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Modeling Attack Security of Physical Unclonable Functions based on Arbiter PUFs

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  • © 2023

Overview

  • Shows the insecurity of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF) designs, which are developed to be secure against attacks
  • Provides an overview over PUF designs based on Arbiter PUFs in one place
  • Proposes a new PUF design that is shown to be secure against known modeling attacks

Part of the book series: T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services (TLABS)

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Table of contents (8 chapters)

Keywords

About this book

This book studies the security of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) based on the Arbiter PUF design, with a focus on so-called modeling attacks. The author shows the insecurity of several designs and proposes a novel construction that is proven to be immune against attacks known in scientific literature. The book explores designs of variants and compositions of the Arbiter PUF, which was introduced as a CMOS-compatible, electrical PUF design, and has received a lot of research attention, albeit being insecure with respect to modeling attacks. After revisiting modeling attacks on the Arbiter PUF and XOR Arbiter PUF, the author demonstrates attacks against the Lightweight Secure XOR Arbiter PUF, Feed-Forward Arbiter PUF, and the Interpose PUF. He then introduces two novel PUF designs, the Beli PUF and the LP-PUF, and analyzes their security against modeling attacks. The book concludes by showing how the LP-PUF is resilient against currently known modeling attacks.

Authors and Affiliations

  • Berlin, Germany

    Nils Wisiol

About the author

Nils Wisiol completed his Ph.D. in hardware security at Technische Universität Berlin, focusing on the modeling attack security of Physical Unclonable Functions. His work on Arbiter PUFs has been published at several hardware security venues, including CHES and HOST. He received his Master’s degree 2014 from the State University of New York at Buffalo.

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