Abstract
This chapter looks closely at the peace-war boundary to reflect on the effects of the historical transformations in the transnational circuit of military savoirs during the second half of the twentieth century.
This is a statement by Fred Halliday, quoted in Brown (2008: 443), used in reference to the Iraqi population. To Halliday, either the enemy or the population in Iraq only understands the use of force. Here, I am appropriating Halliday’s phrase to refer to one of the remarkable characteristics of the “expert soldier”, discussed in this chapter, i.e. the emphasis on tactically efficient bodies in the making of the military professional.
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- 1.
According to Porch (2013: 13), it was only by the late-nineteenth century that one could observe the remarkable contrast between conventional and small warfare. Indeed, the intensification of the Industrial Revolution not only made the differentiation between the two more explicit, but also gave it technological contours—especially with the development of weaponry in line with the agility required by “small wars”. Thus, technological advances in military weaponry walked hand in hand with the development of the edifice of military savoirs: actually, one was the condition for the other.
- 2.
Porch defines “doctrine” as a “trailing indicator of inherited practices and a receptive intellectual environment, combined with tactical and operational routines developed by units to meet current contingencies” (Porch 2013: 179).
- 3.
It is at least intriguing that Galula’s name reached such a projection, considering that the Algerian War in which he participated terminated in 1962 with the Algerian independence. According to Galula, however, the absence of a counterinsurgency doctrine was a key factor in the outcome of the War, as it allowed for a heterogeneous distribution of tactics in that French colony—a dynamic that turned out to be favorable to the resistance.
- 4.
For Galula, one of the main concerns of counterinsurgents when undertaking a propaganda campaign was “to minimize the possible adverse effects produced on the population by the arrests. He will have to explain frankly why it is necessary to destroy the insurgent political cells, and stress the policy leniency to those who recognize their error” (Galula 1964: 92).
- 5.
By doing so, Kilcullen is not denying the pillars that we have discussed so far. When setting the scene he wanted to explore in the document, he did reinforce the position of Galula as a referential theoretical reference. It is in perfectioning the tactical repertoire of counterinsurgency that Kilcullen is more interested, mostly by providing tactical responses to the lack of pertinence of some of the counterinsurgency fundamentals in the terrain. In his words, “Your company has just been warned for deployment on counterinsurgency operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. You have read David Galula, T.E. Lawrence and Robert Thompson. You have studied FM 3–24 and now understand the history, philosophy and theory of counterinsurgency. (…) But what does all that theory mean, at the company level? How do the principles translate into action—at night, with the GPS down, the media criticizing you, the locals complaining in a language you don’t understand, and an unseen enemy killing your people by ones and twos?” (Kilcullen 2006: 29). The plasticity of counterinsurgency resides in its emphasis on tactics, allowing for its constant re-articulation through the preservation of its constitutive pillars.
- 6.
Through a historical analysis of the RAND Corporation and its main research projects from 1945 to 1975, Jardini contends that “While the Korean experience did stimulate a small amount of interest in limited warfare at RAND, its analysis and research remained geared almost exclusively to strategic nuclear conflict. Counterinsurgency research was especially distasteful to the Air Force since that service seemed to play no independent role in anti-guerrilla operations. Not surprisingly, then, in 1961 RAND devoted just two percent of its Project RAND work (…), approximately five man-years, to limited warfare” (Jardini 2013: 143).
- 7.
However, it is important to highlight that, by the time the RAND symposium took place, Algeria was still a French colony in formal terms. As a matter of fact, the Algerian independence was only declared in July 1962, three months after the event held by RAND.
- 8.
In the British case, for instance, the experience in colonies such as Malaya and Kenya was understood as useful for a re-articulated version of counterinsurgency against the Irish Republican Army (IRA) since the early-twentieth century (Porch 2013: 112–119, 246–265). Above all, the operations undertaken by the British government against the IRA were marked by an intelligence apparatus deeply penetrated in the insurgency, which also gave shape to a systematic civil-military cooperation (McFate 2005: 27).
- 9.
