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Equivalence Thesis: Stage C

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Rereading Identity Deception in the UK Sexual Offences Act 2003

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Abstract

This chapter presents the final stage of the Equivalence Thesis (C). It argues that fictitious other impersonation is equivalent to fictitious self impersonation (pretending to be a different kind of person). Accordingly, such impersonation is impermissible and s. 76(2)(b) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 should be read to include it. The substance of the argument is analysis of what counts as fictitious self impersonation. It thus presents the Substantial Difference Argument to support the claim that deception about individual traits, seemingly insufficient, can amount to wholesale impersonation. It builds on previous chapters analysing identity as complex and dynamic, with socio-relational constitutive features. The analysis draws on social, relational, and communitarian/collective conceptions of identity to argue that rather than viewing identity as fixed and immutable, we should view it as a continuum. Objections are addressed.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This is formulated later in this chapter.

  2. 2.

    [2008] EWCA Crim 527.

  3. 3.

    This is a matter of degree. As I understand this, there are two possibilities for fictitious impersonation. One might fabricate an entire self. This is equivalent to adopting a persona. It is fictitious other impersonation. Alternatively, one might fabricate individual traits/attributes, not amounting to an entire persona or self. One the face of it, this would not amount to impersonation. Thus, the central argument is that properly understood, deception as to traits can amount to fictitious self impersonation.

  4. 4.

    [2018] EWHC 3508 (Admin), [2019] QB 1019.

  5. 5.

    Ibid, [82].

  6. 6.

    Radin (1987), p. 1909.

  7. 7.

    Ibid.

  8. 8.

    Meyers (2000); Taylor (1995).

  9. 9.

    Tadros (2016), p. 247.

  10. 10.

    Radin (1987), p. 1906.

  11. 11.

    Ibid, p. 1906.

  12. 12.

    Further argument would be needed to address this mens rea element. I leave aside questions about the justice of imputed intention in criminal law.

  13. 13.

    Noggle (1999); Schechtman (2018). See also Wallace (2019) who modifies Buchler’s (1990) use of the concept.

  14. 14.

    Noggle (1999), p. 315.

  15. 15.

    Ibid, p. 315.

  16. 16.

    Ibid, p. 315.

  17. 17.

    Schechtman (2018).

  18. 18.

    Noggle (1999), p. 315.

  19. 19.

    Ibid, p. 315.

  20. 20.

    Chen and Urminsky (2022).

  21. 21.

    Everett et al. (2022).

  22. 22.

    Parfit (1986), p. 352.

  23. 23.

    Tobia (2015), p. 402.

  24. 24.

    Ibid, p. 396.

  25. 25.

    Meyers (2000).

  26. 26.

    Relational theorists make a similar claim in respect of autonomy. See Wardrope (2015).

  27. 27.

    Clifford (1988), p. 344.

  28. 28.

    Wendt (1994), p. 395.

  29. 29.

    Foster and Herring (2017), p. 3.

  30. 30.

    Ibid, p. 3.

  31. 31.

    Feinberg (1990), p. 85.

  32. 32.

    Taylor (1995), p. 62.

  33. 33.

    Parfit (1984).

  34. 34.

    Ibid, p. 64.

  35. 35.

    Anderson and Honneth (2005); Westlund (2009).

  36. 36.

    Taylor (1995).

  37. 37.

    Meyers (2000), p. 163.

  38. 38.

    Sandel (1982), p. 179.

  39. 39.

    Berlin (1969), p. 159.

  40. 40.

    Wallace (2019).

  41. 41.

    Parfit (1984), p. 327.

  42. 42.

    Gallagher and Marcel (1999).

  43. 43.

    Epilogue, p. 492.

  44. 44.

    Gallagher and Marcel (1999).

  45. 45.

    Frankfurt (1971).

  46. 46.

    Taylor (1995).

  47. 47.

    Ibid.

  48. 48.

    Views differ concerning what ‘intersectionality’ refers to. See Anthias (2012) for discussion.

  49. 49.

    Anthias (2012), p. 2.

  50. 50.

    Williams (2008), p. 67.

  51. 51.

    Clement (2018), p. 276.

  52. 52.

    Madden Dempsey and Herring (2007).

  53. 53.

    [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371; [1998] 162 D.L.R. (4th).

  54. 54.

    Ibid, [563].

  55. 55.

    Williams (2008), p. 67.

  56. 56.

    Creation of reasons might be less morally wrongful. Still, depending on the facts, it could come within the offence, though perhaps as a second-degree version of rape.

  57. 57.

    See Ysseldyk (2017); Ysseldyk et al. (2010, 2018).

  58. 58.

    Duckitt (1989), p. 70.

  59. 59.

    De Cecco and Elia (1993), p. 18.

  60. 60.

    Monica (n 4).

  61. 61.

    This all assumes an objective account. On a subjective account, the conditions V places on her consent express what matters (to her).

  62. 62.

    Foster and Herring (2017), p. 18.

  63. 63.

    ibid, p. 18.

  64. 64.

    Monica (n 4).

  65. 65.

    Fearon (1999).

  66. 66.

    Ibid, p. 13.

  67. 67.

    Ibid, p. 13.

  68. 68.

    Herring (2013) on Nedelsky (1989).

  69. 69.

    Wallace (2019), p. 29.

  70. 70.

    Kahan et al. (2012).

  71. 71.

    Fearon (1999), p. 16.

  72. 72.

    Gross (2015).

  73. 73.

    For example, CrimA 5734/10 Kashur v. state of Israel [2012], Takdin (Isr.), Nevo Legal Database.

  74. 74.

    CrimC (Jer) 561/08 State of Israel v. Sabbar Kashur, PM 1996(123) (2010) (Isr.).

  75. 75.

    Gross (2015).

  76. 76.

    Ibid, p. 33.

  77. 77.

    Ibid, p. 3.

  78. 78.

    Benson (2003).

  79. 79.

    Archer (2015); Greenwood (1994).

  80. 80.

    Honoré (1999).

  81. 81.

    Ibid, p. 15.

  82. 82.

    Dworkin (1993).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Magdalen College, Oxford, UK

    Rakiya Farah

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  1. Rakiya Farah
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Appendices

Cases

  • CrimC (Jer) 561/08 State of Israel v. Sabbar Kashur, PM 1996(123) (2010) (Isr.)

  • R v Devonald [2008] EWCA Crim 527

  • R (Monica) v DPP [2018] EWHC 3508 (Admin), [2019] QB 1019

  • R v Cuerrier [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371; [1998] 162 D.L.R. (4th)

Legislation

  • Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 76(2)(b)

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Farah, R. (2023). Equivalence Thesis: Stage C. In: Rereading Identity Deception in the UK Sexual Offences Act 2003. SpringerBriefs in Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44475-3_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44475-3_9

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