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Part of the book series: LCF Studies in Commercial and Financial Law ((LCFSCFL,volume 2))

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Abstract

Over the last three decades, capital market law in Europe has become genuine EU law—practically all-encompassing at the level of standard-setting and rule-making itself (including implementing acts), (somewhat) weaker at other relevant levels, namely liability issues. Mads Andenas is a true European citizen, navigating from Oslo to Sicily, Oxford to Berlin and back to London. More than virtually all other company and capital market lawyers, he, in his heart and his writings, is as well a genuine fundamental rights and values expert. Therefore, revisiting an allegedly exclusively efficiency driven European capital market law may be a particularly good topic for him—asking as its core question whether there may not be other values as well that this area of the law already de lege lata wants to further or at least de lege ferenda could further. This is namely trust and thereby as well a new mesotes between an efficiency paradigm and a paradigm of truly empowering household investment—a thrust still rather in its infancy in European capital market thinking.

This inquiry is based—with adaptations—on two contributions (in German) in honour of the two most prominent female company and capital market experts in Germany of this generation, Christine Windbichler and Barbara Grunewald, Grundmann (2020a) and Grundmann (2021a)—of course well known to the cosmopolitan scholar honoured in this volume. The topic is supranational in essence and therefore an English adaptation was needed. For help on the translation and adaptation my special thanks go to Henri Winter.

Stefan Grundmann is Professor of Private and Business Law at Humboldt University in Berlin, Germany, and Professor of Transnational Private Law at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For these stages of Europeanization—comprehensive in rulemaking, far-reaching also on three other important levels—see broadly: Grundmann (2019), p. 1.

  2. 2.

    Andenas and Wooldrige (2009); Andenas and Cherednychenko (2020); Andenas and Deipenbrock (2016).

  3. 3.

    Most recently Andenas and Brown (2020), p. 490.

  4. 4.

    See literature in the following and in particular EUI thesis by Yiatrou (2020) with whom the scholar honoured in this volume liked to discuss her thesis.

  5. 5.

    Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market, and repealing Directive 2003/71/EC, EU OJ 2017 L 168/12; Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, EU OJ 2014 L 173/1; along with Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on criminal sanctions for market abuse (market abuse directive) [MAD-Crim], EU OJ 2014 L 173/179 (originally Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 coordinating regulations on insider dealing). See on all of this in more detail Grundmann (2021c).

  6. 6.

    Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU, EU OJ 2014 L 173/349 (connected with: Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, EU OJ 2014 L 173/84; on this legal act see also Busch and Ferrarini (2017) and Grundmann (2021c), part 8. On conflicts of interests see Grundmann and Hacker (2017), p. 165.

  7. 7.

    On the abandonment of fundamental resistance from Germany in April 1989 see Assmann (1994a), p. 199; cf. prior to the adoption of the EEC Insider Trading Directive 89/592/EEC predominantly Hopt and Will (1973); after the adoption: Hopt and Wymeersch (1991).

  8. 8.

    According to this, capital markets do not accurately reflect all relevant information about companies, their opportunities and risks, i.e. more generally also about the ‘real economy’ but they do reflect the publicly known information. See on the ECMH in this version Fama (1970), p. 383; on implementation of capital market law Gilson and Kraakman (1984), p. 553 ff. See Gilson and Kraakman (2014) on the question of whether the financial crisis has shaken the foundations and generally rejecting this. A concise critical summary putting forward certain reservations is offered by Grundmann (2021c), pp. 16–18.

  9. 9.

    See for example, in the area of contract theory, Alces (2011); Benson (2020); Dagan and Heller (2017); Ribeiro (2019); Oman (2017); different in approach, but also important for this line of thinking Saprai (2019); Grundmann et al. (2014); Grundmann and Hacker (2021b); Micklitz (2018); certainly classical for common law Fried (1981); Collins (1999); Kennedy (2006); Kreitner (2004); Smith (2004).

  10. 10.

    Fundamental, on market creation and maintenance through ‘sales law’, Kaufrecht, Windbichler (1998), esp. pp. 271 ff.; subsequently on the infrastructure system Bachmann (2006), esp. pp. 73 ff.; Micklitz (2009), pp. 255 ff.; in the past decade, particularly Hellgarth (2016); Buck-Heeb and Dieckmann (2010); Bumke and Röthel (2017); Fornasier (2013), esp. pp. 65 ff.; Podszun (2014); Poelzig (2012); and (Regulation and Private Law) Grundmann (2017), p. 907; earlier. on various areas Binder (2012); Franck (2016); Grünberger (2013); Schmolke (2014).