Trinquier, for instance, claims that interrogations must be “conducted by specialists perfectly versed in the techniques to be employed” (Trinquier 1985: 23), and then identifies a set of action-reaction sequences that may take place during an interrogation and what kind of information is expected to be extracted in such situations (Trinquier 1985). Aussaresses, by his turn, narrates in rich details specific cases of torture and execution, under the basic logic that “Some prisoners started talking very easily. Others only needed some roughing up. It was only when a prisoner refused to talk or denied the obvious that torture was used. (…) They would therefore either talk quickly or never” (Aussaresses 2010: 128).
- 10.
The Carlisle Barracks were originally established in the mid-eighteenth century for the preparation of British and Provincial troops to fight against the Indians. At that time, the motto of the Carlisle School was “Kill the Indian and save the man”. Closed only in 1918, the barracks served as the basis for the establishment of the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle in 1973. Despite the change in the name, the preservation of its facilities symbolizes an enduring component of that brutality. Indeed, a testimonial given by a Colonel to Bass (2008) during his field work suggests that the Carlisle School is more than an abandoned fragment in the debris of the wars against the Indians: “Back in the days of Manifest Destiny, we were geniuses at setting one group of Indians against another. This is what we need to do in Iraq. Get some Sunnis on our side, to block the crazy Shi’a. Then, when things calm down, we start introducing the poison blankets” (Bass 2008: 233). Celebrating the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a time when the U.S. knew how to handle tribes militarily, the connection drawn between the expertise of the past with that of the present also reveals a persistent claim of inferiority projected towards those against whom counterinsurgency is mobilized.
- 11.
The 1950 “Operations Against Guerrilla Forces” is considered the first manual on counterinsurgency in the U.S. The manual does not mention Latin America in the section about the main concerns regarding “guerrilla warfare” in the world: it concentrates the diagnosis of the problem under those terms in the Soviet “zone of influence” and in Asia (especially Philippines) (The U.S. Infantry School 1950).
- 12.
To be sure, this did not imply the erasure of brutal practices such as the ones associated with the French colonial legacy. In the case of torture, brutality was vested with a set of “interrogation techniques” that suggested precision and provided a regime of justification for the interrogation (CIA 1963: 3, 82–85). The first U.S. manual for this kind of operation was produced in 1963 by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Titled Kubark Counterintelligence Interrogation, the manual used the terminology of “coercive counterintelligence interrogation of resistant sources” (CIA 1963: 52) instead of torture. It also included categories of interrogated, situation-specific categories of coercion, and professionals that would join the military in the interrogation, such as the doctor, whose participation in the process aimed at turning the escalation of the pain of the interrogated into an object of scientific observation (CIA 1963: 82–85).
- 13.
- 14.
This problematization of violence would change significantly in 1956, with the Benidorm Agreement. Signed by the leaders of the Conservative and the Liberal Party (respectively, Laureano Gómez and Alberto Lleras Camargo), the Benidorm Agreement established the rules for a peaceful coexistence between the two main political parties in Colombia, creating the Frente Nacional (National Front), dissolved only in 1974. This Agreement is a fundamental moment in the construction of the “problem of the guerrillas” in Colombia because it de-coupled members of the Liberal Party not only from the problematization of communism (Pécaut 2010), but also of violence. In this sense, it cleared the ground for the association of “guerrilla warfare” with leftist armed groups, which became the basis of the counterinsurgency doctrine emerging in the following years, as we will see further in this Section.
- 15.
In the original: “El comunismo, enemigo universal, opera en todo el mundo con incesante actividad y con sistemas idénticos pero ajustándose en cada sitio a las peculiaridades propias del terreno y adoptando la denominación más adecuada para el logro de sus propósitos. Echa mano en cada país de la bandera de la oposición para sembrar el caos a todo trance. (En Colombia) al menos en las aparencias, el comunismo opera a sus anchas bajo la bandera del liberalismo. Y el liberalismo, consciente o inconscientemente, sirve los planes del dominio internacional soviético”.
- 16.
To be sure, there had been ad hoc bilateral interactions before. Military officers from both countries participated in a series of meetings that culminated in the creation of the Inter-American Defense Board, in 1942, for instance. Also, in 1938 representatives from the U.S. Army made an official visit to Colombia. Studies about the scope and effects of this mission are scarce, nonetheless. According to Rodríguez Hernández (2006: 47), that particular visit was focused on Naval and Air Forces and did not involve the Colombian Army. However, a campaign manual on war in the jungle (La Guerra en la Selva, Manual de campaña) suggests otherwise. Published in 1944 by the Colombian Military Forces General Staff and mostly used in professionalization programs of the Army, the manual reads “translated and adapted by the Military Mission from the U.S.” in its opening pages (Estado Mayor General de las Fuerzas Militares 1944: 3).
