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Conclusion and New Challenges

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Philosophy of Social Cognition

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Abstract

We started our discussion with several considerations about the wide range of phenomena that go under the heading of social cognition. We have looked at approaches to how mindreading works, the attribution of mental states for the purpose of explaining and predicting behaviour of others. In this regard, Chaps. 2, 3 and 4 elaborated and critically discussed the theory-theory, modularity-theory and simulation-theory as different philosophical approaches aiming to capture how such attribution works. Discussion of theories of empathy and enactive approaches brought further facets and situational differences to light. Consideration of the ambitious predictive processing framework put forward in cognitive science and philosophy completed the picture. In this concluding chapter, these discussions are briefly summarized, before some new developments and future challenges are outlined. These challenges, to do with the development of new technologies that engender new forms of social interaction, involve interactions via digital media and with humanoid robots and other AI systems.

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Schlicht, T. (2023). Conclusion and New Challenges. In: Philosophy of Social Cognition. Palgrave Philosophy Today. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14491-2_9

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