Abstract
In the closing passages of his De unitate intellectus, Thomas Aquinas makes some indignant remarks about the use of language and the philosophical views of one of his unnamed opponents, whom I call Athaq in this paper. I will argue that Aquinas does not intend to accommodate Athaq’s claims in his own system of beliefs. Quite the contrary, he tries to render these claims as outlandish as possible in an attempt to expose what he supposes to be Athaq’s true intention. Aquinas’s theoretical unkindness, however, comes at a price, as it makes himself less rational and coherent, at least with respect to the issues concerned. Put differently, his uncharitable interpretation has a destructive effect on his own philosophy and theology.
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Notes
- 1.
See Thomas Aquinas 1976, 314, 397–430; Keeler 1936, 78–80, no. 122–123. The De unitate intellectus was written during Aquinas’s second teaching period in Paris, most probably in 1270 (see Keeler 1936, XX–XXI. Thomas Aquinas 1976, 248–249; Torrell 1996, 348). I will abbreviate the title of Thomas Aquinas’s De unitate intellectus throughout this paper as DUI, and the thesis of the unity of the possible intellect as TUI. For the sake of simplicity, and since the distinction is not relevant to the argument that follows, I am going to refer to the ensemble of the possible and active intellect as “intellect”. I will quote the Latin text of DUI according to the Leonina edition (Thomas Aquinas 1976). In addition to the page number, I will also give the line numbers of the Leonina edition as can be seen above. Since the paragraph numbers of Leo W. Keeler’s earlier edition are still in use for reference, I will also indicate these numbers as it is usual in the literature (e.g. no. 122–123; this latter will be the standard reference to the closing passages of the DUI discussed in this paper). As a rule of thumb, I am going to use Beatrice H. Zedler’s fairly literal English translation (Zedler 1968), and if needed, I will also indicate the page number of Ralph McInerny’s later rendering (see McInerny 1993). I am going to refer to Aquinas’s unnamed opponent’s individual claims presented by Aquinas as AC1, AC2 and so forth. In Aquinas’s account his opponent makes the following claims. AC1: “Latini pro principiis hoc non recipiunt, (…) quia forte lex eorum est in contrarium.” (“the Latins do not hold this as a principle, (…) because perhaps their law is against it”); AC2: “Hec est ratio per quam Catholici uidentur habere suam positionem.” (“this is the reasoning by which Catholics seem to hold their supposition”); AC3: “Deus non potest facere quod sint multi intellectus, quia implicat contradictionem.” (“God cannot make many intellects, because this would involve a contradiction.”); AC4: “Per rationem concludo de necessitate quod intellectus est unus numero, firmiter tamen teneo oppositum per fidem.” (“I necessarily conclude through reason that the intellect is one in number; but I firmly hold the opposite through faith.”); AC5: “sententiae doctorum de hoc sunt reprobandae” (“the teachings of the doctors on this point should be rejected”). This unspecified claim happens to be in connection with the problem whether “the soul may suffer hell fire” (“anima patiatur ab igne inferni”). See Thomas Aquinas 1976, 314, 400–427; Keeler 1936, 78–79, no. 122–123. Zedler 1968, 74; McInerny 1993, 143. AC3 and AC5 have slightly been modified due to the different syntactic configuration. Aquinas’s comments are going to be discussed later in this paper.
- 2.
Aquinas’s text clearly implies that his remarks in no. 122–123 refer to the utterances of one and the same person, in all probability one of the contemporary arts masters at Paris. One of his claims (AC3) is mentioned earlier by Aquinas in no. 100 and no. 105 as a corollary of one of the central arguments of his opponents. It seems therefore likely that his adversary mentioned in no. 122–123 can be identified with at least one of those philosophers who are referred to in the earlier paragraphs. What is more, since plural references in medieval Latin often indicate individuals, it seems possible that the same person is implied by at least some of Aquinas’s plural references to his contemporary adversaries. For these references see Van Steenberghen 1977, 58–59; De Libera 2004, 250 and 503–504. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the person mentioned in no. 122–123 was the only master Aquinas bore in mind when writing his polemical tract. Famously, Aquinas coined the term “averroista” for his opponents (Thomas Aquinas 1976, 294, 308; Keeler 1936, 12, no. 17), considering them the followers of Averroes with respect to the problem of the unity of the intellect. On this latter point, see Van Steenberghen 1966, 369; 1974, 542–546; 1977, 394–395. The word “averroistae” became widely used to designate those philosophers who are thought to have been targeted by Aquinas’s polemical tract. For the titles, incipits and explicits of the work in the manuscript tradition that used the term “averroista” see Thomas Aquinas 1976, 251–255. On the early use of the term in a different sense see, however, Bianchi 2015, esp. 73–76.
- 3.