- 17.
In the words of General Rojas Pinilla, President at that time: “Repeat to your brothers the lesson learnt in Korea: organization of the troop, unified command, cooperation while in service, arms stretched to the comrade under the most acute torments, greatness of the soul when defeated, and serene rejoicing when victorious. Discipline, patient preparation, methodic training, loyalty, agile mobility towards the objective, without letting the spirit to be intimidated nor the muscle to be weakened”(Rojas P. 1954: 243–244 Apud Rodríguez H. 2006: 56). In the original: “Repetid a vuestros hermanos la lección aprendida en Corea: organización de las fuerzas, unidad de mando, cooperación en el servicio, brazos tendidos al camarada en las supremas angustias, grandeza de alma en la derrota y sereno regocijo en el triunfo. Disciplina, paciente preparación, entrenamiento metódico, lealtad, ágil movilización hacia el objetivo, sin que el espíritu se amilane ni el músculo flaquee”.
- 18.
These works were titled: El Batallón Colombia en Korea: 1951–1954 (published in 1956); Enseñanzas militares de la campaña de Corea aplicables al Ejército de Colombia (1956); and El Gran Desafío (1965).
- 19.
In the original: “La filosofía del Plan era ‘quitarle el agua al pez’, o sea, quitarle el apoyo campesino a la guerrilla”.
- 20.
For this reason, General Ruiz Novoa became known as one of the first desarrollistas (“developmentalists”) among the Colombian military officers (Leal B. 2002: 45; Rodríguez H. 2006: 61).
- 21.
In the original: “Como se ha mostrado cierta extrañeza porque el Ministro de Guerra trate estos temas, debo explicar las razones: (…) es evidente que las injusticias sociales y económicas son tan generadoras de violencia como el bandolerismo aparecido como secuela de la violencia política y que esta situación de desequilibrio incide fundamentalmente sobre el orden público cuyo mantenimiento, corresponde al Ministro de Guerra”.
- 22.
In the original: “Con la operación Marquetalia desapareció la ‘república independiente’. Se hizo con el apoyo de operaciones de tipo psicológico. Nos ayudaron antiguos guerrilleros liberales como ‘Peligro’. A Marquetalia entramos sin que salieron los campesinos. En diciembre de 1965 se gestó la última operación en El Pato y Guayabero”.
- 23.
In the original: “Estas bandas irregulares han sido desde hace mucho tiempo una continua amenaza para la paz y seguridad del pueblo colombiano; expertas conocedoras de los caminos en la montaña y la selva, son muy difíciles de descubrir y vencer, y el Ejército ha tenido muy poco éxito en su misión de dominarlas. Para obviar esta dificultad, fue lógicamente necesario adelantar un entrenamiento específico en este tipo especial de operaciones, y desde que pequeñas unidades se emplearon para combatir a los antisociales la solución fue evidente: oficiales y suboficiales seleccionados debieron ser entrenados para combatir al enemigo en su propio terreno y usando sus mismos métodos. La Escuela de Lanceros llevó a cabo esta misión y lo hizo muy bien”.
- 24.
In the original: “En la guerra en la selva el soldado combate contra dos enemigos: el hombre y la naturaleza. De estos dos, la naturaleza es con frecuencia el enemigo más formidable”.
- 25.
In the original: “guías cuidadosamente seleccionados, cuya lealtad e integridad sean indiscutibles”.
- 26.
In the original: “La familiaridad de estas tropas con el terreno y su conocimiento de los habitantes y del idioma compensarán ampliamente el trabajo de instruirlas. El empleo de tropas nativas organizadas y controladas por el comandante de la fuerza expedicionaria. No solamente ayudará a disipar cualquier objeción a la presencia de nuestras tropas sino que fortalecerá la solidaridad contra un enemigo común”.
- 27.
As we will see in the next Section, these characteristics of professionalization programs would become key to the intensification of military campaigns in the context of Plan Colombia. Indeed, the fact that the military preparation could be undertaken through short-term courses and in large scales allowed for the fast multiplication of the Colombian Army’s manpower when pacification operations were intensified in the country.
