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The Effects of the Directive 2013/48/EU on the Italian System of Precautionary Measures: Defence Rights in Remand Hearings

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Abstract

Within the European area of justice, Directive 2013/48/EU aims to establish common minimum standards on the right of access to a lawyer for suspects and defendants in criminal proceedings throughout the European Union. In this paper, we analyse the possibility of extending the guarantees provided for by Italian criminal procedural law in relation to an emblematic activity, the questioning of a person subjected to preventive custody. Many issues remain unresolved, and there seem to be numerous shortcomings in the text of the new Directive, especially if we are to ensure the practicality and effectiveness of the protection it envisages.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty.

  2. 2.

    In accordance with Recital 15, “the term ‘lawyer’, in this Directive, refers to any person who, in accordance with national law, is qualified and entitled, including by means of accreditation by an authorised body, to provide legal advice and assistance to suspects or accused persons”.

  3. 3.

    With specific regard to the relationship between Community law and national law, see, among many others, Azzena (1998), pp. 132 ff. See also Carbone (2006), pp. 547 ff.

  4. 4.

    The implementation of these categories of treaties by ordinary law has given rise to considerable discussion. According to some, the adaptation on the part of Italy to treaties involving limitations of state sovereignty should have taken place by means of a constitutional provision.

  5. 5.

    Constitutional Court, dec. 14/1964.

  6. 6.

    The amendment of Title V of Const.-Italy took place through Constitutional Law no. 3 of 18 October 2001.

  7. 7.

    In fact, the amended version of Article 117 Const.-Italy does not cause any changes of a “procedural” nature to allow limitations of sovereignty but merely to acknowledge the participation of Italy in the EU system.

  8. 8.

    The term “adaptation” to European law refers to the way in which the sources of law of the European legal system become part of the individual Member States’ legislation.

  9. 9.

    With regard to the distinction, within the sources of EU law, between primary and secondary sources, see Ruggeri (2005), p. 210.

  10. 10.

    Ruggeri (2006), pp. 432 ff.

  11. 11.

    Constitutional Court, dec. 14/1964. The Constitutional Court justified this decision on the basis of the fact that the founding treaties were endorsed by the formal instrument of domestic law. Thus, the criterion to be used in case of conflicting rules, according to the Court, was that of the ordinary succession of laws over time.

  12. 12.

    Constitutional Court, dec. 183/1973.

  13. 13.

    Court of Justice, dec. Simmenthal, 9 March 1978, case C 106/77. In particular, in the opinion of the Court of Justice, “the national court is called upon, within its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of Community law, and is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, if necessary not applying, of its initiative, any conflicting provision of national legislation, even if adopted subsequently, without having to request or await for the prior setting aside of such a provision by legislative or other constitutional means”.

  14. 14.

    Constitutional Court, dec. 170/1984.

  15. 15.

    The Constitutional Court promoted the “dualist” conception of law. This was in contrast with the findings of the Court of Justice under the so-called monistic conception, which recognised the existence of a single legal order, the European one.

  16. 16.

    See Court of Justice, 22 June 1988, Fratelli Costanzo, case 103/1988. Subsequently, the Court of Justice ruled that not even domestic administrative measures can be applied if they are contrary to the directly applicable rules of European law. On this point, see Court of Justice, 29 April 1999, Ciola, Case 224/1997.

  17. 17.

    Constitutional Court, dec. 389/1989.

  18. 18.

    Cf. Constitutional Court, dec. 64/1990 and Constitutional Court, dec. 168/1991.

  19. 19.

    One cannot fail to point out that over the years the so-called theory of limits and counter-limits has been introduced to limit the advance of Community law within the constitutional structures of the Member States. The term “counter-limits” was perceptively coined by Barile, who in the early 1970s used it to indicate those limitations (the fundamental principles, or rather, as stated by the Constitutional Court, the supreme principles and inalienable rights of the person) to limitations of sovereignty pursuant to Article 11 Const.-Italy. See, by way of example, Cartabia (1995), pp. 102 ff. This theory was an important spur to the affirmation of a genuine European protection of fundamental rights. Along these lines, cf. Cartabia (2007), pp. 13 ff.

    This theory has long been debated. In the opinion of other authoritative scholars, counter-limits do not exist on a theoretical level, for the reason that the contradiction between Article 11 Const.-Italy and the remaining fundamental principles may not be resolved under the system to the benefit of either one or the other. This contradiction, however, needs to be composed in accordance with the usual rule of “balancing” values, a rule that may variously lead to the prevalence of one or the other value. Cf. Ruggeri (2006), pp. 289 ff.