The common opinion supported by a robust tradition is that Aquinas’s main contemporary adversary throughout the DUI as well as his unnamed opponent cited and referred to in no. 122–123 was Siger of Brabant. For the extant manuscripts indicating that Siger was Thomas’s target, see Thomas Aquinas 1976, 247–248. For the interchange between Siger and Thomas on the nature of the intellect see, among many others, Mandonnet 1911, esp. 103–112; Nardi 1938, 67–89; Zedler 1968, 5–11; Van Steenberghen 1977, esp. 57–70 and 338–383. Bazán 1972; Bazán 1974; Imbach and Putallaz 1997, esp. 27–55 and 154–168; Mahoney 1974, 532–551. De Libera 1994, 33–65; De Libera 2004, passim. For those who happen to read in Hungarian see my De unitate intellectus volume (studies, commentaries, translation) from 1993 and the dialectical dispute between Gyula Klima and myself. See Thomas Aquinas 1993, and Borbély–Klima 2000. See further Klima 1998. For Siger as Aquinas’s unnamed opponent in no. 122–123 see Mandonnet 1911, 151–153. Nardi 1938, 187–189; Van Steenberghen 1977, 60 and 1980, 53 where he says it is “morally certain” that the master targeted by Aquinas in the epilogue of the DUI is Siger of Brabant; see further De Libera 1994, 49–58, Imbach and Putallaz 1997, 46–47, and De Libera 2004, 503–504. For an overview of Siger’s works that also indicates important chronological issues with reference to further literature see Calma 2006, 190–193. It seems prudent to keep in mind that Siger of Brabant’s Quaestiones in tertium de anima that has often been regarded as an occasion for Aquinas to write the DUI was probably composed around 1265 and not 1269/70 as it had previously been thought. See Gauthier 1983, 209–212. (Bazán eventually accepted 1265 as the date of the work despite his and Van Steenberghen’s earlier objections, see Bazán 2005, 603). Furthermore, aside from some rather general issues that had been discussed in Siger’s Quaestiones and were also debated a few years later by Aquinas, it is hard to find direct and clear connections between the two texts. For these issues see Van Steenberghen 1977, 60. Although Siger’s Quaestiones might have been one of the texts Aquinas used when writing the DUI, it was certainly not the text he referred to in the epilogue. Furthermore, it seems highly unlikely that the “great master”, “one of the most eminent philosophers” at Paris who Giles of Rome famously refers to in his Sentences commentary could be identified with either Siger of Brabant or Boethius of Dacia. See Luna 1999, 656–658; De Libera 2004, 271–272. For his identification with Siger see Nardi 1938, 88, 143; Giele 1971, 20; Van Stenberghen 1977, 70, although hesitantly. For his identification with Boethius of Dacia, see Dales 1995, 154–155, who also suggests that the unnamed opponent of the epilogue of the DUI could have been Boethius (ibidem, 149). This “great master” is certainly identical to the author of the anonymous De anima commentary edited by Maurice Giele. The commentary of the “Anonymous of Giele” dates from 1270 (most probably from before 10 December when Stephen Tempier’s condemnation was issued, see Luna 1999, 656–657) and it contains an immediate and straightforward response to the DUI. For this latter, see Giele 1971, 70–77. Because of the alleged prominence of this master and due to the obvious connection of his work with the DUI, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the Anonymous of Giele could have been at least one of those arts masters whose Aristotle-interpretation had been salient enough in the second part of the 1260s in Paris to provoke Aquinas’s reaction to start writing the DUI. See Piron 2006, 304, and Calma 2006, 211. Be that as it may, I am no longer pursuing the issue of Athaq’s identity in this paper. I will confine myself as strictly as possible to the examination of the problem indicated below in the main text.
- 4.
It could be a reportatio that Aquinas had before his eyes.
- 5.
Aquinas uses the phrase “et quod postmodum dicit” (“and what he somewhat later says”) twice, and, in addition, the slightly different phrase “postmodum asserere audet” (“what he dares to assert later”) within a few lines in no. 122–123. See Thomas Aquinas 1976, 314, 405–406; 314, 409–410; and 314, 412–413. Keeler 1936, 78–79. Zedler 1968, 74; McInerny 1993, 143. We can certainly assume, in accordance with Aquinas’s usage, that these expressions just like “deinde cum dicit”, “postmodum ostendit” etc. refer to a written text he has at his disposal. Cf. e.g. “Set Aristotiles postmodum ostendit quod anima cognoscit omnia in quantum est similis omnibus in potentia, non in actu.” with reference to De anima III, 4, 429a18–24 and 429b29–430a2. See Quaestiones disputatae de anima, q. 8, Thomas Aquinas 1996, 73, 453–456. Similarly, “de hiis enim que pertinent ad unumquemque sensum specialiter, postmodum dicet.” See Sententia libri De anima, Lib. II., Cap. X., Thomas Aquinas 1984a 107, 18–19. “Deinde cum dicit: Set si quidem tale etc., argumentatur ad questionem prius propositam.” See Sentencia libri De sensu et sensato, Tr. II., Cap. 3; Thomas Aquinas 1984b, 114, 119–120.