- 28.
Known as “the father of the Green Berets”, General William P. Yarborough commanded the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center (later renamed JFK School) at Fort Bragg (North Carolina) from 1961 to 1965. During this period, he reviewed training programs and doctrine material, and expanded the special warfare curriculum, creating additional groups and courses, such as the “Unconventional Warfare Course” and the “Counter-Terrorism Course”. He is also known for his contribution to intelligence operations against black protesters in Detroit and Newark in 1967. Named “Continental United States Intelligence” (Conus Intel), the federal operation General Yarborough was part of was created to monitor “subversive groups” inside the U.S., having classified thousands of civilians according to their “potential to cause trouble”. For more information, see Bernstein (2005).
- 29.
In the same period, the U.S. Army Special Warfare School hosted courses with Lieutenant Colonel Roger Trinquier and General Paul Aussaresses—French military officers whose “acknowledged expertise” on psychological warfare and counterinsurgency tactics derived from their experience in Algeria. Although this does not imply that Trinquier and Aussaresses’ expertise was flowing directly to Colombia, it does point to the domains that were valorized in the U.S. Army Special Warfare School at that time. And it was to that particular school that Colombia was turning its attention when rearticulating the professionalization of its military personnel in the second half of the twentieth century.
- 30.
As mentioned in Sect. 3.2, it is important to highlight that this relation with illegality is not an invention of the U.S., an exclusive feature of Colombia, nor a specific trait of the Cold War. Moreover, the sequence of armed confrontations that marked the trajectory of Colombia since independence resulted in the proliferation of arms across the territory and in its use for “self-defense” purposes long before the creation of “organized self-defense groups” was stimulated as a military tactic. As the play of forces in the armed conflict increased in complexity, different paramilitary groups orbited around the Colombian Armed Forces, oscillating between partners and enemies depending on the context. In other words, despite the usefulness of such groups, the Colombian Armed Forces never had full control over them—as it has been also remarked in Sect. 3.2.
- 31.
The U.S. Army Intelligence School and Counter-Intelligence Records Facility operated at Fort Holabird until 1971, when they were transferred to Fort Huachuca (Arizona). Both the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and the 111th Military Intelligence Brigade, based in Fort Huachuca, conduct training programs on human intelligence (interrogation and counterintelligence, for instance) and imagery intelligence, among other courses.
- 32.
See https://esici.edu.co/index.php/historia-de-la-esici/. Accessed on 18 May 2021.
- 33.
Before taking that position, he had already commanded the Artillery Battalion No. 6 “Tenerife”, where the instruction on counterinsurgency tactics was invested against the “independent republic”. For more information, see https://esici.edu.co/index.php/charry-solano/. Accessed on 18 May 2021.
- 34.
The document was sent to the U.S. Department of State. Labelled as “classified” in 1979 (i.e. confidential information), the full content of the report was only disclosed in 2007. Available at: http://static.iris.net.co/semana/upload/documents/Doc-1474_2007630.pdf. Accessed on 18 May 2021. The report is evidence that Colombian high-ranked officers were not only aware but commanded “para-terrorist operations” (Evans 2007). As it has been discussed in Chapter 3, the countless accusations of human rights violations were repeatedly dodged through the evocation of the “bad apples” narrative or the change in the name of the command unit accused of “deviant conduct”. It was no different with the BINCI, which had its name changed to “20th Brigade” (Brigada 20). As the accusations of abuses in the use of violence continued to flow towards the Brigade, the latter was extinguished in 1998. For more information, see CINEP (2004) and Evans (2007).
- 35.
Suspects of collaborating with “leftist-groups” were also targeted by the “Triple A”. In July 1980, for instance, five military officers who used to integrate the Battalion denounced the BINCI for planning and carrying out, through the “Triple A”, the explosion of the headquarters of the magazine Alternativa, as well as of the newspapers El Bogotano and Voz Proletaria. See El Día (1980).
- 36.
As I hope to have shown in the previous pages of this book, the re-framing of threats both in Colombia and in the hemispheric circuit of military savoirs must in fact be interpreted as discursive re-articulations of the “problem of violence”. These versions stem from the combination of a claim to novelty with sedimentations of how violence was historically understood. The fact that a military savoir such as counterinsurgency came to be understood as valid throughout the decades expresses this very persistence of historical deposits in problematizations of violence presented as fit for “new times”.
