Abstract
We build non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) and ZAP arguments for all \(\textsf{NP} \) where soundness holds for infinitely-many security parameters, and against uniform adversaries, assuming the subexponential hardness of the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption. We additionally prove the existence of NIZK arguments with these same properties assuming the polynomial hardness of both CDH and the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) assumption. In both cases, the CDH assumption does not require a group equipped with a pairing.
Infinitely-often uniform security is a standard byproduct of commonly used non-black-box techniques that build on disjunction arguments on the (in)security of some primitive. In the course of proving our results, we develop a new variant of this non-black-box technique that yields improved guarantees: we obtain explicit constructions (previous works generally only obtained existential results) where security holds for a relatively dense set of security parameters (as opposed to an arbitrary infinite set of security parameters). We demonstrate that our technique can have applications beyond our main results.
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Notes
- 1.
Throughout this work, we focus on NIZKs in the common reference string (CRS) model. In the Random Oracle model, NIZKs are known to be in Minicrypt.
- 2.
In a designated-verifier NIZK, the verifier receives a private verification key that is sampled together with the CRS, which can be used to verify many proofs.
- 3.
[35] actually provides two NIZKs. The first one provides statistical zero-knowledge, but only non-adaptive soundness. The second is adaptively-sound and computationally zero-knowledge. Because our approach can only yield computational zero-knowledge, we will use the second version.
- 4.
- 5.
Assuming the (family of) group is of prime order.
- 6.
Formalizing such a statement turns out to require quite a bit of care, because of subtleties specific to the precise soundness statement of [35]. We will not develop these difficulties further here, as we will directly prove a stronger statement below.
- 7.
- 8.
We only know how to instantiate our universal breaker using a superpolynomial (resp. inverse superpolynomial) function t (resp. \(\varepsilon \)) so that \(\lambda \in \textsf{SECURE}\) implies that DDH is polynomially hard on \(\lambda \) against uniform adversaries. We therefore still need to rely on complexity leveraging, resulting in a superpolynomial gap.
- 9.
This is because the ZAP argument of [35] is only non-adaptively sound.
- 10.
Intuitively, multi-theorem zero-knowledge ensures that a simulator can provide many simulated proofs under a common simulated CRS.
- 11.
See the paragraph on infinitely-often security in Sect. 3.2 for a definition of soundness w.r.t. an infinite set E.
- 12.
Taking any other subexponential upper-bound for t would suffice for us, but would result in additional unnecessary notation.
- 13.
The universal breaker from Lemma 25 is already a strong breaker, so the proof of Lemma 15 can directly argued combining Lemma 18 with Theorem 12, without explicitly using Lemma 17. This is because we internally amplified the success probability of \(\textsf{UnivBreak}\) in Lemma 25 (using Lemma 17).
- 14.
- 15.
See the paragraph on infinitely-often security in Sect. 3.2 for a definition of soudness w.r.t. an infinite set E.
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Acknowledgements
G. Couteau is supported by the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR), under grant ANR-20-CE39-0001 (project SCENE), and the France 2030 ANR Project ANR22-PECY-003 SecureCompute. The second author was supported in part by NSF CNS-1814919, NSF CAREER 1942789, Johns Hopkins University Catalyst award, JP Morgan Faculty Award, and research gifts from Ethereum, Stellar and Cisco. Zhengzhong Jin was supported in part by DARPA under Agreement No. HR00112020023 and by an NSF grant CNS-2154149. Willy Quach was supported by NSF grant CNS-1750795, CNS-2055510
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Couteau, G., Jain, A., Jin, Z., Quach, W. (2023). A Note on Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge from CDH. In: Handschuh, H., Lysyanskaya, A. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2023. CRYPTO 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14084. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38551-3_23
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