- 6.
See Thomas Aquinas 1976, 293, 139–140: “ut Commentator peruerse exponit et sectatores ipsius”; 293, 150–151: “sicut Commentator et sectatores eius peruerse exponunt”; 293, 163–164: “ut Commentator peruerse exponit”; 294, 251–252: “sicut Auerroys peruerse exponit”; 302, 93–96: “Quod autem Alexander intellectum possibilem posuerit esse formam corporis, etiam ipse Auerroys confitetur; quamuis, ut arbitror, peruerse uerba Alexandri acceperit”; 314,389–393: “Patet etiam quod Auerroys peruerse refert sententiam Themistii et Theophrasti de intellectu possibili et agente; unde merito supra diximus eum philosophie peripatetice peruersorem.” He also calls Averroes the “philosophie peripatetice deprauator.” See Thomas Aquinas 1976, 302, 156.
- 7.
“«Latini pro principiis hoc non recipiunt », scilicet quod sit unus intellectus tantum, «quia forte lex eorum est in contrarium».” “the Latins do not hold this as a principle, that is, that there is only one intellect, because perhaps their law is against it.” See Thomas Aquinas 1976, 314, 400–403; Zedler 1968, 74; Keeler 1936, 78, no. 122.
- 8.
“Vbi duo sunt mala: primo, quia dubitat an hoc sit contra fidem (…)” “Here there are two evils: first, because he doubts whether this be against the faith (…).” See also Keeler 1936, 78, no. 122. If Athaq is identical to Siger of Brabant, then Aquinas’s reproach would appear to miss the mark. Based on Siger’s extant writings he seems to have been clearly aware of TUI being contrary to faith.
- 9.
“Adhuc autem grauius est quod postmodum dicit «Per rationem concludo de necessitate quod intellectus est unus numero, firmiter tamen teneo oppositum per fidem».” “But what he says later is still more serious: I necessarily conclude through reason that the intellect is one in number; but I firmly hold the opposite through faith.” See Zedler 1968, 74; Keeler 1936, 79, no. 123.
- 10.
Zedler’s and McInerny’s translations reflect this difference: “the Latins do not hold this as a principle, that is, that there is only one intellect, because perhaps their law is against it. See Zedler 1968, 74. “the Latins do not accept this as a principle, namely, that there is only one intellect, perhaps because their law is contrary to it.” See McInerny 1993, 143.
- 11.
Whereas Aquinas himself is certainly trying to use irony at the beginning of DUI to indicate that his adversaries’ high ambitions pair with ignorance: “Et quia quibusdam, ut dicunt, in hac materia uerba Latinorum non sapiunt, sed Peripateticorum uerba sectari se dicunt, quorum libros numquam in hac materia uiderunt nisi Aristotilis, qui fuit secte peripatetice institutor (…)” “Latin writers on this matter not being to the taste of some, who tell us that they prefer to follow the words of the Peripatetics, though of them they have seen only the works of Aristotle, the founder of the school (…)” R. McInerny’s translation: see McInerny 1993, 19. See Thomas Aquinas 1976, 291, 32–36.
- 12.
An example of a “quia forte” sufficiently close to “quia” can be found e.g. in Albert the Great’s Liber de sensu et sensato: “et ideo ex albo et acuto in sonis non fit unum permixtione, sed fit unum ex eis per accidens in hoc subjecto: quia forte utrumque accidentium illorum sensibilium est cum altero in eodem subjecto, sed non fit ex eis unum formaliter permixtione, sicut ex acuto in voce, et gravi in voce mixtura proportionis fit symphonia.” See Albertus Magnus 1890–98, Vol. 9, 84.
- 13.
- 14.
For the use of “lex”, “fides” and “secta” in the thirteenth century see, Biller 1985, 360–369, esp. 366.
- 15.
- 16.
“Et ex omnibus his patet, quod difficillima quaestio est, quae supra est inducta, et Latini quidem huc usque neglexerunt illam quaestionem; et huius causa est, quia non convenerunt in positionibus suis cum dictis Peripateticorum, sed diverterunt in quandam alteram viam et secundum illam finxerunt alia principia et alias positiones.”
- 17.
“Quod autem dicunt quidam, has tres esse tres substantias in homine, non reputo opinionem, sed ridiculum, et hoc non dixerunt aliqui Peripateticorum, sed quidam Latini naturam animae nescientes hoc confinxerunt, et est expresse a nobis in multis locis improbatum, quia error pessimus est dicere unius subiecti plures esse substantias, cum illae substantiae non possint esse nisi formae.”
- 18.