- 37.
In the original: “Toda la vida de ustedes ha estado dedicada a aprender a obedecer y, como consecuencia, a saber mandar, cuando les llegue su tiempo, pero a mandar personas que no deliberan sobre sus órdenes ni las discuten. Es un ejercicio radicalmente distinto del mando en la vida civil. (…) La política es el arte de la controversias, por excelencia. La milicia, el de la disciplina. (…) El manternerlas [las Fuerzas Armadas] apartadas de la deliberación pública no es un capricho de la Constitución, sino una necesidad de su función. Si entran a deliberar entran armadas. (…) Por eso las Fuerzas Armadas (…) no deben ser deliberantes en política. Porque han sido creadas por toda la nación, porque la nación entera (…) les ha dado las armas (…) con el encargo de defender sus intereses comunes, (…) y todo ello con una condición: la de que no entren con todo su peso y su fuerza a caer sobre unos ciudadanos inocentes, por cuenta de los otros. (…) Yo no quiero que las Fuerzas Armadas decidan cómo se debe gobernar a la nación, en vez de que lo decida el pueblo, pero no quiero, en manera alguna, que los políticos decidan cómo se debe manejar las Fuerzas Armadas, en su función técnica, en su disciplina, en sus reglamentos, en su personal”.
- 38.
In the original: “Al no revisarse y actualizarse las escasas y tímidas directrices políticas del papel militar en la sociedad, los altos mandos castrenses asumieron su diseño en forma improvisada”.
- 39.
In the original: “Seguridad nacional sin política militar de Estado”.
- 40.
See also: https://soaw.org/soa-whinsec-graduate-database. Accessed on 1st June 2021.
- 41.
The use of quotation marks in “modernization” here merits attention. Under Plan Colombia, the use of the term modernization referred specifically to the strengthening of the military forces through capacity management, weapons, equipment, and training. At the time, these were understood as leading to further military professionalization. This connection between modernization, professionalization, and military forces echoes the discourse on modernity presented in Chapter 4. However, as we have also seen in that chapter, the claim by the Colombian military to being “modern” was already at play since at least the late nineteenth century. Thus, with the inverted comas I want to underline that the use of the vocabulary of modernization under Plan Colombia must be interpreted as one more instantiation of what “the military” should be—an instantiation played out, yet again, by connecting the military to modernity. Indeed, the effects of modernity result from its constant affirmation as the regulative ideal of modernization—that is, modernity only exists as modernization.
- 42.
In the original: “Cuando ha estado a punto de obtener la victoria militar definitiva sobre los alzados en armas, la acción de la autoridad política interviene para levantar nuevamente el estado de sitio. En esa forma la voluntad de lucha de los grupos armados de la subversión recibe el oxígeno (…) [y ellos] transforman las derrotas sufridas por la acción militar en victorias políticas de gran resonancia. (…) Esperamos sea la última amnistía”.
- 43.
The high rotativity of Ministers of Defense illustrates the tensions across the civil-military boundary that characterized this period. It is also noteworthy that the two first Ministers of Defense in the Betancur’s administration (1982–1986), Landazábal Reyes and Vega Uribe, had a very similar profile: in addition to the rank “General”, both were military officers with a solid background on guerrilla warfare and intelligence. Such profile reveals not only the credentials required for the highest rank to be granted in the Military Forces, but also the savoirs privileged for the command of the Ministry of Defense.
- 44.
The total duration of those state of sieges was 647 days. To be clear, this was not a particular feature of the 1990s: during the twentieth century, Colombian governments often appealed to the state of siege as a privileged means to tackle disturbances of public order. On some of these occasions, the Constitutional Court considered the practice of governing through states of siege unconstitutional, calling attention to the massive violations of rights deriving from that practice (Vanegas G. 2011). For more information, see: Gallón G. (1979), Vanegas (2011), and Semana (1982).
- 45.
In the 2019 ExpoDefensa, a “security fair” specialized in displaying the arsenal of the Colombian Armed Forces, the Jungla Commands (Comandos Jungla), an elite police unit under the DIRAN, showed the repertoire of war weapons they have at their disposal for counternarcotic operations. See https://www.defensa.com/colombia/armas-comando-jungla-colombianos. Accessed on 9 June 2021.
