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The NATO Enlargement Consensus and US Foreign Policy: Origins and Consequences

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Evaluating NATO Enlargement

Abstract

Following the end of the Cold War, it was not automatic that the United States would back NATO’s expansion into Central and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, consistent support for NATO enlargement has become one of the central features of post-Cold War U.S. grand strategy for over three decades. What explains this trend, and what effects has it had for U.S. national security? Drawing from international relations (IR) theory and policy debates, this paper evaluates a series of hypotheses that might explain the United States’ sustained enthusiasm for NATO’s eastward march. Finding each argument wanting, it develops a synthetic explanation emphasizing the influence of unipolarity on American international opportunities and the effects this had on the course and content of post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy. It then assesses the mixed impact of NATO enlargement on U.S. national security, before discussing implications for policy, historiography, and theory.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For similar efforts to examine the sources of post–Cold War unipolarity, see Layne (2002); Brooks and Wohlforth (2008); Walt (2009); Posen (2006); Mastanduno (1997).

  2. 2.

    As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright testified in 1997, the United States could not ‘dismiss the possibility that Russia could return to the patterns of the past’. Hence, enlarging NATO assisted in ‘closing the avenue to more destructive alternatives’ in Russia’s future. See US Senate (1998), 8. See also Talbott (2019), 412.

  3. 3.

    For example, the 2003 Senate Foreign Relations Committee enlargement discussion coincided with the 2003 invasion of Iraq, leading senators to simultaneously discuss both NATO enlargement and plans for Iraqi reconstruction. See US Senate (2003). On the limited evaluation, compare the range of witnesses and length of testimony in 1998 to the 2008 discussion (US Senate 2008).

  4. 4.

    Equally striking is the speed with which Finland and Sweden decided to pursue NATO membership after decades of formal neutrality. It may well be the case that Helsinki and Stockholm had tacitly used the prospect of abandoning neutrality as a kind of diplomatic deterrent against Russian aggression for much of the post-Cold War era; this would help explain the range of ties (despite formal Finnish and Swedish neutrality) between NATO and the two that emerged after the Soviet collapse. Regardless, the rapidity with which formal neutrality was cast side following the Russian invasion of Ukraine is notable.

  5. 5.

    In this, I use a range of established IR theories to develop potential specific explanations for the enlargement consensus; on this approach, see Van Evera (1997), 40–43.

  6. 6.

    Many opponents of NATO expansion expected that (1) new great powers might soon emerge—suggesting that expansion was strategically risky—just as (2) enlargement might encourage states to counterbalance. See Waltz (1993).

  7. 7.

    NATO’s Partnership for Peace—developed early in the Clinton administration as a way of engaging Eastern European states without formally enlarging NATO—might have offered a mechanism for such commitments. See Art (1998), 400n32; Walker (2019a, b).

  8. 8.

    This dynamic may have created a related problem. Having decided to suppress alternatives, the United States exposed itself to a form of entrapment whereby hints that states were considering security structures besides NATO could spur enlargement; in effect, the United States reduced its control over events.

  9. 9.

    For a related argument, see Porter (2018).

  10. 10.

    Though the importance of the issue is often overstated, it might also allow them to court ethnic voters in key political districts. See Goldgeier (1999a, 1999b), 100–101.

  11. 11.

    Domestic politics may have entered the calculation in a slightly different way following the 2016 election of Donald Trump. Trump was widely perceived to be overly interested in establishing a good relationship with Russia in general and Russian President Vladimir Putin in particular. Combined with accusations that Russia helped engineer Trump’s election in the first place, Democrats began charging Trump with selling out the United States’ European interests and, especially, allies to Moscow; this had the effect of encouraging Democrats to double-down on the importance of NATO and pre-Trump US policy toward Europe. Many Republicans, meanwhile, seemingly felt vulnerable to charges of being subservient or soft on Russia; seeking to differentiate themselves from Trump, they too began highlighting the value of the United States’ existing approach toward Europe. The net effect was sustained bipartisan support for NATO and the alliance’s continued growth despite—and perhaps because of—the Trump administration. Of course, this specific domestic political angle should not be taken too far: after all, bipartisan support for NATO enlargement preceded the Trump years, just as the drive to separate from Trump’s policies was itself seemingly a response to other factors (e.g., public opinion, concerns with U.S. influence)—the choice did not emerge randomly, and may not have been purely political in nature. Still, future research should investigate whether and how the Trump administration’s particular features affected the domestic politics behind NATO enlargement.

  12. 12.

    On miscalculation of the distribution of power as a source of conflict, see Blainey (1988). For nuanced discussion of the situation in Europe, see Glaser (2010), 213–216.

  13. 13.

    This comes on top of ideational, normative, and institutional factors that many scholars argue independently reduce the risk of European competition and conflict. See Mueller (1989), Risse-Kappen (1996).

  14. 14.

    Likely Swedish and Finnish membership in NATO may mitigate some of the problems associated with a conventional defense of the Baltics, though is unlikely to resolve all issues. For that matter, Finland—despite its impressive indigenous capabilities—may present another difficult military challenge for the alliance.

  15. 15.

    To be sure, the US is free not to utilize nuclear weapons on behalf of a NATO ally amid a crisis. Still, given the questions this could raise over the United States’ future credibility and the concern US leaders have historically shown over the United States’ willingness to reassure its partners, expansion increases the likelihood US leaders may feel obliged to escalate up to and including nuclear use for NATO’s new members.

  16. 16.

    Of course, it remains unclear if the US and/or other NATO members would expand to Ukraine, Georgia, or additional countries bordering Russia if conflict were ongoing. Nevertheless, the US has certainly stressed it is willing to consider continued expansion and, in any case, leaders in Russia, Ukraine, and beyond may believe we are serious about further enlargement. Thanks go to Robert Jervis for help on this point.

  17. 17.

    Critics might argue that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine highlights that Europe indeed faces a hegemonic threat. That argument is wrong. As the Russia-Ukraine War demonstrates, Russia lacks the capability to even conquer even moderately capable neighbors and, in any case, faces strong counterbalancing pressures from other regional actors. It may be aggressive, but it is in no place to bid for European hegemony.

  18. 18.

    The canonical statement of the first point is Olson and Zeckhauser 1966. The second point needs elaboration. Alliances tend to wax and wane as states pool resources in response to threats. This is costly and risky domestically—requiring resource mobilization—and internationally—as states rely on one another for their security. For alliances facing limited threats, it is reasonable to expect states to buckpass and underinvest in military forces as much as possible, hoping that their allies will instead bear the burdens of confronting what threats there are.

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Correspondence to Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson .

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Shifrinson, J.R.I. (2023). The NATO Enlargement Consensus and US Foreign Policy: Origins and Consequences. In: Goldgeier, J., Shifrinson, J.R.I. (eds) Evaluating NATO Enlargement. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23364-7_4

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