Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Transporting a Secret Using Destructively-Read Memory

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Security Protocols XXVIII (Security Protocols 2023)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 14186))

Included in the following conference series:

  • 154 Accesses

Abstract

Alice wants to send Bob a secret such as a one-time pad. Our proposal is to use a specially designed mass-produced memory chip, rather like a flash drive, called a DeRM (Destructive-Read Memory). As with other distribution methods, including tamper-evident containers and QKD, we require a side-channel that provides end-point authentication and message integrity (although not message secrecy). Advantages of the DeRM over other tamper-evident containers include that DeRMs can be clonable, and correct verification that the DeRM has not been accessed in transit is ensured by the process of extracting the secret content.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 49.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 64.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    www.smxrtos.com/articles/whiteppr/flashperformance.htm.

References

  1. Christianson, B., Shafarenko, A.: Vintage bit cryptography. In: Christianson, B., Crispo, B., Malcolm, J.A., Roe, M. (eds.) Security Protocols 2006. LNCS, vol. 5087, pp. 261–265. Springer, Heidelberg (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04904-0_34

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  2. Christianson, B., Shafarenko, A., Stajano, F., Wong, F.L.: Relay-proof channels using UWB lasers. In: Christianson, B., Malcolm, J. (eds.) Security Protocols 2010. LNCS, vol. 7061, pp. 45–46. Springer, Heidelberg (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45921-8_8

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  3. Miller, F.: Telegraphic Code to Insure Privacy and Secrecy in the Transmission of Telegrams. Charles M. Cornwell, New York (1882). https://books.google.com/books?id=jNf2GwAACAAJ

  4. Ryan, P.Y.A., Christianson, B.: Enhancements to prepare-and-measure based QKD protocols. In: Christianson, B., Malcolm, J., Stajano, F., Anderson, J., Bonneau, J. (eds.) Security Protocols 2013. LNCS, vol. 8263, pp. 123–133. Springer, Heidelberg (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41717-7_14

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  5. Stajano, F., Wong, F.-L., Christianson, B.: Multichannel protocols to prevent relay attacks. In: Sion, R. (ed.) FC 2010. LNCS, vol. 6052, pp. 4–19. Springer, Heidelberg (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14577-3_4

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, AL10 9AB, UK

    Bruce Christianson & Alex Shafarenko

Authors
  1. Bruce Christianson
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Alex Shafarenko
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Alex Shafarenko .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

    Frank Stajano

  2. Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic

    Vashek Matyáš

  3. University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, UK

    Bruce Christianson

  4. Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John’s, NL, Canada

    Jonathan Anderson

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this paper

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this paper

Christianson, B., Shafarenko, A. (2023). Transporting a Secret Using Destructively-Read Memory. In: Stajano, F., Matyáš, V., Christianson, B., Anderson, J. (eds) Security Protocols XXVIII. Security Protocols 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14186. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-43033-6_3

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-43033-6_3

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-43032-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-43033-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation