Abstract
This is the introductory chapter of the edited volume "The Political Economy of Lobbying: Channels of Influence and their Regulation". The book analyzes interest groups and lobbying from the perspective of the economic theory of politics (also known as Public Choice theory). The book pursues an interdisciplinary approach, integrating political science and economic perspectives. It provides a comprehensive overview of the current state of the art in lobbying research, and offers fresh new perspectives on a classic topic in interest group research. This introductory chapter provides an overview of the book and its individual chapters which cover three major topic areas: (1) politico-economic theories of lobbying, (2) channels of influence and their regulation, and (3) lobbying in selected world regions.
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Mause, K., Polk, A. (2023). Introduction. In: Mause, K., Polk, A. (eds) The Political Economy of Lobbying. Studies in Public Choice, vol 43. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44393-0_1
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