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UC Analysis of the Randomized McEliece Cryptosystem

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Innovative Security Solutions for Information Technology and Communications (SecITC 2021)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13195))

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Abstract

In this paper, we will examine the UC (Universal Composability) security of an improved version of the McEliece cryptosystem, namely the Randomized McEliece cryptosystem. We will prove that even this improved variant does not realize \(\mathcal {F}_\texttt{PKE}\), the public key encryption functionality securely.

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Correspondence to Daniel Zentai .

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Zentai, D. (2022). UC Analysis of the Randomized McEliece Cryptosystem. In: Ryan, P.Y., Toma, C. (eds) Innovative Security Solutions for Information Technology and Communications. SecITC 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13195. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17510-7_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17510-7_11

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-17509-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-17510-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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