  11. 11.

    See only Arnold (2014); Auer (2018); Gutmann (2020); Lomfeld (2015); Schmolke (2014); broad overall treatise by Grundmann et al. (2021); See for an overview Grünberger and Jansen (2017); on cases discussed in this way see Lomfeld (2017).

  12. 12.

    Namely (all on trust and financial or capital market law) Colombo (2010b), p. 829; Colombo (2010a), p. 577; (with special emphasis on the role of regulation) Sapienza (2009), p. 29 and pp. 36–38; Kalss (2010), p. 9. Even before the financial crisis, inquiries can be found sporadically, see Huang (2003); more detailed: Mülbert (2013); and more comprehensive: Mülbert and Sajnovits (2016), p. 1. It is also often pointed out that the first deep conceptualization of prospectus liability in German private law by Canaris was based on the principle of trust (see Sect. 4 below).

  13. 13.

    Namely Beckemper (2011); Wendrich (2013); Pizarro (2017); Beckemper (2010). The role and importance of trust are highlighted in particular in insider law (Sect. 3 below), and prospectus law (see Sect. 4 below) is the subject of a special criminal offence harming capital market confidence (§ 264a StGB).

  14. 14.

    This has been emphasized time and again in sociological research on trust. ‘The prime condition of requirements for trust is not lack of power but lack of full information’—according to this view, modern societies build institutional frameworks for actions that are recognized as risky, ‘trust settings, rounding frameworks of trust’, Giddens (1990), pp. 33 and 35. This is also described as an intermediate state of mind [or consciousness, the editor] between knowledge and (complete) ignorance, see Simmel (1992), p. 393; Barbalet (1996); see on this also Merkt (2000), p. 347.

  15. 15.

    See only Sapienza (2009), pp. 29, 30; and, Mülbert and Sajnovits (2016), p. 23; ibid, p. 1 f.; The opposite extreme can be found, where an across-the-board failure of the information model in capital market law is postulated, in Kalss (2010), pp. 9, 31 ff.

  16. 16.

    Among the most famous examples is Rawls (1971). In his theory of justice, Rawls adopts typical elements from the social sciences, particularly economics, such as rationality as a basic assumption on the part of the rule-giver and individual incentive control; to some extent also total utility maximization. And yet, despite argueing vehemently against utilitarian theories, nevertheless arrives at results with his two principles of justice that deviate completely from those of economics and utilitarian theoretical approaches. On this, see, for instance Sen (2009), pp. 52 ff.; Fleurbaey et al. (2008); Grundmann (2021b), pp. 131–155; Similar convergence tendencies—towards these the main elements—for example in the case of Coleman, when he develops—parallel to Bourdieu—the concept of ‘social capital’, which is central to trust research—as a source of values that does not follow market laws, but is important and partly indispensable even in markets—but at the same time regards rational actors maximizing self-interest as a basis. See Coleman (1990) on social capital, all focusing on it and contrasting it with economic capital. See Bourdieu (1983), p. 183; Coleman (1988); in summary Haug (1997); Portes (1998).

  17. 17.

    Path breaking Hesse (1999), pp. 125 ff.

  18. 18.

    See Evers (2003), esp. chapter 2 with discussion and review of the literature on the question of whether system and organizational trust promote or hinder evolutionary change; Hardin (1991), p. 185; Kramer (1999); Lane and Bachmann (1998); Mülbert and Sajnovits (2016), pp. 7–10 and 12 ff.; Schweer and Thies (2003).

  19. 19.

    More on this kind of methodological pluralism and on the (still very open) question of suitable methodological filters in more detail Grundmann and Hacker (2021a), p. 1; Grundmann (2022a). Against a purely (or even primarily) economic reading of trust explicitly also Luhmann (1994), pp. 210 ff.

  20. 20.

    A concise overview up to this point can be found by Endreß (2002). Further summaries or essays on the centrality of the concept in sociology, for instance trust as a sociological category, in Preisendörfer (1995); Funder (1999); Beckert (2002); ultimately also Beckert (2003), pp. 103–400 f. esp. on Émile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, Niklas Luhmann and Anthony Giddens; the treatise, however, going far beyond ‘trust’. See also Gambetta (1988); Misztal (1996).

  21. 21.