- 46.
Gill (2004: 83) also remarks that Colombian police professionals attended courses on counternarcotic operations at the SoA in expressive numbers during the 1990s. More broadly, the SoA Watch database illustrates this transit of Latin American police professionals at the SoA during the second half of the twentieth century. See https://soaw.org/soa-whinsec-graduate-database. Accessed on 1st June 2021.
- 47.
Ten years after the Toma de Mitú, many were the stories in the Colombian newspapers that recovered the event by narrating the excesses of violence used by the FARC and telling family stories of the armed forces’ members that had not been liberated by the guerrilla since the takeover, in 1998. Described as “hell”, “the bloodiest strike of the FARC”, and a “violation of all the humanitarian law rules”, Mitú came to represent the unwillingness of the FARC to engage in peaceful talks (Martin and Jaramillo-Marín 2014). More than this: it came to be promoted as an emblematic case of the collective memory about violence in Colombia (Martin and Jaramillo-Marín 2014: 404). For us to understand the political effects of this mobilization of Mitú, we must take into account that the news coverage of its 10th anniversary was inscribed in a context marked by the renewal of Plan Colombia (since 2006) and by the Uribe administration’s (2002–2010) indisposition towards any kind of negotiation with the FARC, in sharp contrast to his predecessor Pastrana—whose Presidency (1998–2002) ended with failed attempts to negotiate with that guerrilla. This “eventalization” (Foucault 1988) of Mitú offers the guerrilla’s brutality as evidence for the impossibility of any negotiation, thereby authorizing the use of massive violence to tame that very brutality: in the terms of such discourse, it is because the guerrilla cheats that peace negotiations are not possible, and war is necessary.
- 48.
In addition to the widespread outreach of the “military crisis” narrative through high-ranked military officers and politicians, there was also a profusion of “security specialists” emerging in Colombia at that time. Among this new generation of “violentólogos” (La Silla Vacía 2016) was the Security & Democracy Foundation (FS&D, in Spanish), a policy center with close ties to political circles created in the context of Plan Colombia, funded with resources from the U.S. (León 2010), and led by the economist Alfredo Rangel. The establishment of FS&D cannot be dissociated from a broader context marked by the valorization of an epistemological grid with which policy diagnoses came to be disputed, as discussed in Sect. 3.1. In other words, at the same time the Foundation’s emphasis on data, impact measurement and models partly derived from some of its researchers’ background on Economics, the privileged position of FS&D in the debates about the military reform expresses a specific form of knowledge production about policy that came to characterize not only governmental agencies, but also the work of civil society in Colombia. The official website of FS&D (http://www.seguridadydemocracia.org/) was extinguished around 2014, when Alfredo Rangel was elected Senator through the Democratic Center Party, founded by Uribe in 2013.
- 49.
Elsewhere, Peixoto and I have explored the hemispheric circuit of police savoirs, taking the Police Community of the Americas (AMERIPOL, in Spanish) as an object of investigation. In this police cooperation mechanism, Colombia came to enjoy a privileged position as regards intelligence, as well as counternarcotic and counterterrorism operations. The authority of the Colombian National Police among its hemispheric counterparts in these domains of expertise cannot be dissociated from the U.S. resources received in the context of the war on drugs since the late-1980s. See Viana and Peixoto (2019).
- 50.
In the original: “En pocas palabras, se puede afirmar que se subestimó de manera grave al enemigo. Esto se explica en parte por la actitud tradicional de catalogar a los insurgentes como ‘bandidos’, ‘facinerosos’ o ‘cuatreros’, desconociendo su capacidad militar y en general menospreciándolos al verlos como simples criminales comunes”.
- 51.
In the original: “Estamos en guerra y la estamos ganando”.
- 52.
The General Command was formerly constituted by six central offices: Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistic, Integral Action and Strategic Planning.
- 53.
By its turn, the kind of operations previously inscribed in the category of “Civil-Military Relations” were renamed “Integral Action” (Acción Integral) in this context.
- 54.
