Abstract
This chapter provides a broad overview of the different philosophical frameworks that have emerged attempting to situate computer simulations and their epistemic import within scientific inquiry. In particular, it provides an analysis of the two main frameworks through which computer simulations have been understood: on one side there are those that have interpreted computer simulations to be akin to mathematical models; on the other side those that consider their extra-mathematical elements to be evidence of their epistemic proximity to empirical experimentation. Together, these two frameworks constitute a dominant dichotomy in the understanding of computer simulations in science. Important reactions to and within this dichotomy are also surveyed in this chapter as the ‘in-betweenness’ of computer simulations is introduced and explored.
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Notes
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The representational heuristic of the simulations pipeline will be treated in more detail in a further section within this chapter.
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He mentions three possible objections against the supposed sui generis nature of computer simulations in these claims: (1) you could say that computer simulations are just extensions of numerical methods already in existence. Therefore, they are not entirely an additional methodology, as suggested by the first claim; (2) computer techniques do not qualify as a method apart because they do not directly access empirical content. If so, then it is hard to account for what exactly is their epistemic import in scientific inquiry; and (3) examining the reliability of computational methods has serious-enough challenges that may prevent them from ever meeting the requirements of rigor in scientific settings. Hence, even if computer simulations were to qualify as an additional category of scientific inquiry, that they would be on a par with existing methodologies is highly questionable.
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Importantly, the question of whether or not simulations in fact represented any novel epistemic challenges gave rise to an important debate about the nature and role of computer simulations in science. In particular, Frigg and Reiss (2009) wrote an important rebuttal of the views expressed by Humphreys which implied that computer simulations were anything new: in their view, not only did simulations not represented the advent of a new methodological paradigm, as some of the quotes above suggest, but philosophically speaking they also did not pose any new epistemically interesting questions. And if they posed any epistemically interesting questions at all, these were questions that could be easily addressed by, or whose context could already be found in, the rich literature in philosophy of science concerning the role of models.
It is within this debate on the possible epistemic novelty of computer simulations that important questions and insights begin to emerge regarding the close relationship of computer simulations with models. Those with the intuition that there was indeed something epistemically particular and therefore interesting about the use of computer simulations in science responded to Frigg and Reiss. Amongst them was Humphreys own reply (2009a, b) in which he states that at the very least, computer simulations do in fact represent novel epistemic challenges due to the unprecedented epistemic opacity of their processes. While other methods may be generally opaque, Humphreys argues, computer simulations are essentially epistemically opaque.
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As we will see, another argumentative strategy is to acknowledge the distinction of computer simulations from either category and push the discourse to its natural conclusion: accepting that computer simulations must be in fact a strange and novel element in scientific inquiry altogether. A sui generis way of doing science. In other words, by suggesting that computer simulations are neither exactly identical to formal methods like mathematical modeling or identical to established experimental practices, philosophers and practitioners have tried to make sense of their epistemic role in scientific inquiry by suggesting that computer simulations are epistemologically speaking somewhere in between experiment and theory because they are completely novel additions to science or because they are a distinct kind of science or a distinct kind of scientific practice. While there is much to be said about these other strategies, let us consider the first argumentative strategy first.
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As we will also see, the view that computer simulations are instruments does not belong to any of these strategies. Yes, the instrument view accepts that computer simulations does not belong to either category. Yet it does not deem them to be special cases of either. And no, it does not deem them to be a novel sui generis element of scientific inquiry either.
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In fact, it is precisely the detail that computer simulations require the kind of calibration or tuning that Lenhard mentions that makes Florian Boge (2021) think that computer simulations are more like a precision instrument. This view is in many ways like that of Margaret Morrison explained below, in particular, it deploys a metaphorical use of the term ‘instrument’ that makes few ontological commitments, and it is ultimately deflationary vis-a-vis both precision and instrumentation (2015).
- 8.
It is worth noting that in the computer simulation literature, even this seemingly simple assertion is highly contested (See Primiero, 2019 Ch. 10–12 p. 171–213)
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Alvarado, R. (2023). The Rise of a Dichotomy. In: Simulating Science. Synthese Library, vol 479. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38647-3_3
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