  20. 20.

    Kostoris (2014), p. 36.

  21. 21.

    Sotis (2007), pp. 33 ff.; Viganò (2010), pp. 617 ff. On the distinction between European legislation with “direct” and that with “indirect” effects, cf. the recent reconstruction by Kostoris (2014), pp. 35 ff.

  22. 22.

    In this regard, see Manes (2007), pp. 15 ff.

  23. 23.

    Kostoris (2014), p. 39, talks of “‘integrative’ effect” produced by a consistent interpretation and stresses that the outcome of the interpretation “will be the result of the combination between the domestic and supranational law”.

  24. 24.

    The Court of Justice may well affirm incompatibility with EU law of a certain interpretation of the internal standard and therefore, ultimately, bind the national court “to give priority in resolving the dispute to the European source of law (as authoritatively interpreted by the Court of Justice)”. See Viganò (2011), p. 14. The mechanism mentioned in the text implies the risk that the consistent interpretation of national law in conformity with Union law is conducted on the basis of a binding case law of the Court of Justice based on an inexact reconstruction of national law by the supranational court. With reference to the problem posed by the fact that the Court of Justice, for the purpose of finding the incompatibility of national provisions with EU law, knows the national law through information provided by the referring court, that may however be incorrect or incomplete; see Kostoris (2014), p. 31. With regard to the “Pupino” case, see Lupària (2005), p. 3544. See also Campailla (2012), pp. 99 ff. Some authors point out that “it does not seem correct to have the supranational law with which domestic law is in conflict to play at the same time the role of benchmark against which to measure the conflict and that of a tool to resolve it”. See Kostoris (2014), p. 42.

  25. 25.

    On this phenomenology, from a criminal procedure perspective, see Amodio (2003), p. 8.

  26. 26.

    With reference to the instrument of non-application, see Gaito (2010), p. 40.

  27. 27.

    Viganò (2014).

  28. 28.

    By way of example, see Article 14 of Directive 2013/48/EU. In literature, cf. Bubula (2014).

  29. 29.

    The result, in this area of the process, is a recovery of the (natural) pre-eminence of domestic law for the criminal court.

  30. 30.

    Mazza (1994), pp. 822 ff.

  31. 31.

    Marzaduri (1992), pp. 278 ff.

  32. 32.

    In accordance with an inquisitorial vision, the accused person was considered “the repository of a truth to be squeezed out of him”. On this point, see Cordero (1987), pp. 19 ff.

  33. 33.

    Article 135 of the 1930 CCP-Italy.

  34. 34.

    Law 81/1987.

  35. 35.

    Art. 2(6) of the Law 81/1987.

  36. 36.

    From a “beast of confession” (see Cordero 1987, p. 19) we now have a person with precise rights and guarantees, including the right not to contribute in any way to his own conviction. On this point, see Mazza (2010), p. 714.

  37. 37.

    In terms of European case law, the concept seems to be highly innovative in scope; in fact, it does not seem to be confined to establishing contact with any judge but includes establishing contact with the judge who decided on the application of the precautionary measure, unlike Article 5(3) ECHR, which only speaks of “a judge”.

  38. 38.

    Act 332/1995 extended the list of measures that may require the performance of questioning, previously required only for house arrest.

  39. 39.

    Constitutional Court, dec. 77/1997. In literature, see Santoriello (1999), pp. 1257 ff.

  40. 40.

    Court of Cassation, Joint Sections 12 October 1993, no. 748, Thomas, in CED Cass. 195625.

  41. 41.

    Article 503 CCP-Italy, inserted among the regulations on the adversarial procedure, governs the examination of private individuals.

  42. 42.

    Article 391 CCP-Italy governs the hearing for the confirmation of arrest in flagrante delicto and detention for questioning.

  43. 43.

    Article 422 CCP-Italy provides for the provision of supplementary evidence by the judge in the evidentiary phase of the preliminary hearing in order to issue a ruling not to prosecute.

  44. 44.

    Arts. 3, 13(1) and 24(2) Const.-Italy.

  45. 45.

    Conso (1970), pp. 242 ff.

  46. 46.

    Recommendation No. R (1987) 3 adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 12 February 1987, eur-lex.europa.eu. See also the more recent Recommendation R(2006)2, adopted on 11 January 2006, eur-lex.europa.eu.

  47. 47.