“Et quia res difficillimas hic perscrutari intendimus, ideo volumus primo totam Aristotelis sententiam pro viribus nostris explanare et tunc inducere aliorum Peripateticorum opiniones et post hoc videre de opinionibus Platonis et tunc demum nostram ponere opinionem, quoniam in istarum quaestionum determinatione omnino abhorremus verba doctorum Latinorum (…) in verbis eorum nullo modo quiescit anima, propterea quod sententiam veritatis nec ostendunt nec verbis propriis attingunt.”; De anima, L. 3, Tr. 2, Cap. 1.
- 19.
- 20.
In his Opus maius Roger Bacon gives two, partially different lists of the six “sectae principales”. Cf. Roger Bacon 1897, I, 254. and Roger Bacon 1897, II, 367. “secta Christianorum”: Roger Bacon 1897, II, 389; “secta Christi”: Roger Bacon 1897, II. 392; “lex Christiana”: Roger Bacon 1897, II, 252; 389; 396. Similarly, Bonaventure also seems to include the Christian religion among the “leges et sectae” when saying that “anima rationalis, secundum philosophos et secundum etiam omnes leges et sectas, est incorruptibilis ergo non est per naturam propagabilis ergo non est ex traduce.” In Sent 2, Dist. XVIII. Art. II. Q. III; see Bonaventura 1885, 452. The term “secta” as it stands for “religion” was frequently used after the thirteenth century, mainly among English Franciscans, and had no negative connotations whatsoever. See Kaluza 1996, 340–341.
- 21.
“(…) qualiter oporteat persuadere de sectae veritate (…)”; “Sed non possumus hic arguere per legem nostram, nec per auctoritates Sanctorum, quia infideles negant Christum Dominum et legem suam et sanctos. Quapropter oportet quaerere rationes per alteram viam, et haec est communis nobis et infidelibus, scilicet philosophia.” See Roger Bacon 1897, II, 372–373. For a similar approach see Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles 1.2 (abbreviated as SCG below).
- 22.
- 23.
For a similar reasoning, see Aquinas’s SCG 1.11: “Et sic nihil inconveniens accidit ponentibus Deum non esse: non enim inconveniens est quolibet dato vel in re vel in intellectu aliquid maius cogitari posse, nisi ei qui concedit esse aliquid quo maius cogitari non possit in rerum natura.” See Thomas Aquinas 1918, 24b.
- 24.
For the usage of the term “sententia” as it is applied – from the thirteenth century on – to certain and authoritative propositions: Paré-Brunet-Tremblay 1933, 267–274, esp. 272. The phrase “sententia fidei” was used by both Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. See e.g. Boethius of Dacia’s De aeternitate mundi (Boethius de Dacia 1976, 335; 340; 346) and Siger of Brabant’s De anima intellectiva (Siger de Brabant 1972, 88).
- 25.
According to Alain de Libera, Aquinas’s remarks in no. 122–123 display a rhetorical progression towards the worst (De Libera 2004, 501). As Aquinas seems to strictly follow Athaq’s claims up until AC4 this would imply that Athaq’s text displays a similar rhetorical progression.
- 26.
Aquinas refers twice to “the Catholics” in DUI. (1) “Quicquid autem circa hoc dicatur, manifestum est quod ex hoc nullam angustiam Catholici patiuntur, qui ponunt mundum incepisse.” “But whatever may be said on this point, it is clear that Catholics, who hold that the world has had a beginning, have no reason for concern.” See Thomas Aquinas 1976, 313, 340–343; Keeler 1936, 76, no. 118; Zedler 1968, 72; McInerny 1993, 139. (2) “uel Deus secundum Catholicos, uel intelligentia ultima secundum Auicennam”; “either God, according to Catholics, or the last intelligence, according to Avicenna.” See Thomas Aquinas 1976, 314, 368–370; Keeler 1936, 77, no. 120; Zedler 1968, 73; McInerny 1993, 141. Taken out of context, these references could also be regarded as an indication that they were written by someone who did not consider himself a Catholic.
- 27.
- 28.
The date of composition is most probably 1271. See Torrell 1996, 348.
- 29.
See e. g. SCG 2. 29: “(…) supposito quod Deus hominem facere vellet, debitum ex hac suppositione fuit ut animam et corpus in eo coniungeret, et sensus, et alia huiusmodi adiumenta, tam intrinseca quam extrinseca, ei praeberet.” Thomas Aquinas 1918, 335b; and SCG 3.97: “Supposito autem quod Deus creaturis suam bonitatem communicare, secundum quod est possibile, velit per similitudinis modum: ex hoc rationem accipit quod sint creaturae diversae.” Thomas Aquinas 1926, 301a.
- 30.
In Sent II.19.1.1 co.: “Quarta positio est quam fides nostra tenet, quod anima intellectiva sit substantia non dependens ex corpore, et quod sint plures intellectivae substantiae secundum corporum multitudinem, et quod, destructis corporibus, remanent separatae, non in alia corpora transeuntes; sed in resurrectione idem corpus numero quod deposuerat unaquaeque assumat.” “The fourth position is that which our faith holds that the intellective soul is a substance that does not depend on the body, that there is more than one intellective substance corresponding to the multitude of bodies, and that they remain separate when bodies are destroyed, not passing into other bodies. Rather, in the resurrection each soul assumes the same body numerically that it had laid aside.” (English translation is from https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~Sent.II.D19.Q1.A1.C.4)
- 31.
