Abstract
This study reveals conditions under which a world leader might credibly issue a brinkmanship threat of preemptive action to deter sovereign states or transnational terrorist organizations from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The model consists of two players: the United Nations (UN) “Principal,” and a terrorist organization “Agent.” The challenge in issuing a brinkmanship threat is that it needs to be sufficiently unpleasant to deter terrorists from acquiring WMD, while not being so repugnant to those that must carry it out that they would refuse to do so. Two “credibility constraints” are derived. The first relates to the unknown terrorist type (Hard or Soft), and the second to acceptable risks (“blowback”) to the World community. Graphing the incentive-compatible Nash equilibrium solutions reveals when a brinkmanship threat is credible, and when it is not – either too weak to be effective, or unacceptably dangerous to the World community.
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© 2009 Springer-Verlag/Wien
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Melese, F. (2009). A Brinkmanship Game Theory Model of Terrorism. In: Memon, N., David Farley, J., Hicks, D.L., Rosenorn, T. (eds) Mathematical Methods in Counterterrorism. Springer, Vienna. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-211-09442-6_19
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-211-09442-6_19
Publisher Name: Springer, Vienna
Print ISBN: 978-3-211-09441-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-211-09442-6
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