    Kostoris (1995), p. 41. In the interest of completion, moreover, the Constitutional Court has also taken steps, declaring the illegality of Article 18 of Law no. 354 of 26 July 1975, in the part in which it does not require that the detainee convicted by a final judgment should have the right to confer with his lawyer right from the beginning of enforcement of the sentence. Cf. Constitutional Court, dec. 212/1997.

  48. 48.

    This rule also applies to a prisoner serving a sentence. Cf. Constitutional Court, dec. 212/1997.

  49. 49.

    Knowledge of the procedures up to that time carried out by the prosecution, which is brought to the defence lawyer by virtue of the provision of Article 293(3) CCP-Italy, represents the fulfilment of a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for a more adequate technical defence and has a direct impact in terms of the suspect’s self-defence.

  50. 50.

    Constitutional Court, dec. 192/1997.

  51. 51.

    It may be legitimately waived by the accused person who refuses to be interviewed, without prejudice to the validity of subsequent procedural actions.

  52. 52.

    Kostoris (1990), pp. 1391 ff.

  53. 53.

    Prior to the amendment to article 104(3) CCP-Italy, introduced under Article 1 of law no. 332 of August 8, 1995, the postponement was for a time not exceeding 7 days.

  54. 54.

    For the reference to “the danger of pre-establishing a common strategy”, see Court of Cassation, Division VI, 3 May 2006, no. 15113, Luparini, CED Cass, 21768.

  55. 55.

    Court of Cassation, Division VI, 22 January 2010, no. 2941 and previously, the Court of Cassation, Division V, 27 September 1993 Zambrotti, Archivio nuova procedura penale, 1993, p. 716: “The measure which, pursuant to article 104 CCP-Italy, postpones the right of the accused remanded in custody to confer with defence counsel may also be based on the seriousness of the facts (regarding a plurality of suspects), together with the need to avoid the possibility of establishing preordained and common defensive arguments of convenience”. For criticism of this, see Scalfati (2010), pp. 1093 ff. Cf., Court of Cassation, Division IV, 29 October 2007, no. 39827, Cambria, CED Cass., 237 845: “although the ban on conversation between suspect and lawyer could also be based on the alleged severity of facts regarding a number of suspects, there must however be indicated, even in this case, the specific need to avoid the possibility of establishing pre-established and common defensive arguments of convenience, since this need cannot be inferred by way of presumption and/or be considered implicit in the subjective and objective connotations of the alleged offence leading to a custodial measure”. According to the Court of Cassation, Division VI, 2 October 2006, no. 32622, Litizzi, CED Cass., 235019, “the danger of compromising evidence that the measure aims to avoid is clear from the seriousness of the facts, the plurality of suspects and the organized context of the activity engaged in”.

  56. 56.

    The legislature did not, therefore, underestimate the risks of possible undesirable relations between the defendant and the lawyer such as to undermine the requirements of the investigation. Grevi (1996), pp. 3 ff.

  57. 57.

    Court of Cassation, Division I, 20 April 1995, no. 719, Spiro, CED 200224.

  58. 58.

    On this point, see Trevisson Lupacchini (1993), p. 193; Giunchedi (2002), p. 133. Some scholarship, however, believes that the literal meaning should not be overlooked, whereby it seems that the reasons for the postponement, while having to be sought in the context of “reasons of caution” relating to the arrest, must possess a quid pluris that justifies their uniqueness and specificity.

    In case law, see Court of Cassation, Division VI, 15 July 2003, Vinci, CED Cass. 326223.

  59. 59.

    If the interview continues after the 5th day, it should be suspended, to allow the meeting with the lawyer up to that point denied. Kostoris (1995), p. 41.

  60. 60.

    Grevi (1996), pp. 3 ff.

  61. 61.

    Unlike in the cases of custodial measures, questioning by the prosecutor pursuant to article 388 CCP-Italy is completely independent and may therefore be conducted prior to the examination performed by the judge to immediately check the legitimacy of the restrictive measure. Constitutional Court, dec. 384/1996.

  62. 62.

    See the chapter by Candito, this volume, Sect. 3.2.2.

  63. 63.

    In this case, the lawyer and the accused will already have had the opportunity to inspect and take copies of the entire file of the prosecutor, in accordance with the combined provisions of Articles 416(2) CCP-Italy, 419(2) and (3) CCP-Italy and 131 Rules Implementing the CCP-Italy. The conversation between the accused person and his lawyer, after the request for trial, can no longer be postponed; the parties will have had the time necessary to properly prepare their defensive strategies. There in any case remain some intrinsic limits to the ways of carrying out the interview in question.

  64. 64.

    The Constitutional Court, in judgment no. 384 of 1996, justified and legitimated this discipline. Constitutional Court, dec. 384/1996.

  65. 65.

    Dalia and Cimadomo (1999), pp. 501 ff.

  66. 66.

    Spangher (1993), pp. 26 ff.

  67. 67.

    Case law has found it legitimate to prevent the immediate meeting between the defendant and his lawyer in order to prevent irregularities due to the adoption of common defensive strategies of convenience. Court of Cassation, Division VI, 15 July 2003, Vinci, CED Cass 326223.

  68. 68.

    On 30 November 2009, the Council adopted a Resolution regarding a roadmap for reinforcing the procedural rights of suspects or defendants in criminal proceedings. The “roadmap” calls for the adoption of measures regarding the right to translation and interpretation (measure A); the right to information about rights and the charge (measure B); the right to legal advice and legal aid (measure C); the right to communication with relatives, employers and consular authorities (measure D); and special safeguards for vulnerable suspects and defendants (measure E).

  69. 69.

    Directive 2013/48/EU, cit. For a more detailed discussion of the Directive, see the chapter by Bachmaier Winter, this volume.

  70. 70.

    Recital 14 and 54 of Directive 2013/48/EU and article 1 of Directive 2013/48/EU. Note that Recital no. 54, then, provides, in addition to the power of Member States to ensure a higher level of protection than that provided for by the Directive itself, the duty to ensure a level of protection no lower than the rules of the EU FRCh and the ECHR, as interpreted by the case law of the Court of Justice and the ECtHR.

  71. 71.

    Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States.

  72. 72.

    Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings. On this issue, see the chapter by Quattrocolo, this book.

  73. 73.

    Recital 14.

  74. 74.

    On this point, see Ubertis (2012), pp. 21 ff.; Bartole et al. (2012), pp. 185 ff.

  75. 75.

    See Recital 21. This provision is in accordance with the principle of the protection against self-incrimination.

  76. 76.

    In detail, Article 4 lays down the principle of confidentiality of communications between suspects or accused persons and their lawyer in the exercise of their right to avail themselves of a lawyer, including meetings, correspondence, telephone conversations and other forms of communication permitted under national law. In the same vein, Recital 33, after recognising the essential nature of confidentiality in order to ensure a fair trial, however recognises the procedures applicable in the event of circumstances that lead to the objective and concrete suspicion that the lawyer is involved in an offence with the suspect or accused person. This derogation is justified by the fact that the criminal activity of the lawyer should not be considered an example of legitimate assistance. It is also specified that the obligation to respect confidentiality implies for Member States not only the prohibition to interfere in such communications or access them but also the duty to ensure, if the suspects or accused persons are deprived of their liberty or are otherwise in a place under state control, that the provisions relating to communication defend and protect confidentiality.

  77. 77.

    Recital 22.

  78. 78.

    Recital 23.

  79. 79.

    Along the same lines are Recitals 25, 26, 28 and 29.

  80. 80.

    By way of example, see Article 3(2).

  81. 81.

    For example, also in terms of summary information, the only case where the lawyer’s assistance is obligatory is that provided for under Article 350(5) CCP-Italy (“at the place or in the immediacy of the fact” for “the immediate continuation of the investigation”).

  82. 82.

    The lawyer appointed in the issuing State will have the role of assisting the lawyer appointed in the executing state “by providing that lawyer with information and advice” [Art 10 (4)].

  83. 83.

    Note that in Directive 2012/13/EU, there is a single derogating provision in relation to the right of access to investigative documents.

  84. 84.

    Recital 30, not fully referred to in Article 3 (5), specifies that during a temporary derogation for this reason, if it is impossible to have immediate access to a lawyer due to the geographical remoteness of the suspect or accused person, the Member States should establish communication via telephone or videoconference, unless this is impossible.

  85. 85.

    Recitals 31 and 32, not included in their entirety in Article 3(6), provide the competent authorities with the power to question suspects or accused persons without the presence of a lawyer only if they have been informed of their right not to respond and may exercise this right, provided that the interview does not prejudice defence rights, including guarantees against self-incrimination. Questioning can take place only for the purpose and to the extent necessary to obtain information essential to avoid serious negative consequences for the life, liberty or physical integrity of a person.

  86. 86.

    Some authors speak of a new step in the “slow” path towards creating a “European statute of defence guarantees”. Among others, see Siracusano (2013), p. 77. Others speak of “‘European codification’ of minimum rules for the protection of the rights of defence”. Among others, Vigoni (2014), p. 14.