    Hartmann and Offe (2001).

  22. 22.

    Bosshardt (2001), p. 196.

  23. 23.

    Weber (1976), esp. pp. 382 ff.; Weber (1988), pp. 442, 456, 470 ff. goes into more detail on the concept of system trust, more precisely on modern society as a community of consent. Often, since the word ‘trust’ is not used by Weber, reference is made (first) to Luhmann as a primary source for system trust, who certainly did further central work here, see below.

  24. 24.

    This raises the question of whether in societies that place more trust in society as such and its robustness than, for example, in states or institutions such as banks (with their respective stronger consolidation as a system), the investment propensity of, for example, private investors must also generally be higher or at least less negatively influenced by the absence or failure of capital market law that protects expectations well. On this see Olsen (2008); Lunawat (2013).

  25. 25.

    Luhmann (1968), p. 5 f.; on this, see for instance Endreß (2002), pp. 30–34:‘Trust ‘overcomes … information insecurity’; Baecker (1988), p. 219; Beckert (2003), pp. 290–312.

  26. 26.

    On the value of trust as an enabling factor—recognized across disciplines—see (next to Luhmann and Arrow) for instance (also in political science and philosophy) Fukuyama (1995); Geramanis (2002), pp. 7 ff.; Morrison and Firmstone (2000), p. 602; Coleman (1990), pp. 394 ff.; Hartmann and Offe (2001), p. 14.

  27. 27.

    I.e. self-referentially, out of their own laws and structures, Luhmann (1984). See also Teubner (1989); Fischer-Lescano (2012); Hejl (1982); Kjaer (2006); Schulte (2011); Willke (1993).

  28. 28.

    Luhmann (1968), pp. 90 ff.; Luhmann (1991), p. 90; Luhmann (2010), p. 132, each with a foundation of trust that extends beyond the personal level. This is particularly challenging in the context of e-commerce, which is becoming more and more prevalent Morrison and Firmstone (2000), esp. p. 602; and Beckemper (2011), pp. 321 ff.

  29. 29.

    ‘Risky advance’, Luhmann (1968), pp. 27 ff., 53; Coleman (1990), pp. 91 ff.; (Theory of evolution), Güth and Kliemt (1993).

  30. 30.

    Systems and actors in their interplay as key drivers or bearers of the ‘structuration’ of modernity, Giddens (1984); taken up by Beckert (2003), pp. 378 ff. Conversely, however, the irrelevance of personalized trust in this context is still widely assumed, Weber (1972), pp. 382 ff. On the role of these personal bearers of trust in systems—asking whether the all too strong attempt to discipline these bearers of trust is not likely to cause counter-intentional effects, Shapiro (1987).

  31. 31.

    Giddens (1990), pp. 21 ff. and p. 84; taken up and summarized by Beckert (2003), pp. 377–380. Trust ‘only comes to when it is unconscious.’, Hartmann and Offe (2001), pp. 1 and 25; Zucker (1986). Summary given by Endreß (2002), p. 48; similarly Luhmann (1968), pp. 56 ff. and pp. 90 ff. System trust is blind—and only becomes aware when there are breaches of trust, see Pennington et al. (2003), p. 201; comparable—in the context of pedagogy—Schweer and Thies (2003), p. 154.

  32. 32.

    To him, the search for unity in the social science explanatory heuristics, namely the attempt to make the sociological theory of trust particularly compatible with the economic one, is central; for example, by drawing on strict assumptions of rationality, see Coleman (1990).

  33. 33.

    Beckert (2003), esp. pp. 19–97, 403–415; and also Hartmann and Offe (2001), pp. 7, at 11–14 and pp. 16–18; on Beckert’s concept of trust, see, for instance Strulik (2004), pp. 74 ff.

  34. 34.

    Pointedly Sztompka (1995, 1996). More generally Sztompka (1999).

  35. 35.

    Thus the prelude to the groundbreaking contribution on the ‘economics of information’ by Stigler (1961); on development and theoretical and transnational contexts including further core stages of information economics see Grundmann (2021b), pp. 230–247.

  36. 36.

    Arrow (1972), esp. pp. 356 ff. “Virtually every commercial transaction has an element of trust in it, certainly every transaction that is conducted over a period of time” (Ibid., p. 357) and “trust has a very important value …”, Arrow (1974), p. 26. “But they are not commodities for which trading on the free market is technically possible or even practical.” ibid., p. 26. See also Albach (1980).