Although this enhanced airpower could have stimulated the design of joint operations, each of the branches of the Colombian Armed Forces—most notably, the Police and the Army—used some of those helicopters to reinforce their own airpower. Even the simplification of the General Command mentioned above did not result in the increase of joint operations. When addressing the case of the General Command of the Military Forces, Villamizar (2003: 65) argues that it “is more invested in administrative tasks than the actual conduction of the joint operations for which it was established. The operational control, that is, the conduction of war is in the hands of each of the Forces (Army, Marine, and Air Force) separately. And each of these forces fights, in a certain way, its own war” (Villamizar 2003: 65–66). In the original: “el Comando General (…) está más dedicado a labores administrativas que la conducción real de las operaciones conjuntas para lo cual fue establecido. El control operacional, es decir, la conducción de la guerra está en manos de cada una de las Fuerzas (Ejército, Armada y Fuerza Aérea) por separado. Y cada una de estas fuerzas pelea, en cierta forma, su propia guerra”.
- 55.
For instance, the Colombian Army had already created the lanceros in the 1950s as a military unit specialized in the jungle, as we have seen in Sect. 5.2. In the context of the intensification of the war on drugs, the Urban Anti-terrorism Special Forces Group (AFEUR, in Spanish) was created in the Military Forces in 1985, with the objective of countering and neutralizing terrorist actions in the main urban areas of Colombia. Another example is found in 1996, when the Army created the Unified Action Groups for Personal Freedom (GAULA, in Spanish) to prevent and solve cases of kidnapping and extortion.
- 56.
Currently, the FUDRA, the AFEUR, the GAULA, and the BACN are four of the 6 Special Forces of the Colombian Army. For more information, see https://www.ejercito.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=279742. Accessed on 6 June 2021.
- 57.
Although the “baptism” of the 1st Battalion was held in August 1999, it was only with the publication of Ministerial Resolutions No. 1296 (1st September 2000) and No. 005 (8 December 2000) that the Counternarcotic Special Brigade was formally created, with a military base in Larandía (Caquetá).
- 58.
Currently, the Brigade comprises three maneuver units (BACN No. 1, 2 and 3), and a support one—the Counternarcotic Services and Support Battalion (BASCN, in Spanish), responsible for the provision of supplies and of logistical support to the other units of the Brigade. See https://www.ejercito.mil.co/?idcategoria=189542. Accessed on 8 June 2021.
- 59.
As these numbers suggest, the use of this particular type of military professional was not inaugurated by Plan Colombia. Indeed, during César Gaviria’s administration (1990–1994), the “professional soldiers” were intensively mobilized in the “integral war” against the drug cartels and the guerrillas refusing to demobilize. If, in 1990, the Colombian Army had 2,000 professional soldiers, in 1994 this number had reached 23,000 soldiers of this category (Leal B. 2002: 99).
- 60.
See http://www.espro.mil.co/?idcategoria=412825#. Accessed on 10 June 2021.
- 61.
See http://www.espro.mil.co/?idcategoria=189706. Accessed on 10 June 2021.
- 62.
In March 2000, the first group of instructors who attended courses in Fuerte Tolemaida for this purpose was formed by 11 commissioned officers (oficiales) and 15 non-commissioned officers (suboficiales). In addition to that, 25 s Corporals (Cabo Segundo) attended the Lancers’ School in order to work as instruction assistants. See http://www.espro.mil.co/?idcategoria=412477#. Accessed on 10 June 2021.
- 63.
See http://www.espro.mil.co/?idcategoria=189706. Accessed on 10 June 2021.
- 64.
For more information on the historical transformation of Fuerte Toleimada, see https://www.cenae.mil.co/centro_nacional_entrenamiento/conozcanos/resena_historica. Accessed on 10 June 2021.
- 65.
See http://www.espro.mil.co/?idcategoria=189706 . Accessed on 10 June 2021.
- 66.
See http://www.espro.mil.co/?idcategoria=189706. Accessed on 10 June 2021.
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See http://www.cenae.mil.co/?idcategoria=344179. Accessed on 10 June 2021.
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See https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_143936.htm. Accessed on 6 June 2021.
- 69.
In the original: “Este gran avance multiplica exponencialmente las opciones para los comandantes de todos los escalones y en cualquier ambiente operacional”.
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Viana, M.T. (2022). “All They Understand Is Force”: The Military Professional as the Expert-Soldier. In: Post-conflict Colombia and the Global Circulation of Military Expertise. Critical Security Studies in the Global South. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96103-9_5
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