The War on Terrorism idea system consists of a hybrid of empirical and ideational codifications. It efficaciously draws on the strengths from both. For example, the massive mobilization of empirical information helped to create extraordinary correlative patterns and vivid illustrations, whereas an ideational mode of codification—which operates on a much more relaxed empirical requirement—was often activated to form constructs or forge linkages whenever empirical codification reached a point of exhaustion.

Such a hybrid structure allowed the Bush administration to establish ideas with a great degree of flexibility. Its codification approaches even withstood the supposed scrutiny within the “modern” informational and media environment. In fact, the administration even incorporated numerous informational, expert, and media apparatuses for their purposes.

Let us now reflect on the key features of the construct and uses of the War on Terrorism idea system, along the five-tier criteria.

Believability

Two phases of the War on Terrorism—the first month after the 9/11 events and the first month after the outbreak of the Abu Ghraib scandal—were primarily based on ideational codification. These two phases had one thing in common: the general information available was scarce. An ideational mode of codification showed its utility by helping to organize disparate information, at great speed, into coherent explanations.

In these ideational codification phases, an internally cohesive set of codes was designed to define the general act, scene, agent, agency, and the purpose in the unfolding, the so-called War on Terrorism. The broad descriptive codes include terrorists, good Americans, democratic values, and freedom haters. These codes had a typical set of general meanings as well as images with which they were associated. Matching—per the principle of resemblance—particular concrete situations, characters, and activities (information) to this scheme of codes yielded various “fitted images.” These “fitted images” (coded information) in turn allowed idea-makers to generate cognitive events such as “winning the War on Terror” and “providing a safe haven to terrorists.” Once such fitted images were developed into structurally organized formats substantiated with a high degree of informational density (in other words, into compact symbolic structures), they enabled many other secondary cognitive processes, including step-by-step logical deduction and the creation of new ideas.

An evidentiary mode of codification was mobilized to extend the War on Terrorism to Iraq. The available empirical information was, however, fractured and ambiguous rather than coherent or definitive. Gaps and imperfections were noticeable. In such situations, the administration strategically used ideational codifications to its advantage. Often, intermittent insertion of fitted images and minor steps of extrapolative guesses (i.e., speculations) bridged otherwise disconnected parts, ultimately affording the creation of coherent accounts, as well represented in Colin Powell’s U.N. presentation in February 2003. Factually true information—such as Iraq having made WMD-production plans before 1991—was brought back to contextualize current sets of uncertain signs, creating discernable cohesive “patterns,” into which currently gathered information fitted.

This case study shows how empirical information and rigorous procedures could serve as bad idea safeguards. These safeguards simulated empirical rigor, actually making the manipulative idea system appear to be much more objective than it would otherwise look without the embellishing information. The backstage apparatus that gathered, filtered, and encoded the empirical information was tightly controlled. Ordinary audiences had no means of examining the rawest possible form of data; instead, they could “openly” access what was ostensibly a close version of them, such as investigative reports, even some that had been “leaked.”

These materials allowed limited critiques, such as the possibility to identify some internal or external contradictions. At the same time, they also enabled the manipulators of an idea system to generate believable speculations that could not otherwise be formed, especially because the manipulators could command a group of organized, institutional experts. These conditions amounted to increased opportunities to create packaged summaries, viewpoints, and biased filtered information that seemed legitimate and believable.

Resilience

Part of the resilience of the War on Terrorism script was owing to its preemptive designs.

In the face of stubborn patterns of uncertain signs, many ideas of threats were not designed to be easily disproven, because of the classic difficulty of “proving a negative.” Conducting the patterns of uncertain signs as a pretext is a key process of empirical codification, if the threat conception is to be kept unchallenged by counterevidence. For a normal person, it can be harder to generate a pattern of uncertain signs. However, for a resourceful nation, given the pretext of discrepancy in documentation, it was relatively easy to create patterns of uncertain signs by the use of the broad category of WMDs. The code “WMDs” does not technically have to specifically refer to nuclear weapons, so stockpiles of chemicals and bacteria commonly possessed by nations for regular needs can easily be made into such suspicious signs. Compared to physically existing objects, it would be infinitely easier to create patterned, uncertain signs if the categories of mental objects were broadened—from actual WMDs to “WMD-related capabilities” or “intentions to develop WMDs.” If a suspected person seeking to disprove an accusation by “proving a negative” is hard enough, a nation seeking to clear itself from suspicion of all of these concrete and abstract objects associated with vague conceptual objects is bound to find it infinitely harder. Even efforts that were monumental cannot—in an absolute sense—disprove the proposition generated from all kinds of suspicious, uncertain signs. The ISG investigation and the U.N. inspection headed by Blix were cases in point.Footnote 1

The ease of creating patterns of suspicious, uncertain signs has been extensively discussed, but a fundamental issue affecting the epistemological condition is that many empirical codification processes were often confidential to begin with. This is different from an open, low-threshold research environment wherein multiple researchers could independently perform their own investigations and generate their own data analysis (ideally without being affected by power). Therefore, even when certain publicized portions of the Bush administration’s account were questioned, some undisclosed procedures and materials could be referenced in their defense. Such backstage confidentiality, alongside the intricate design of accusations, was a major factor for the idea system’s resilience.