  37. 37.

    On this line of reasoning and in particular on the concept of reputation, see Klöhn and Schmolke (2015); Sumser (2016), esp. pp. 139–144.; The remarks by Beckert (2003) and Bosshardt (2001), criticising this to be entirely illusory are particularly vehement and profound.

  38. 38.

    On such a calculation of confidence, see for instance Williamson (1993); Mülbert and Sajnovits (2016), pp. 14 ff.

  39. 39.

    Ripperger (1998).

  40. 40.

    For example, trust is too ‘systematically pointed towards accounting, efficiency and effectiveness’, which “threatens to thwart the intention of this step… . After all, the said first steps are grounded precisely in the fact that they are understood as not calculating.”, Endreß (2002), p. 49. It seems possible that one side knows that the other side’s balance of benefits is positive—and then their attitude or action is even quite predictable. However, this knowledge is often not solid. The potential fragility in case of a subsequent change in the assessment of potential benefits is difficult to assess. This is precisely what potentially makes a significant difference in philosophical/social attitudes, Kern (1996), p. 271.

  41. 41.

    Schweer and Thies (2003).

  42. 42.

    See Van Parijs (1993), p. 638; Offe (2000); Warren (1999); Hartmann and Offe (2001), pp. 241–369.

  43. 43.

    Fundamental, Kant (1984/1985) intoducing the first version of the categorical imperative (more equality based) and the second version (equality and human dignity based): “A lie is the throwing away and, as it were, the destruction of his [the deceived person’s] human dignity”, Kant (1985), p. 562; and the imperative itself: ‘Act in such a way that you use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of everyone else, at all times as an end [in itself], never merely as a means.’, Kant (1984), p. 79; on this, following Kant, understanding a breach of trust as a violation of the claim to equal human dignity (‘in reality, one uses one’s person, with its trust and its spiritual claim to truth, for an end [the human being thus as a mere means] that one does not believe one can achieve without the cunning of untruth’), Drewermann (2005), p. 224; taken up by Mersits (2016), pp. 303 ff.; particularly pointed by Rawls’ disciple: ‘Deceivers do not treat others as moral equals, they exempt themselves from obligations that they rely on others to live up to.’ (emphasis added), O’Neill (2002).

  44. 44.

    Hartmann and Offe (2001), pp. 7, 11–14; on ‘interest, reason and moral’, Ziegler (1996), p. 241. See, more generally, Faulkner and Simpson (2017).

  45. 45.

    In general private law, see for instance for ‘falsus procurator’ liability Schubert (2018), pp. 2120 ff.; Criticism is much more widespread in prospectus law, for which Canaris’ approach to liability on the basis of trust was initially the/one main concept in Germany, but later on and alternatively, a concept of liability by virtue of professional role was relied upon Hopt (1980); Hopt (1979), p. 237; following him, for instance Lang (2001), pp. 557–565, and also Schwark (1987), p. 2045; and see Köndgen (1981), pp. 224–227.

  46. 46.

    In response to the aforementioned criticism above all Canaris (1971), passim, for instance p. 540 n. 78, and esp. (strong differentiation according to norm-specific bona fides), pp. 503–517; on prospectus liability Canaris (1971), pp. 272–276; Canaris (1975/88), pp. 28–42; lastly Herresthal (2016), p. 103, esp. pp. 105–108; Comparative law for the stricter civil liability in cases of reliance, Beale et al. (2010), pp. 371–425; and comparative criminal law Rönnau (2010).

  47. 47.

    Assmann (1994a), pp. 201–204; then—in each case already in the title—for instance Livingston and Haskell (1998); and today Sifuna (2012).

  48. 48.

    Disclosure solely via generally accessible information systems, see Buck-Heeb (2016), p. 113; Hopt and Kumpan (2017), p. 1223.

  49. 49.

    Assmann (1994a), p. 242; even on broadcasts on the internet, see Claussen and Florian (2005), p. 749; For general meetings and court hearings, see Assmann (1994b), p. 512; Issuer Guideline of the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, version of 22 July 2013 (no new version for MAR so far), III.2.1.2 and IV.2.2.12.

  50. 50.

    For the notion of equal access, see Case C-384/02, Grøngaard/Bang, ECLI:EU:C:2005:708 and Case: C-45-08, Spector Photo Group, ECLI:EU:C:2009:806.

  51. 51.

