Abstract
We propose a model-based procedure for preventing security threats using formal models. We encode system models and threats as satisfiability modulo theory (SMT) formulas. This model allows us to ask security questions as satisfiability queries. We formulate threat prevention as an optimization problem over the same formulas. The outcome of our threat prevention procedure is a suggestion of model attribute repair that eliminates threats. We implement our approach using the state-of-the-art Z3 SMT solver and interface it with the threat analysis tool THREATGET. We demonstrate the value of our procedure in two case studies from automotive and smart home domains.
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreements No. 956123 (FOCETA), No. 871385 (TEACHING) and from the program “ICT of the Future” of the Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG) and the Austrian Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology under grant agreements No. 867558 (project TRUSTED).
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Notes
- 1.
THREATGET uses its own syntax and semantics to express threats [3]. We use instead predicate logic to facilitate the encoding of the forthcoming algorithms into SMT formulas. Our implementation contains an automated translation from THREATGET syntax to threat logic.
- 2.
We ignore here a fourth possible verdict \(\mathop {\textrm{unknown}}\limits \) that can arise in practice and that happens if the solver is not able to reach a conclusion before it times out.
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Tarrach, T., Ebrahimi, M., König, S., Schmittner, C., Bloem, R., Ničković, D. (2023). Attribute Repair for Threat Prevention. In: Guiochet, J., Tonetta, S., Bitsch, F. (eds) Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security. SAFECOMP 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14181. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40923-3_11
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