  87. 87.

    See also, on this point, Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, http://europa.eu.

  88. 88.

    Rafaraci (2011), p. 129, speaks of “prudent gradualism”, in reference to the EU approach to the issue of procedural rights. More generally, on the “uncertain” path of European integration in the field of criminal procedure, see, among many others, Catalano (2007), p. 522.

  89. 89.

    The criticisms are levelled by Mazza (2011), p. 34.

  90. 90.

    For the particular problems of administrative and judicial cooperation in criminal tax law, see Corso (2013), pp. 465 ff.

  91. 91.

    For an emphasis on the existence of a logical order between cooperation and harmonisation, cf. Galantini (2002), p. 271.

  92. 92.

    In the sense that the harmonisation of defensive guarantees facilitates “the application of the principle of mutual recognition, given that the existence of a common framework of essential individual guarantees increases the mutual trust on which that principle is based”, Rafaraci (2011), p. 120.

  93. 93.

    In turn, the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions is the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the Union [Art 82(1) TFEU]. Caprioli (2007), p. 391, talks of an authentic “cornerstone” of judicial cooperation, In addition, see Siracusano (2011), p. 85; Gaito (2010), pp. 33 f.

  94. 94.

    For the connection between judicial cooperation and harmonisation, see Article 82(2) TFEU. From the point of view of the protection of the rights of defence, see Rafaraci (2011), p. 119; from the point of view of evidence, see Allegrezza (2007), pp. 691 ff.

  95. 95.

    Art. 3(2) TEU.

  96. 96.

    Gaito (2010), p. 33, points out that the protection of fundamental rights assumes a “central role” in the functioning of the EU after the Lisbon Treaty.

  97. 97.

    Pulitanò (2013), p. 1628.

  98. 98.

    See, again, Rafaraci (2011), p. 130, according to whom “an action by the Union that does not restore the connection with the procedural context inherent in cross-border situations probably remains, on one hand, insufficient and, on the other, of dubious legality”.

  99. 99.

    Viganò (2014), p. 10.

  100. 100.

    Article 15 specifies 27 November 2016 as a deadline for transposition.

  101. 101.

    In relation to the above requirements for the immediate application of European standards, see recently, Kostoris (2014), p. 22.

  102. 102.

    Viganò (2014), p. 7, among others, differentiates between non-application, consistent interpretation and direct application.

  103. 103.

    On the possibility for the rules of a European Directive to produce indirect effects, i.e. related to the duty of consistent interpretation imposed on the domestic judge, from their entry into force, with regard to Directive 2010/64/EU regarding interpretation and translation, see Gialuz (2012), pp. 434 ff., who is critical of the contrary interpretation of the Court of Cassation, Division III, 18 March 2011, no. 26703, www.dirittoegiustizia.it. In this ruling, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the provision of Article 8 of the Directive, under which the Member States have to adopt the internal rules necessary to implement the Directive, until 27 October 2013, to exclude the existence of a duty of translation of the judgment for an accused person who does not understand the Italian language. To overcome this interpretative position, see, however, Court of Cassation, Division III, 12 July 2012, no. 5486, Gallo, CED Cass. 2013, 2185. In literature, see Gialuz (2013), pp. 2188 ff.

  104. 104.

    Gaito (2010), p. 26.

  105. 105.

    For example, also in terms of summary information, the only case where the lawyer’s assistance is obligatory is that provided for under Article 350(5) CCP-Italy (“at the place or in the immediacy of the fact” for “the immediate continuation of the investigation”).

  106. 106.

    It should be stressed that this is a power of the states, not an obligation.

  107. 107.

    For the view whereby the assumption of the measure contained in Article 104(3) CCP-Italy “is closely related to […] the precautionary needs underlying the restrictive measure”, see Cass., Division VI, 13 October 2009, no. 39941, Valsena, CED Cass., 244265.

  108. 108.

    Based on these regulatory lines, Italian case law has developed an interpretation whose misalignment with European regulations should be noted. On this point, see Mazza (2010), pp. 89 f.

  109. 109.

    With reference to the value of life and personal safety, see Giuliani (2013), p. 154.

  110. 110.

    According to Marandola (2006), p. 362, “the choice not to encode with sufficient precision the cases when derogation is possible has led to practices which are divergent from the real legislative intention”.

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Arasi, S. (2015). The Effects of the Directive 2013/48/EU on the Italian System of Precautionary Measures: Defence Rights in Remand Hearings. In: Ruggeri, S. (eds) Human Rights in European Criminal Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12042-3_14

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