    Path breaking Manne (1966), pp. 76–91, 111–158 f.; Manne (1966); Carlton and Fischel (1983), pp. 866–872; Ruder (1964/65), pp. 210–212; to some extent also Fenn et al. (1991), pp. 3 and 6; in this sense also later Manne (1966); but see also the following note.

  52. 52.

    Mülbert and Sajnovits (2016), p. 15 with reference to Mülbert (2013), pp. 172 ff.; again with general reference to the Legal Origins literature LaPorta et al. (1997, 1999); and large parts of the US law and finance literature.

  53. 53.

    This image is adopted by Manne (1984), p. 937 who already speaks of ‘victimless crime.’

  54. 54.

    Hopt and Will (1973); on loss of confidence among traders, Amihud and Mendelson (1988), p. 11. See, more recently, Buck-Heeb and Dieckmann (2010), pp. 244 ff.; Nietsch (2010), p. 589; Krauel (2000), p. 58.

  55. 55.

    Here, the derivation is particularly clear, see Schmidt (1991), pp. 21, 28 ff.; similar: Rudolph (1994), pp. 1345–1349; Krauel (2000), pp. 56 ff.; on the costs of insider-trading see Klöhn (2018b) MAR pp. 97 ff.; Mülbert and Sajnovits (2016), pp. 14 ff.

  56. 56.

    Recitals 2, 23, 24, 32, 55, 58 and Art. 1 Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) and recital 1 MAD-Crim. Early in the early history of this field of law, see recitals 3–6 of the EC Insider Dealing Directive; see Case C-45-08, Spector Photo Group, (1st holding); Assmann (1994a), p. 202; Assmann (1994b), p. 499; Dedeyan (2015), pp. 678 ff.; investor confidence is, however, seen in a primarily subordinate role by Bachmann (2015), pp. 18 ff.

  57. 57.

    See Bishop and Walker (2012), pp. 3 ff. and more detailed in Chaps. 6 and 7; Schmittchen et al. (2007); Basedow (2007); further from the rich German literature see Bechtold and Bosch (2018), pp. 23–25; Huttenlauch and Lübbig (2016), pp. 542–545; Ewald (2020), pp. 18 ff.

  58. 58.

    More on this from Hopt and Kumpan (2017), p. 1278 (even the emergence of rumors is harmful); Zetzsche (2020), p. 815; Klöhn (2016), p. 431.

  59. 59.

    Klöhn (2014), pp. 462 ff. and p. 704; Hilgendorf and Kusche (2019), p. 704.

  60. 60.

    Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).

  61. 61.

    Beckemper (2011), pp. 322 ff.; Lepsius (1996), pp. 283, 289.

  62. 62.

    Case C-101/08, Audiolux, ECLI:EU:C:2009:626, hotly debated mainly in Germany. See on this decision for instance Habersack and Tröger (2010), p. 4; Haar (2010), pp. 189 ff.; more generally Basedow (2010), pp. 27, at 30 ff.; Schön (2010), p. 1347.

  63. 63.

    See Art. 3, 5–8 of Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids, OJ EC 2004 L 142/12.

  64. 64.

    Case C-45-08, Spector Photo Group, ECLI:EU:C:2009:806 (1st recital); see, only Klöhn (2017), esp. p. 2088; and Kumpan and Schmidt (2020), pp. 2272 ff.; summary by Grundmann (2021c), pp. 420 ff.

  65. 65.

    Cahn (1998), pp. 3–11; consenting Schürnbrand (2011); Hirte (2014), pp. 1409 ff.; initially overwhelmingly rejected, this proposal is presently still controversial, but supported by many authors, see the overview by Grundmann (2021c), p. 221.

  66. 66.

    Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market, and repealing Directive 2003/71/EC, EU OJ 2017 L 168/12; on the entry into force, see Art. 49 (2); for more detail on the institutional environment and interplay referred to below, see the references in the commentaries and in the following notes, summarising the rich body of articles. Already commenting on this new version is Groß (2020); Grundmann (2021c), pp. 135 ff. Other commentaries still comment on the (national) forerunner regime.

  67. 67.

    For references for the Regulation and for the Directive, see above. For the references on investor confidence in EU insider law (with analysis), see in more detail Grundmann (2020), pp. 67 and at 85–93; and Mülbert and Sajnovits (2016), pp. 15, 26 and 34–38; and, more general Kalss (2010) and Huang (2003).

  68. 68.

