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Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy pp 367–387Cite as

Quotation and the Use-Mention Distinction

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Part of the book series: Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology ((PEPRPHPS,volume 1))

Abstract

Quote marks, I claim, serve to select from the multiple ostensions that are produced whenever any expression is uttered; they act to constrain pragmatic ambiguity or indeterminacy. My argument proceeds by showing that the proffered account fares better than its rivals—the Name, Description, Demonstrative, and Identity Theories. Along the way I shall need to explain and emphasize that quoting is not simply the same thing as mentioning. Quoting, but not mentioning, relies on the use of conventional devices.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Washington (1992) criticizes Davidson's theory on the grounds that quotation may refer to size and other features aside from shape, and Garcia-Carpintero (1994) concurs. Granted, I can truthfully say "a" is smaller than "a". However, "shape" can refer to all sorts of formal properties, including size. After all, size is a geometrical feature, speaking in the strictest, mathematical sense.

  2. 2.

    For the sake of clarity, I sometimes use double apostrophes and italicization as interchangeable marks of quotation. When I put a word in italics and a set of apostrophes, it is equivalent to being inside of two sets of apostrophes.

  3. 3.

    Cappelen and Lepore (1997, p. 439) note the non-iterativity of quotation within their Demonstrative Theory, though they do not recognize it as a problem. Grandy (1973, p. 106) notes an analogous recursion problem for Davidson's paratactic theory of indirect discourse.

  4. 4.

    While it is clear that word magic of Type I is irrational, Type II is a doubtful case. In any event, I apologize if I offend any sensibilities, and hope you see that my point might have been lost had I stuck to ciphers and circumlocutions.

    Perhaps too I ought to clarify that "word magic" is a standard anthropological term (cf. Ogden and Richards 1923), and I am not using it as an implied ad hominem against anybody. Obviously I am not trying to taint the Name and Description Theorists by this terminology, for they deny the existence, or at least the significance, of word magic. Just as obviously I am not trying to taint picture theorists, for the picture theory, or something like it, is what I am advocating. What I do want to do is to emphasize some robust properties of quotation that get ignored in the philosophical literature.

  5. 5.

    Boolos (1995) discusses another kind of ambiguity, one due to scope. For instance, (i) denotes either (ii) or (iii):

    1. (1)

      “a” followed by “b”

    2. (2)

      ab

    3. (3)

      a” followed by “b

    Incidentally, Boolos proposes a way of resolving such ambiguity: in an ideal language you could use subscripts so that each left quote mark gets explicitly and uniquely paired up with some right quote mark.

  6. 6.

    For simplicity I subsume the phonetic and the phonological under the "phonic".

  7. 7.

    I use "use" and "mention" in their technical senses (to utilize an expression with customary reference versus to utilize it in reference to itself). It seems that I need to make this clear because some writers insist that, in order to mention an expression, you need to use it (Geach 1950; Ziff 1960, p. 27; Garver 1965; Davidson 1965 and 1979). The sense in which this is obviously true is irrelevant.

  8. 8.

    I myself am using two layers of quotation—a pair of double apostrophes plus italics—to describe S's speech. In S's speech, however, only a single layer is being used.

  9. 9.

    Most of this paper was written under a University of Illinois University Fellowship in 1995–96, and revisions were made while I held a Beckman Institute Cognitive Science Fellowship in 1997. For reading and commenting on various drafts, I gratefully acknowledge Steve Wagner, Tim McCarthy, Mark Sainsbury, and an anonymous reviewer.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Texas-Pan American, Edinburg TX, 78539-2999, USA

    Paul Saka

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  1. Paul Saka
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Correspondence to Paul Saka .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Barcellona PG ME, Italy

    Alessandro Capone

  2. University of Palermo, Palermo, Italy

    Franco Lo Piparo

  3. University of Palermo, Palermo, Italy

    Marco Carapezza

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Saka, P. (2013). Quotation and the Use-Mention Distinction. In: Capone, A., Lo Piparo, F., Carapezza, M. (eds) Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01011-3_16

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