SCG 3.65: “Circa rerum originem duplex est positio: una fidei, quod res de novo fuerint a Deo productae in esse; et positio quorundam philosophorum, quod res a Deo ab aeterno effluxerint. Secundum autem utramque positionem oportet dicere quod res conserventur in esse a Deo.”
- 32.
- 33.
See STh 1a.1.2 co: “Respondeo dicendum sacram doctrinam esse scientiam. Sed sciendum est quod duplex est scientiarum genus. Quaedam enim sunt, quae procedunt ex principiis notis lumine naturali intellectus, sicut arithmetica, geometria, et huiusmodi. Quaedam vero sunt, quae procedunt ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, sicut perspectiva procedit ex principiis notificatis per geometriam, et musica ex principiis per arithmeticam notis. Et hoc modo sacra doctrina est scientia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, quae scilicet est scientia Dei et beatorum. Unde sicut musica credit principia tradita sibi ab arithmetico, ita doctrina sacra credit principia revelata sibi a Deo.”
- 34.
Expositio libri Posteriorum I, 5.: “Quaedam uero propositiones sunt inmediate quarum termini non sunt apud omnes noti.”
- 35.
“Et ideo cum quadam positione recipiuntur huiusmodi principia.”
- 36.
“(…) et hec positio suppositio dicitur, quia tanquam ueritatem habens supponitur.”
- 37.
STh 1a.1.2. See also Expositio libri Posteriorum I, 5.: “Sunt enim quedam propositiones que non possunt probari nisi per principia alterius sciencie, et ideo oportet quod in illa sciencia supponantur, licet probentur per principia alterius sciencie (…)”. Thomas Aquinas 1989, 25b.
- 38.
“Sic ergo concedimus, quod est in eis compositio essentialis, et concedimus rationes ad hoc. Nec oportet a nobis quaerere aliquam demonstrativam viam deveniendi in Angelos hoc modo compositos: quia fides non demonstratur, sed sufficit quod sustineatur. Haec autem accipimus per positiones fidei.” De coelesti hierarchia, Cap XI, Q. unica.
- 39.
“Supponendum est ergo quod Deus est rerum conditor, gubernator actuum, doctor intellectuum, iudex meritorum.” Collationes in Hexaëmeron, Visio II. Collatio V.
- 40.
See Theoremata de corpore Christi, propositio XXXIX, fo. 27va: “positio fidei de existentia accidentis absque subiecto, non est irrationabilis, si diligenter videatur modus ponendi.”; 27rb:,,(…) non est impossibilis positio fidei, cum solam quantitatem in sacramento altaris sine subiecto ponat: quae sine implicatione contradictionis, ut patet per habita, sine subiecto esse potest (…).”
- 41.
“Dicendum circa corruptionem et rebellionem in appetitu rationis et sensualitatis duae sunt positiones extremae erroneae, et tertia iuxta quam fides catholica confitetur.” See further: “Placuit autem Augustino communis positio, dum communis teneatur fides redemptionis.” Johannes Peckham 1918, 6.
- 42.
See Robert Kilwardby’s letter to Peter of Conflans: “Si autem ubique per generationem, tunc intellectiva potentia in nomine est ex traduce, quod est contra catholicorum positionem et fidem.”
- 43.
“Nec minoris presumptionis est quod postmodum asserere audet, Deum non posse facere quod sint multi intellectus, quia implicat contradictionem.” “What he dares to assert later is no less presumptuous that God cannot make many intellects, because this would involve a contradiction.”
- 44.
- 45.
“Valde autem ruditer argumentantur ad ostendendum quod hoc Deus facere non possit quod sint multi intellectus, credentes hoc includere contradictionem.” See also Keeler 1936, 67; Zedler 1968, 67; McInerny 1993, 127. I deviate here from the English translation of both Zedler and McInerny. For Aquinas’s plural references see footnote 2 above.
- 46.
As Gyula Klima emphasizes, in Aquinas’s view “all matter in reality is designated matter, i.e., concrete chunks of matter existing under the determinate dimensions of the individual bodies they constitute.” The distinction between “designated” and “non-designated” matter therefore is not a real distinction, but a distinction of two different conceptual approaches to the same thing. See Klima 2007, 231, footnote 18. For more on the principle of individuation see Roland-Gosselin 1926, 51–134. For the various interpretations of Aquinas’s theory and the spatial and temporal dimensions of individuation see further Wood 2015, esp. 114–116.
- 47.