    ‘Confidence in SMEs as a target is taken up again in Art. 15 (2) subpara. 4 (b) of the Prospectus Regulation, the only provision in the regulatory part of the Regulation that refers to ‘confidence’—here now as a guideline for the implementing legislation of the EU Commission.

  69. 69.

    See, even for the Anglo-American sphere, with its significantly above-average capital market capitalization ratio, Bertaut and Haliassos (1995); Campbell (2006, 2016); Darriet et al. (2020). For statistical material (on country statistics), esp. Chater et al. (2010), p. 18; ‘a large literature on household finance has documented the so-called stockholding [non-participation] puzzle’, ibid. p. 56.

  70. 70.

    Whereas, on the other hand, at least for the parallel provision in Art. 15 EU Prospectus Regulation (‘proportionate disclosure’), the investor’s interest is ultimately given priority after all, see recital 22 of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/980 of 14 March 2019 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the format, content, scrutiny and approval of the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market, and repealing Commission Regulation (EC) No 809/2004, EU OJ 2019 L 166/26; Möller and Ziegltrum (2020); Geyer and Schelm (2019), pp. 1738 ff.

  71. 71.

    More specifically on the regionalization of SME promotion and the constitution of this market segment see Klöhn (2018a) Die neue Prospektfreiheit; and (with a list of the different arrangements in the various member states) ESMA, ‘National thresholds below which the obligation to publish a prospectus does not apply’, ESMA31-62-1193; on the other hand, focusing only on the aspect of SME promotion Preuße (2020), pp. 517 ff.; for a targeted focus on the advantages of decentralized rule-making, especially in an area that is characterized by local preferences, local information and possibly also more local trust, see Grundmann (2020), pp. 67 and 93–95.

  72. 72.

    On the absence of the EU recognition regime (‘European passport’), see for instance Preuße (2020), pp. 513 ff.; on the nevertheless existing possibility of individual recognition between member states Moloney (2014), pp. 111 ff. and pp. 119 ff.

  73. 73.

    See BaFin (2014); Grundmann (2021c), pp. 163 ff. Specifically on prospectus law see ibid., pp. 197 ff. and pp. 164–166; Ueding (2009).

  74. 74.

    See, for example, the study commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy in 2016, Innovative SMEs 2025. For the tenor of the perception of the SME sector in Germany, see Vilain (2010), pp. 103–139; on the (re)localisation tendency on the basis of the election programmes of the ‘Bundestag parties’ 2017, Vieweg (2018), pp. 220–228.

  75. 75.

    See only Grundmann (2021c), p. 7 ff. and pp. 61–63; The “grey market” focuses on non-tradable instruments, mostly designed in ways that allow tax savings.

  76. 76.

    On this regime, see more in detail Groß (2020), pp. 336–338; Grundmann (2021c), p. 196 ff.; The questions of condensation of information and the repercussions of such a reduction on investor confidence are in any case similar to the (less far-reaching) condensation of information in the EU growth prospectus (see below Sect. 3). Since these questions are dealt with in more detail there, see below. For reasons of space, we will refrain from going into more detail on the design of the securities information sheet—on the parallel passages and concepts in Sect. 4 WpPG and Art. 15 EU Prospectus Regulation, see only (focusing on the aim of promoting investor confidence) Grundmann (2021c), pp. 197 ff. and p. 240.

  77. 77.

    On the fact that this was seen as sufficient protection, see Bundestag-Drucksache (BT-Drs.) 19/2700, p. 4.

  78. 78.

    Schammo (2011), p. 126 and see note 71 above. On the use of the exemption (option) by national legislators (thresholds, but also introduced protection mechanisms) ESMA (2020)—e.g. the three large Member States (and in general almost half of all Member States) with use of the option up to EUR 8 million, the medium-sized Member States often at EUR 5 million, the Central and Eastern European Member States largely without any exercise of the option.

  79. 79.

    See, rather implicitly only SWD (2015) 255 final, p. 10.

  80. 80.

    Detailed information on this, but also on other forms of condensed prospectus design, namely in the case of follow-on issues Groß (2020), Art. 14 and 15 EU-Propectus Regulation; Grundmann (2021c), pp. 236–241.

  81. 81.

    See recital 22 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/980 of 14 March 2019 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the format, content, scrutiny and approval of the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market, and repealing Commission Regulation (EC) No 809/2004, EU OJ 2019 L 166/26; Möller and Ziegltrum (2020); Geyer and Schelm (2019), pp. 1738 ff.; esp. chapter IV and attachments 23–27 as well as attachments 4 and 5 of the EU-Prospectus Regulations.

