Abstract
A persistent problem for American political and military planners has been the question of how to defend “third areas.” How can a major power make credible an intent to defend a smaller ally from attack by another major power? Simply making an explicit promise to defend an ally, whether that promise is embodied in a formal treaty or merely in a unilateral declaration, is not sufficient. There have been too many instances when “solemn oaths” were forgotten in the moment of crisis. On the other hand, more than once a major power has taken up arms to defend a nation with whom it had ties appreciably less binding than a formal commitment. If a deterrer is to be firm, the prospective gains from a successful policy of firmness must be greater, when weighted by the probability of success and discounted by the cost and probability of war, than the losses from retreat.
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Notes
- 1.
This article is part of the research of the Yale Political Data Program. I am grateful to Paul Y. Hammond for comments on an earlier draft. It was first published with the same title in: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 7, 2 (June 1963): 97–109 by Sage. Permission to republish this text was granted by Sage on 6 October 2014.
- 2.
These definitions are employed purely in an analytical sense with no intention of conveying moral content. The British-French ‘attack’ in 1956, for instance, was certainly provoked to a large extent by the Egyptians themselves.
- 3.
Note that we have excluded instances of protracted guerrilla warfare. While preventing and defeating guerrilla war is a major problem, the differences from the matters considered here require that it be treated separately. The current Berlin crisis was not included because, at the time of writing, it was still unresolved. Also excluded are those cases of aggression in the 1930s and 1940s where no particular power had given a previous indication of a readiness to defend the pawn. By “previous indication” we mean either at least an ambiguous official statement suggesting the use of military force, or the provision of military assistance in the form of arms or advisers. The League of Nations Covenant is not considered such an indication because, barring further commitments by a particular nation, it is impossible to identify any one defender or group of defenders. Data on a number of factors are presented, for all of the cases, in the appendix. The current Berlin crisis was not included because, at the time of writing, it was still unresolved. Also excluded are those cases of aggression in the 1930s and 1940s where no particular power had given a previous indication of a readiness to defend the pawn. By “previous indication” we mean either at least an ambiguous official statement suggesting the use of military force, or the provision of military assistance in the form of arms or advisers. The League of Nations Covenant is not considered such an indication because, barring further commitments by a particular nation, it is impossible to identify any one defender or group of defenders. Data on a number of factors are presented, for all of the cases, in the appendix.
- 4.
On the other hand one might argue that they were not of sufficient potential value to the attacker for him to run even a relatively slight risk that the defender might actually fight. A complete formulation involving these factors would have to include both the value of the pawn to the attacker and his estimate of the probability that the defender would fight. See below.
- 5.
See George Kirk on the Iranian case (Kirk 1952: 473).
- 6.
In both of these instances we must recognize that the ‘attacker’s’ failure to persevere to defeat of the pawn was probably due less to Soviet threats than to pressures from the ‘attacker’s’ own allies and world opinion.
- 7.
On the military situation prevailing in various crises before World War II see Winston Churchill (1948: 177, 270–271, 287, 336–337).
- 8.
American intelligence reports were, however, far from unanimous. By the end of 1961 it was clear to those with good information that the Soviets’ strategic forces were distinctly inferior to America’s.
- 9.
In the cases of Berlin and Quemoy-Matsu we must rely on trade figures for a larger unit (West Germany and Taiwan). West Germany conducted an above-average proportion of her trade with the United States and France in this period, but her trade with Britain was below average. Yet as Allied resolve in the Berlin crisis clearly depended upon American initiative it seems correct to include Berlin in the class of economically interdependent pawns.
- 10.
Remember that we have been dealing only with those cases in which deterrence was visibly in danger of failing, and not with instances where it was fully successful; i.e., where the attacker was dissuaded from ever making a serious explicit threat. As noted earlier the latter cases are extremely difficult to identify; nevertheless it seems likely that analysis would show similar results to those above. American protection of Western Europe is an excellent example. The political, economic, and military interdependence of Europe and the United States is great enough to make America’s threat highly credible (though perhaps not as credible as we might sometimes wish).
- 11.
Formally, the defender will pursue a firm policy only if, in his calculation:
V f · 5 + V w · (1 − s) > V r where
V f = the value of successful firmness (deterrence without war)
V w ~ the value (usually negative) of the failure of firmness (war)
V r = the value (usually negative) of retreat
s = the probability that firmness will be successful.
Daniel Ellsberg presents a related formulation (Ellsberg 1960 ).
- 12.
Precisely, he will press the attack only if: V a · 5 + V, * (1 − 5) > V o where
V a = the value of a successful attack (no war)
V w = the value (usually negative) of an attack which is countered (war)
V o = the value of doing nothing in this instance (no attack, no war)
s = the probability of a successful attack.
- 13.
This point is further illustrated by the 1962 Cuban crisis. The American government took great pains to indicate that it was reacting to the threat of Soviet missiles on the island, and only demanded their removal, not the overthrow of the Castro regime. To have directly threatened the existence of a Communist government in which the Soviets had such a heavy military and economic investment would have carried a much greater risk of Soviet military retaliation.
- 14.
The theoretical and empirical literature on this point is voluminous and cannot be discussed in more detail here. I have presented elsewhere a general theoretical examination of these problems and their application to Anglo-American relations (Russett 1963).
- 15.
Few markets are perfectly analogous to the model of perfect competition, as the products of two sellers are seldom identical, at least in the mind of the buyer. Customs, habits, traditions, and ‘myths’ about the goods or the seller differentiate two seemingly identical products. A seller who speaks the language and understands the mores of his customers has a great advantage over one who does not. Past habits can affect current prices through credit terms. Goods coming across a previously established trade route can be shipped more cheaply than those across one which has not yet developed much traffic.
References
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Ellsberg, Daniel, 1960: The Crude Analysis of Strategic Choice, RAND Monograph P-2183 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation).
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Appendix
Appendix
Presence or absence of various factors alleged to make deterrent threats credible
Attacker presses on | |||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Attacker holds back | Defender does not fight | Defender fight | |||||||||||||||
Iran | Turkey | Berlin | Egypt | Quemoy-Matsu | Cuba | Ethiopia | Austria | Czechoslovakia (1938) | Albania | Czechoslovakia (1989) | Rumania | Guatemala | Hungary | Poland | South Korea | North Korea | |
Pawn 20 % + of defender’s population | * | X | X | X | X | X | |||||||||||
Pawn 5 % + of defender’s g.n.p. | X | X | X | X | X | ||||||||||||
Formal commitment prior to crisis | ? | X | ? | ? | ? | X | X | ? | X | X | ? | X | X | ||||
Defender has strategic superiority | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | ? | ? | X | ||||||
Defender has local superiority | X | X | ? | ? | ? | ? | |||||||||||
Defender is dictatorship | X | X | * | X | X | ||||||||||||
Pawn-defender military cooperation | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | ||||
Pawn-defender political interdependence | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | |||||||||
Pawn-defender economic interdependence | * | X | X | X | X | X | * | X | X | ||||||||
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Russett, B.M. (2015). The Calculus of Deterrence. In: Starr, H. (eds) Bruce M. Russett: Pioneer in the Scientific and Normative Study of War, Peace, and Policy. SpringerBriefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice, vol 34. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13850-3_3
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