Matter would prevent them from exercising their proper act of thinking. Aquinas says that “matter” can only be used homonimously for the separate substances. They are being composed of what makes them actual (esse) and of what is made actual (quidditas). See In Sent II.3.1.1: “intelligentia non est esse tantum, sicut causa prima; sed est in ea. esse, et forma, quae est quidditas sua et quia omne quod non habet aliquid ex se, sed recipit illud ab alio, est possibile vel in potentia respectu ejus, ideo ipsa quidditas est sicut potentia, et suum esse acquisitum est sicut actus; et ita per consequens est ibi compositio ex actu et potentia et si ista potentia vocetur materia, erit compositus ex materia et forma quamvis hoc sit omnino aequivocum dictum; sapientis enim est non curare de nominibus.” Thomas Aquinas 1929, 88.
- 48.
See e.g. in the De ente et essentia: “(…) the essences of composite things, since they are received in designated matter, are multiplied by the division of designated matter, whence in their case it happens that there are numerically distinct things in the same species. However, since the essence of a simple thing is not received in matter, in their case there cannot be this kind of multiplication; therefore, in the case of these substances, there cannot be several individuals in the same species, but there are as many species as there are individuals, as Avicenna expressly claims.” See Klima 2007, 239. See further as especially relevant for our investigation a well-known passage from SCG 2.93: “Quaecumque sunt idem specie differentia autem numero, habent materiam differentia enim quae ex forma procedit, inducit diversitatem speciei; quae autem ex materia, inducit diversitatem secundum numerum. Substantiae autem separatae non habent omnino materiam, neque quae sit pars earum, neque cui uniantur ut formae. Impossibile est igitur quod sint plures unius speciei.” See Thomas Aquinas 1918, 563a. For further references to Aquinas’s account of the multiplication of intelligences see Hissette 1977, 83, footnote 2.
- 49.
Johannes Peckham was certainly right when he remarked that the immateriality of the possible intellect is the “fundamentum” of the TUI. See Johannes Pecham 1918, 49.
- 50.
“Sic ergo si intellectus naturaliter esset unus omnium quia non haberet naturalem causam multiplicationis, posset tamen sortiri multiplicationem ex supernaturali causa, nec esset implicatio contradictionis.” See also Keeler 1936, 68, no. 105.
- 51.
Aquinas applies his recurring examples for miracles here (“the dead rise again”, “the blind’s sight is restored”). It is important to mention that in no. 105 Aquinas uses essentially the same reasoning as he had set forth in his Quaestiones disputatae de potentia (QDP) VI. 1 ad 5 (most probably from 1265–1266; see Torrell 1996, 335), just relying on the somewhat more obscure concept of “a cause in a thing’s own nature” in place of “an intrinsic principle”: “Just as God cannot make yes and no to be true at the same time, so neither can he do what is impossible in nature in so far as it includes the former impossibility. Thus for a dead man to return to life clearly involves a contradiction if we suppose that his return to life is the natural effect of an intrinsic principle, since a dead man is essentially one who lacks the principle of life. Wherefore God does not do this but he makes a dead man to regain life from an extrinsic principle: and this involves no contradiction. The same applies to other things that are impossible to nature, and which God is able to do.” See Thomas Aquinas, On the Power of God. Translated by the English Dominican Fathers Westminster, Maryland the Newman Press, 1952, Reprint of 1932. HTML Edition by Joseph Kenny, O.P., as retrieved in https://isidore.co/aquinas/QDdePotentia6.htm
- 52.
See e.g. “Hoc autem ultimum uerbum maxime assumunt ad sui erroris fulcimentum, uolentes per hoc habere quod intellectus neque sit anima neque pars anime, sed quedam substantia separata.”: “Now it is especially this last word that they take over to support their error, intending by this to hold that the intellect is neither the soul nor a part of the soul, but some separate substance.” See Thomas Aquinas 1976, 296, 450–453; Zedler 1968, 33; Keeler 1936, 17. no. 25.
- 53.
As it is clear from no. 99: “Si ergo est separatus et non est forma materialis, nullo modo multiplicatur secundum multiplicationem corporum.” “If, therefore, it is separate and is not a material form, it is in no way multiplied according to the multiplication of bodies.” Thomas Aquinas 1976, 310, 12–14; Keeler 1936, 64; Zedler 1968, 65.
- 54.
“Per rationem concludo de necessitate quod intellectus est unus numero, firmiter tamen teneo oppositum per fidem.” See also Keeler 1936, 79, no. 123; McInerny 1993, 143. “Firmiter teneo”: there is nothing peculiar in this expression. It had been in use since the Patristic era and was still widely used in the thirteenth century. In its various forms, this phrase tipically refers to a mental attitude regarding the doctrines of faith and expresses an obligation of the faithful. See e. g. the phrasal idiom “firmissime tene, et nullatenus dubites” in Ivo of Chartres’s Decretum (PL 161, passim). However, it is important to emphasize that it does not have anything to do with epistemology or logic, as it is related only to the rule-following behaviour of the believer in a religious context. For the occurrence of the phrase in the contemporary arts magisters’ works, see e.g. Siger of Brabant’s Quaestiones super Librum de causis, q. 27: “firmiter tenendum quod hominum multiplicatione multiplicatur” or Boethius of Dacia’s De aeternitate mundi: “ut sententia fidei firmiter teneatur.” See Marlasca 1972, 115; Boethius de Dacia 1976, 335.
- 55.
“Ergo sentit quod fides sit de aliquibus quorum contraria de necessitate concludi possunt; cum autem de necessitate concludi non possit nisi uerum necessarium, cuius oppositum est falsum impossibile, sequitur secundum eius dictum quod fides sit de falso impossibili, quod etiam Deus facere non potest: quod fidelium aures ferre non possunt.” See also Keeler 1936, 79, no. 123.
- 56.
See footnote 50 above.
- 57.
See e.g. SCG 2.4: “Philosophus (…) considerat illa quae eis secundum naturam propriam conveniunt (…)”; Similarly, Siger of Brabant with regard to the multiplication of the intellect: “As to the seventh point raised above, viz. whether the intellective soul is multiplied in accord with the multiplication of human bodies, it must be carefully considered insofar as such pertains to the philosopher and can be grasped by human reason and experience, by seeking the mind of the philosophers in this matter rather than the truth since we are proceeding philosophically.” (On the Intellective Soul, Chap. VII; Klima 2007, 203). See further Boethius de Dacia, Super Libros Physicorum I Quaestio 1–2 (Boethius de Dacia 1974, 139–142) and Roland Hissette’s remarks in Hissette 1977, 23–26.
- 58.
Perhaps because he has grown out of his ruditas by now. If Athaq is identical to Siger of Brabant, this would miraculously shorten the period of his development into a Thomist. For what has been called Siger’s “evolution” see, among many others, Van Steenberghen 1942, 551–560; Zimmerman 1967–68, 206–217; Fioravanti 1972, 407–464; Marlasca 1972, 18–22; Mahoney 1974; Bazán 1980, esp. 236–243; Van Steenberghen 1977, passim; Imbach and Putallaz 1997, 154–168, Bazán 2005, 613–625. For the historiography of Siger’s “evolution”, see Imbach 1991, 202–205. For the opposite case see Calma and Coccia 2006, 284–317.
- 59.
See QDP VI. 1: “(…) logicus et mathematicus considerant tantum res secundum principia formalia; unde nihil est impossibile in logicis vel mathematicis, nisi quod est contra rei formalem rationem. Et huiusmodi impossibile in se contradictionem claudit, et sic est per se impossibile. Talia autem impossibilia Deus facere non potest. Naturalis autem applicat ad determinatam materiam unde reputat impossibile etiam id quod est huic impossibile. Nihil autem prohibet Deum posse facere quae sunt inferioribus agentibus impossibilia.” See also footnote 51 above.
- 60.
See e.g. the commentary by Francis Sylvester of Ferrara on SCG 2.93 with reference to DUI no. 105. See Thomas Aquinas 1918, 565a, VI. 3. See further Descoqs 1922; Balthasar 1922; Keeler 1936, 67–68, notes to no. 105; Hissette 1977, 82–87; Hissette 1977, 5–7; Wippel 1995, 243–248; De Libera 2004, 395–402.
- 61.
For this concept pair which is just an example borrowed from an author writing centuries later, see Francis Sylvester of Ferrara’s commentary referred to in the previous footnote.
- 62.
For the strong emphasis of the arts masters on the inscrutability of divine will and the distinction of true or false simpliciter and true or false secundum quid/secundum naturam in contexts where doctrines of faith and propositions of philosophy are compared and evaluated see, again, among many others, Fioravanti 1970, esp. 530–531, 557; Pinborg 1974, esp. 169–181; Hissette 1977, esp. 45–49., 275–276; Knuuttila 1993, 99–137, esp. 136; Bianchi 1999, esp. 175–187; De Libera 2004, 25. It is also important to note that, in Aquinas’s view, the second aspect of truth with regard to divine things “totally exceeds the ability of human reason”, even though certain “intelligibilia divinorum” can be expressed in propositional form as articles of faith. See SCG 1.3, Thomas Aquinas 1918, 7–8.
- 63.
- 64.
See e.g. De Libera 2004, 506–511.
- 65.
- 66.
It is not relevant from the perspective of the “duplex veritas” approaches that keep revolving around the idea of having two contradictory beliefs simultaneously that Aquinas contrasts faith with science and opinion.
- 67.
For Aquinas’s emphasis on the fact that the commitment to the incomprehensible and indemonstrable articles of the Catholic faith is a result of a purely voluntary act and not a termination of natural cognitive processes, see Borbély 2020, 75–77.
- 68.
ST 2a2ae.2.5. co.: “Quantum ergo ad prima credibilia, quae sunt articuli fidei, tenetur homo explicite credere, sicut et tenetur habere fidem. Quantum autem ad alia credibilia, non tenetur homo explicite credere, sed solum implicite vel in praeparatione animi, inquantum paratus est credere quidquid in divina Scriptura continetur.” “As regards the first believable things, which are the articles of faith, man is held to believe them explicitly, just as he is also held to have faith. As regards the rest of the believable things, man is not held explicitly to believe, but only implicitly or by preparation of soul, so far as he is prepared to believe whatever is contained in divine Scripture.” See Thomas Aquinas 1990, 78.
- 69.
Even though I will not discuss this issue in this paper, it deserves to be mentioned that the multiplicity of the intellect within the same species is a doctrine of faith for Aquinas, too. See footnote 30 above. On Aquinas’s admirable attempt to provide us with a semantic solution for the problem of the duplex entitas of the human soul, i.e. for the problem that the human soul alone seems to be both an inherent and a subsistent being, see Klima 2018.
- 70.
On this point see footnote 54, and the literature in footnote 62 above.
- 71.
See e.g. ST 2a2ae.2.1. co: “(...) actus iste qui est credere habet firmam adhaesionem ad unam partem, in quo convenit credens cum sciente et intelligente, et tamen eius cognitio non est perfecta per manifestam visionem, in quo convenit cum dubitante, suspicante et opinante.” “But the act of believing has firm adherence to one alternative, in which the believer agrees with the knower and the one who understands. Yet its apprehension is not completed by manifest vision, in which the believer agrees with the doubter, the suspecter, and the opiner.” See Thomas Aquinas 1990, 67–68.
- 72.
See SCG 1.6 with reference to 2 Peter 2:16. In Aquinas’s view, “imagination” (phantasia) can metaphorically refer to the erroneous choice of the intellect (see e. g. QDP VI.6 ad 3: “utitur autem metaphorice” (i.e., Dionysius) “nomine phantasiae pro intellectu errante in eligendo.”) In contrast to human reason which “is always correct either in that it is disposed toward first principles about which it does not err, or in that error results from defective reasoning rather than the properties of reason”, it is an essential property of imagination that it apprehends the images or likenesses of absent (including non-existent) things. Its operation therefore leads to error. See Quaestiones disputatae de malo 7.5 ad 6; for the English translation, see Thomas Aquinas 2003, 291.
- 73.
As for whether the assent to the articles of faith can rationally be justified according to Aquinas, see Borbély 2020. In Aquinas’s view, although the will “takes a leading role” “in the knowledge of faith”, still “the good of the will” consists in the fact that “it follows the understanding”. Therefore, “what is apart from reason is evil.” See SCG 3.40 and SCG 3.107. Cf. Thomas Aquinas 1926, 99a and 336b; Thomas Aquinas 1956 (Part I), 131 and Thomas Aquinas 1956 (Part II), 102.
- 74.
“With equal reasoning he could argue about the Trinity, the Incarnation, and other teachings of this kind” that “he could only discuss as someone who is blind to these matters,” adds Aquinas. Again, I deviated from the English translation of both Zedler and McInerny. See Zedler 1968, 74, and McInerny 1993, 143. Keeler 1936, 79–80, no. 123. Thomas Aquinas 1976, 314, 422–430: “Non caret etiam magna temeritate, quod de hiis que ad philosophiam non pertinent, sed sunt pure fidei, disputare presumit, sicut quod anima patiatur ab igne inferni, et dicere sententias doctorum de hoc esse reprobandas; pari enim ratione posset disputare de Trinitate, de Incarnatione et aliis huiusmodi, de quibus nonnisi cecutiens loqueretur.” For Aquinas’s famous reference to the issue of whether the soul can suffer from fire see De Libera 1994, 281 and De Libera 2004, 511–521.
- 75.
In Aquinas’s view, “human philosophy” “serves” theology as the highest wisdom: “et propter hoc sibi, quasi principali, philosophia humana deservit.” See SCG 2.4 (Thomas Aquinas 1918, 279b).
- 76.
For the text of the statute, see Denifle and Chatelain 1889, 499–500; Weijers 1995, 140–142. For the interpretation of the statute, see Gauthier 1984, 20–25; Imbach and Putallaz 1997, 123–142; Bianchi 1999, 165–201; Pluta 2002; Bianchi 2008, 98–115. For the apparent link between the DUI and the statute, see Van Steenberghen 1977, 84; Imbach and Putallaz 1997, 47; De Libera 1998, 86; Bianchi 1999, 171–172.
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Borbély, G. (2023). Aquinas, perversor philosophiae suae. In: Hochschild, J.P., Nevitt, T.C., Wood, A., Borbély, G. (eds) Metaphysics Through Semantics: The Philosophical Recovery of the Medieval Mind. International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées, vol 242. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15026-5_6
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