  82. 82.

    See already references above. However, this is again limited in the 53rd recital of the EU Prospectus Regulation and according to which the investor may not rely on the same depth of information as in the full prospectus.

  83. 83.

    See 51st recital of the EU Prospectus Regulation; Möller and Ziegltrum (2020).

  84. 84.

    On the following, see more in detail Grundmann (2021c), pp. 16–18 and pp. 156–158.

  85. 85.

    Thus the so-called Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECHM). See also note 8 above.

  86. 86.

    On this mechanism, that prices on capital markets are already efficiently changed by well-informed (professional) investors alone and that other investors can ‘just follow’ these decisions, see, e.g. Welch (1992); Brunnermeier (2001), pp. 165 ff.; Parker (2014).

  87. 87.

    See Edmunds and Morris (2000); Eppler and Mengis (2004); Jackson and Farzaneh (2012); Paredes (2003); Baddeley (2012).

  88. 88.

    On the principle of clarity or transparency in prospectus law outlined in this way, in more detail Just et al. (2007), pp. 139 ff.; Holzborn and Mayston (2014), pp. 177 ff.

  89. 89.

    On the principle of clarity or transparency in general in European capital market law in more detail Veil (2014), p. 24; Brinckmann (2014), p. 294; Otto (2010), p. 2014; see also (but rather as a means to the goal of allocative functioning) Merkt and Rossbach (2003), p. 220; Oulds (2019), pp. 2060 ff.

  90. 90.

    Fundamental Kahneman et al. (1990), p. 1342; see also Hacker (2017), pp. 96 ff. and pp. 532 ff.; More general on warnings, especially in the case of cognitive distortions, Klöhn (2009); Hacker (2017), pp. 771–776 and pp. 898–902.

  91. 91.

    My own view on this Grundmann (2021c), pp. 241 ff.

  92. 92.

    On this issue—and also on the aspect that, conversely, this does not impose an unreasonable burden on investors, since they can distinguish between new and old pieces (better hedged or more speculative pieces) and invest in a differentiated manner accordingly—see Grundmann (2021c), pp. 282 ff. and pp. 303 ff.

  93. 93.

    See, only Grundmann (2021c), pp. 282 ff. and pp. 293 ff.; According to the prevailing opinion, consequential damages are only to be compensated on the basis of a contractual guarantee (rare exception) or on the basis of § 826 BGB, i.e. in the case of intent or even deliberate intent to cause damage Grundmann (2021c), pp. 312–314. This will be assumed as a framework in the following.

  94. 94.

    In addition to the fact that this is the most restrictive claim structure in an international comparison and to the many more far-reaching alternatives (scattered damages, consequential damages, but also triple damages) Grundmann (2021c), pp. 353 ff.

  95. 95.

    See, on all of this (also with further references to voices that continue to assume that the standard of care is contrary to European law, but also still assume that German case law does indeed require ‘gross negligence’), only Grundmann (2021c), pp. 278 ff. and pp. 293–302; there are, however, a number of decisions by the highest court, in which it can hardly be assumed that there was a violation ‘immediately obvious’ to any insider (thus the standard for gross negligence). See, for instance (foreign business press also to be observed) Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen (BGHZ) [official reports] 123, 126, at 129 ff.; Bundesgerichtshof (ongoing obligation to observe and update) Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 1998, 1528.

  96. 96.

    For the modernization of the Law of Obligations (Schuldrecht) prominently Kommission zur Neuordnung des Schiedsverfahrensrechts (1994), p. 31; Justifying this solution intensively in terms of promise content, therefore particularly relevant for the present context Ehmann (2007), pp. 165, 168–178; in summary Grundmann (2022b).

  97. 97.

    On the consideration that strict liability in contract law promotes comparability Grundmann (2009); on other benefits of strict liability Shavell (1980); Schäfer and Ott (2020), pp. 219 ff. and pp. 233–237 and pp. 251–257; Ben-Shahar and Porat (2010).

  98. 98.

    On this see Yiatrou (2020).

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Grundmann, S. (2024). Trust and the (EU) Capital Market. In: Heidemann, M. (eds) The Transformation of Private Law – Principles of Contract and Tort as European and International Law. LCF Studies in Commercial and Financial Law, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28497-7_21

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