Skip to main content

How Can a Banking Union Make the EU More Resilient to Crises?

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Routes to a Resilient European Union

Abstract

This chapter examines if and how the yet-incomplete European Banking Union can make the EU more resilient to crises. Key experiences from the financial and sovereign debt crises, and the EU’s new bank regulatory framework and the components of the Banking Union, are summarised. An overview of how European banking sectors have developed since the previous crises is also provided. The current regulatory framework is analysed in light of the literature on financial safety nets, focussing on the existing Banking Union components of common supervision and bank resolution as well as the intended but not yet implemented, component of common deposit insurance. It finds that resilience gains from completing the Banking Union are likely to be considerable, but that credibility for the existing components also needs strengthening. The chapter concludes by reviewing the main obstacles to the completion of the Banking Union and discussing prospects for a political breakthrough.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 119.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 119.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Acharya, V., Drechsler, I., & Schnabl, P. (2014). A pyrrhic victory? Bank bailouts and sovereign credit risk. Journal of Finance, 69(6), 2689–2739.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Admati, A., & Hellwig, M. (2013). The bankers’ new clothes—What’s wrong with banking and what to do about it. Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baldwin, R., & Giavazzi, F. (Eds.). (2015). The eurozone crisis: A consensus view of the causes. CEPR Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barth, J., Prabha, A., & Wihlborg, C. (2015). Transparency of financial regulation. In J. Forssbæck & L. Oxelheim (Eds.), Oxford handbook of economic and institutional transparency. Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Battistini, N., Pagano, M., & Simonelli, S. (2014). Systemic risk, sovereign yields and bank exposures in the euro crisis. Economic Policy, 29(78), 203–251.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beck, T., Todorov, R., & Wagner, W. (2013). Supervising cross-border banks: Theory, evidence and policy. Economic Policy, 28(73), 5–44.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Benczur, P., Cannas, G., Cariboni, J., Di Girolamo, F., Maccaferri, S., & Petracco Giudici, M. (2017). Evaluating the effectiveness of the new EU bank regulatory framework: A farewell to bailout? Journal of Financial Stability, 33, 207–223.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carmassi, J., Dobkowitz, S., Evrard, J., Parisi, L., Silva, A. F., & Wedow, M. (2020). Completing the banking union with a European deposit insurance scheme: Who is afraid of cross-subsidization? Economic Policy, 35(101), 41–95.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cimadomo, J., Ciminelli, G., Furtuna, O., & Giuliodori, M. (2020). Private and public risk sharing in the euro area. European Economic Review, 121, 1–20.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • De Grauwe, P. (2016). The legacy of the eurozone crisis and how to overcome it. Journal of Empirical Finance, 39(B), 147–155.

    Google Scholar 

  • Demyanyk, Y., Ostergaard, C., & Sørensen, B. E. (2007). U.S. banking deregulation, small businesses, and interstate insurance of personal income. Journal of Finance, 62(6), 2763–2801.

    Google Scholar 

  • Engineer, M. H., Schure, P., & Gillis, M. (2013). A positive analysis of deposit insurance provision: Regulatory competition among European Union countries. Journal of Financial Stability, 9, 530–544.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • European Banking Authority. (2019). EBA report on NPLs (2019). Progress made and challenges ahead. Retrieved from https://eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/npls

  • European Commission. (2015a, June 22). Completing Europe’s economic and monetary union. Report by J.-C. Juncker in close cooperation with D. Tusk, J. Dijsselbloem, M. Draghi, & M. Schulz (the “Five Presidents’ Report”).

    Google Scholar 

  • European Commission. (2015b, November 24). Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to Establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme. COM(2015) 586 final.

    Google Scholar 

  • European Commission. (2017, October 11). Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the ECB, the EESC and the Committee of the Regions on Completing the Banking Union. COM(2017) 592 final.

    Google Scholar 

  • Farhi, E., & Tirole, J. (2018). Deadly embrace: Sovereign and financial balance sheet doom loops. Review of Economic Studies, 85(3), 1781–1823.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Forssbæck, J. (2011). Ownership structure, market discipline, and banks’ risk-taking incentives under deposit insurance. Journal of Banking and Finance, 35(10), 2666–2678.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Garcia-de-Andoain, C., Heider, F., Hoerova, M., & Manganelli, S. (2016). Lending-of-last-resort is as lending-of-last-resort does: Central Bank liquidity provision and interbank market functioning in the Euro area. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 28(C), 32–47.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goodhart, C., & Schoenmaker, D. (1995). Should the functions of monetary policy and banking supervision be separated? Oxford Economic Papers, 47(4), 539–560.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jordà, Ò., Richter, B., Schularick, M., & Taylor, A. M. (2020). Bank capital redux: Solvency, liquidity, and crisis. Review of Economic Studies, 88(1), 260–286.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2005). Allocating bank regulatory powers. European Economic Review, 49(8), 2107–2136.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Laeven, L., & Valencia, F. (2018). Systemic banking crises revisited (IMF Working Paper WP/18/206). International Monetary Fund.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mailath, G., & Mester, L. (1994). A positive analysis of bank closure. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 3(3), 272–299.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pennacchi, G. G. (2000). The effects of setting deposit insurance premiums to target insurance fund reserves. Journal of Financial Services Research, 17(1), 153–180.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pisani-Ferry, J., & Zettelmeyer, J. (Eds.). (2019). Risk sharing plus market discipline: A new paradigm for Euro area reform? A debate. CEPR Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schäfer, A., Schnabel, I., & Weder di Mauro, B. (2016). Bail-in expectations for European banks: Actions speak louder than words (CEPR Discussion Paper DP11061). Centre for Economic Policy Research.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Rompuy, H. (2012, June 26). Towards a genuine economic and monetary union. Report by the President of the European Council, EUCO 120/12.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jens Forssbæck .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2022 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Forssbæck, J. (2022). How Can a Banking Union Make the EU More Resilient to Crises?. In: Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, A., Ekman, P., Michalski, A., Oxelheim, L. (eds) Routes to a Resilient European Union. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93165-0_7

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics