Advocates’ Immunity in the High Court of Australia and the House of Lords” (2006) 13(1) Murdoch University Electronic Law Journal~187.

References

  • Beever, A. 2013. The declaratory theory of law. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 33: 421–444.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Campbell, E. 2003. The retrospectivity of judicial decisions and the legality of governmental acts. Monash University Law Review 29: 49–84.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dworkin, R. 1986. Law’s empire. Great Britain: Fontana Paperbacks.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heydon, J.D. 2009. How far can trial courts and intermediate appellate courts develop the law? Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 9: 1–46.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hinchy, R. 2006. Judicial method and advocates’ immunity in the High Court of Australia and the House of Lords. Murdoch University Electronic Law Journal 13(1): 187–208.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mason, K. 1989. Prospective overruling. Australian Law Journal 63: 526–531.

    Google Scholar 

  • Palmer, A., and C. Sampford. 1995. Judicial retrospectivity in Australia. Griffith Law Review 4: 170–213.

    Google Scholar 

  • Right Honourable Sir Owen Dixon. 1956. Concerning judicial method. Australian Law Journal 29: 468–476.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sir Anthony Mason. 1988. The use and abuse of precedent. Australian Bar Review 4: 93–111.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sir Anthony Mason. 2003. Legislative and judicial law-making: Can we locate an identifiable boundary? Adelaide Law Review 24(1): 15–36.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sir Maurice Byers, ed. 1988. Final Report of the Constitutional Commission. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

    Google Scholar 

Cases

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to James Douglas .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Douglas, J., Atkins, E., Clift, H. (2015). Judicial Rulings with Prospective Effect in Australia. In: Comparing the Prospective Effect of Judicial Rulings Across Jurisdictions. Ius Comparatum - Global Studies in Comparative Law, vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16175-4_15

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics