Abstract
How can opposition agency in authoritarian systems be conceptualised? This chapter develops a conceptual framework for opposition agency based on Albert Hirschman’s framework of exit, voice and loyalty. The chapter puts forward a conceptualisation of opposition agency which recognises the different forms and combinations of exit and voice which can exist and how these variations of exit and voice are dependent on the type of opposition involved (institutional vs. non-institutional). The chapter also highlights how these different combinations of exit and/or voice are conditioned by the on-going response from the regime in terms of sanctions and institutional adaptation. A four nodal point regime-opposition equilibrium is outlined of the different points at which political opposition possesses agency of exit and/or voice. This includes private voice inside the regime, exit from the regime (with or without voice), exit the system/country (with or without voice) and non-elite voice outside the regime. Finally, the chapter unpacks the mutually constituted cycle of regime-opposition relations which underpins the equilibrium in which a paradox exists where at one and the same time the regime is both stable and unstable. It is this conceptual framework which will be applied to Kazakhstan in later chapters.
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Notes
- 1.
Hirschman argues that the relationship between the exit function and reaction function is variable in that if demand is inelastic with respect to a decline in quality, then the losses will be minimal to the firm, and they will not register the feedback mechanism from the impact of exit. However, if demand is too elastic then the reaction strategy will not take place as the firm will be wiped out with losses before it can respond. Thus, Hirschman posits that for exit to work best for the firm it requires both alert and inert customers. See Hirschman (1970, 22–25) for more detail.
- 2.
This assumes that in the case of authoritarian regimes, opposition elites tend to emerge from the regime in the first instance.
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Isaacs, R. (2022). Exit, Voice and Loyalty: An Analytical Framework for Opposition Agency in Authoritarian Regimes. In: Political Opposition in Authoritarianism. The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06536-1_3
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