Abstract
We suggested and investigated a model of generations change for Cournot competition with predictions and memory. Then, we described the general method to calculate equilibrium and discussed his weak and strongpoints. The numerical experiments have been conducted and confirmed the importance of the periodic solutions. Some analytical solutions were found for periodic solutions. These results seem to be the foundation for solving control problem tasks and better understanding the Stackelberg game’s generalizations.
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This work/article is an output of a research project implemented as part of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE University).
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Fedyanin, D.N. (2021). Ordering in Games with Reduced Memory and Planning Horizon of Players. In: Petrosyan, L.A., Mazalov, V.V., Zenkevich, N.A. (eds) Frontiers of Dynamic Games. Trends in Mathematics. Birkhäuser, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_5
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