Many claims that seemed to be empirical had been fused with ideational codifications; for example, a matter of trust is not really just an empirical matter, and neither is a matter of threat. An entrusted nation could have all the WMDs in the world and not be threatening, while for an untrustworthy nation, even the prospect of being able to develop or own any can be constructed as a matter of grave threat.

Ideationally, many general ideas of the War on Terrorism script were resilient because they were culturally and intuitively valid. Culturally, they were ideational constructs that were already established in the American culture and constantly revalidated in American schools and civil discourse. Intuitively, the ideational propositions—like the mission to battle the forces of “terror”—are also intuitively sensible almost by definition: who would not be against “terror”?

The faults in empirical details, even when revealed, hardly threatened the core proposition of the idea systems. They were rather unimportant partly because of the hybrid structure of constructions. Just as Satan’s power was depicted by de Lancre as consistently inconsistent, terrorists’ and enemies’ methods were always secretive in their multifarious active formations. Because the mysteriousness was given by the object in question, and that the threat could be prospective rather than currently existing, making errors in technical assessment or speculation would not necessarily affect the overall idea system, as long as those errors are compartmentalized as being technical in nature, for which improvement could be sought in future actions. And if the aggregate outcome is assessed to be generally positive in an aggregate sense, the erroneous means would largely be irrelevant—and the strategic errors could be partly attributed to the enemy itself. The successful ridding of an evil, even when motivated by initial misinformation, would not undermine the integrity of the idea system in a fundamental way. Only demonstrated patterns of intentional, immoral motives would do so.

Ensuring that the War on Terrorism script remains intact partly depends on the voices available in the discourse environment. What disaffirming information and ideas are being brought forth and how they are articulated in those voices are important determinants. As our analysis shows, the core propositions were protected in “debates” that took place in national forums, and even in international ones. Fundamental challenges to the moral integrity of the American nation or the motivation of the Bush administration were largely kept out of view in domestic media, and even in the scene of the United Nations. Critical voices were articulated as suggestions of alternative considerations or limited to the specific, technical dimensions of the War on Terrorism project.

This condition of discursive closure made all the most developed, potential alternative explanations fall within a restricted, well-controlled parameter. The Bush administration and the agencies it oversaw created their own potential alternative explanations to address empirical ambiguities. Those that sought to significantly depart from the Bush administration’s explanations often repeated the core propositions when they voiced their alternative interpretations—as evidenced in the busy international discourses voiced at the dawn of the Iraq invasion. It was even more evident in the response toward the Abu Ghraib scandal by a network of elected as well as bureaucratic government officials, crossing the lines of political parties, which was filled with regurgitations of the honorable identity of the U.S. military as well as that of the idea of the War on Terrorism. These discourses repaired any damage to the core propositions by suggesting ways of improving efficacious execution of the project, demonstrating their commitment in the process. Otherwise negative information, whether pertaining to human abuse, informational misjudgment, or financial costs, was actually used to reinforce the strength of the idea system (by the means of what has been called oracular reasoningFootnote 2).

Adaptability

The War on Terrorism script was adapted and readapted by the Bush administration a number of times—from its initial focus on the 9/11 attackers to bin Laden and al-Qaeda, and then to the Taliban and Iraq. Each major shift to a new major enemy or policy objective took some reconstruction work, entailing a new wave of empirical, ideational, and hybrid codifications. But given the enormous informational and expert apparatuses, as well as the flexibility of the script, the process of building connections to new agendas was not too difficult. The unique form of hybrid codification—consisting of flexible switching between evidentiary and ideational modes as well as their creative intermixing—made adaption-related tasks easier.

Empirically speaking, the enormous empirical apparatus run by the U.S. government made the gathering of fitting empirical materials relatively easy. Partly due to the timing, the case of the Afghan war did not even necessitate the use of much empirical work. Referencing historical facts and undisclosed information was largely sufficient. The Bush administration also self-generated a piece of evidence in the discursive interchange; it had requested that Mullah Mohammed Omar’s government in Afghanistan extradite bin Laden, a request that Omar refused, citing fairness, bureaucratic, and religious reasons.Footnote 3 In this way, a key piece of information—an act of protecting “terrorists”—was elicited, aiding in the adaptation of the war target to Afghanistan.

The apparatus was put into work in the case of Iraq. The apparatus needed to generate enough patterned, uncertain signs at the empirical level that could warrant suspicion. Where gaps and deficits occurred, they could be bridged or filled by speculative connections and interpretations afforded by previously validated ideational constructs. When new ideas or agendas emerged, a hybridized version of empirical codification could “catch up” with such changing situations, generating new sets of information, objects, and ideas that looked real, vivid, or legitimate.

