Abstract
There is no logical process by which science moves from observations to testable hypotheses. Rather, the progress of science depends upon the creative making of informed guesses and then subjecting them to criticism. We must cultivate the highest critical standards towards our own work so that we can identify and eliminate error as efficiently and rigorously as possible.
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References
Magee B (1985) Popper. Fontana, London, p 24 (This is a first rate and accessible introduction to the thought of Karl Popper. It provides insight into how the rigor of philosophical thought in an apparently limited area can generate a coherent worldview.)
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Truran, P. (2013). More on Induction and Justification. In: Practical Applications of the Philosophy of Science. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-00452-5_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-00452-5_9
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