Developmental Potential

Developmental potential is equivalent to the ability to “scale-up.” The War on Terrorism idea system was designed to be flexibly expandable.

The initial decision not to treat the 9/11 attacks as a legal case handled by law enforcement and court officials, but instead, promising a “global war on terror” campaign, had moved the efforts into unspecified boundaries. The War on Terrorism was said to have multiple “fronts” (much like how the Chinese Communist Revolution had their multiple fronts and battles).

In the War on Terror, when the “front” moved to domestic policies, budget priorities were altered and new security policies were made. In foreign policy, the U.S. government gained new power in labeling states and groups as terrorists or sponsors of terrorists, pre-legitimizing drastic adjustments in sanctions, immigration, arms sales, aside from physical and verbal coercion. And although the actual act of invasion stopped at the 2003 Iraq war, the idea system pre-legitimizes actions later on.Footnote 4

The opening of new phases of development required agents to assemble a basis of new information, a slightly new set of codes, and from them create new mental objects, make creative and new linkages between them, thus forging stepwise idea creation, equivalences, and an elaborative set of potential explanations’ core propositions. In the vast potentiality of hybrid codification, knowing when to draw from which elements to bridge a gap, as well as knowing what to create in order to service a precise objective, is an art. Those who could tackle the most challenging tasks could be considered agents who had forged catalytic changes to the idea system so that it could be developed into a new phase.

The most prominent catalytic agents, first and foremost, were the backstage players who authored the initial War on Terrorism idea as well as the so-called Bush doctrine that drew equivalence between terrorists and their supporters. These cognitive mechanisms allowed speedy linkages to be drawn between one proposal and the next. And creative metaphors, such as that of “draining the swamp,” serviced as additional catalytic ideas that, in one stroke, added intuitive legitimacy for the United States to dramatically transform multiple countries in order to solve the problem of terrorism. And when a narrow scope was needed, the idea of “Axis of Evil” came into view from Bush’s discourse, and further sub-doctrines (or sub-ideas) pertaining to the methods of weapons inspection and norms of internationalism (including the departure from the U.N. framework) were also devised.

The hybrid format of codification allowed the idea system to have both solid and fluid materials for idea development. An ideational mode of codification could be relied on exclusively if conditions for robust material proof were not available. And when the empirical route of codification was blocked at a particularly critical juncture, infusing ideational codification could serve as an imperfect but nonetheless functioning remedy. Such a fluid, hybrid structure of codification allowed more combinative and synthetic possibilities to be generated.

Ease of Use

The War on Terrorism idea system is bifurcated when it comes to its ease of use.

The ideational mode of codification is easier to master and apply by the public than the empirical mode; it is an “easy-to-use” version of the idea system. The American civil religion was already heavily ingrained in the American vocabulary and culture. The propositions derived from it would have a guaranteed degree of intuitive support as well as familiarity. This quality is a precondition that allowed for speedy extrapolations, parallel structuring, deductions, and conclusions by users of the idea system, which make it very important in the context of casual conversations.

The Bush administration officials often—in the “language of Washington”—modeled an easily digestible and repeatable line of thought and reasoning initially, filled with abstract codes that nevertheless encompassed complex matters and made intuitive sense. Such lines organized a set of “simple and clear” ideas, which were then repeatable by others (officials, experts, journalists, etc.) in public settings.

Through these exercises, the administration institutionalized certain cognitive portals in the polity enabling actors to quickly make their steps from premises to meanings, as if by a “leap.” For example, the concept that all “terrorists” share similar qualities, and that Iraq’s capability was conceptually linked to 9/11 attacks, became quite “natural” due to repetitive rehearsals.

Even if the portal-like linkages were not completely established in the public mind (that is to say, those in the public who are not die-hard believers), they were shared among internal officers in charge of authoring official documents and reports. This pattern could be seen in the reports and documents issued by multiple departmental units—from immigration, visa extension, homeland security, extradition, foreign aid, government research grants, government contracts, congressional research reports, and so forth. Established templates were often developed from year to year without significant changes in their formats except for the need for updates. The categories and styles of depiction—the codification—were built into these internal reports with remarkable continuity.Footnote 5

But empirical conversations have also become a substantial part of public discourse—both in the discussions among pundits invited to TV shows and among fierce online commentators. The detailed empirical codification works were much harder to replicate, or even to reiterate and comprehend, due to their technical nature and sheer volume. Even the most interested, motivated members of the public would find the process of sorting through the details and jargons overwhelming, as well as the task of firmly ascertaining the relations between suspicious evidential signs. It would be much easier for those segments of the public to simply follow the guide of certain epistemic authorities, such as a Powell or a Duelfer. Although the task of debating these empirical matters would still be overwhelming in the space of public discourse, those audiences would receive an elevated advantage in such situations, with officials and experts demonstrating particular lines of codification that they could model and cite.