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Arsyad Al-Banjari’s Qiyās for Integrating Banjarese Traditions into Islamic Law

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Arsyad al-Banjari’s Insights on Parallel Reasoning and Dialectic in Law

Part of the book series: Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning ((LARI,volume 25))

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Abstract

As pointed out in Chap. 4, the process of re-Islamization of Banjar carried out by Arsyad al-Banjari after his arrival in Banjar from his studying in Mecca and Medina was challenged by the emergence of new cases related to the Banjarese culture that required legal certainty regarding their status according to Islamic law. This galvanized a dynamic interaction between Islam and Banjarese culture that led to, on one side, cultural integration and, on the other, cultural isolation between the two. Qiyās or correlational inference played a paramount role in this process since Arsyad al-Banjari applied this legal theory of parallel reasoning in his effort to integrate Islamic law into the Banjarese society. In some cases, he presents his qiyās in the question and response format. In this context, we might say that Arsyad al-Banjari applied a model of integration based on a dialectical understanding of qiyās.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This issue is discussed in Tuḥfat al-Rāghibīn, the treatise that deals with the doctrines of Sunni theology. This treatise was composed two years after Arsyad al-Banjari’s return to the Banjarese Sultanate (1772), namely in 1188H/1774. It was published several times in Istanbul, Mecca, Cairo, Singapore, and Surabaya. The treatise was printed for the first time in 1887 in Istanbul by al-Maṭba‘a al-Ḥāj Muḥarram Afandī. Its authorship, in fact, triggers a controversy since the author’s name is not mentioned in some manuscripts (Hasan, 2007). Some scholars have argued that this treatise was composed by Abdul Samad al-Palimbani. However, the arguments of the researchers compiled by Mujiburrahman (2014) – including the one of Hasan (2007) – provide strong evidence that the treatise was authored by Arsyad al-Banjari, mainly regarding the similar dictions of the doxology to some works of Arsyad al-Banjari, the use of some Banjarese words and the mention of the Banjarese traditions. Moreover, the publication by Maṭba‘ah al-Aḥmadiyyah Singapore and al-Ihsan Surabaya in 1929 mentioned clearly Arsyad al-Banjari as the author of the treatise.

  2. 2.

    This issue is discussed in Sabīl al-Muhtadīn. As discussed in the previous chapter, it is Arsyad al-Banjari’s magnum opus that was composed upon the request of Sulṭān Tamjīd Allāh because of lacking book of Islamic law in Malay language. This request is mentioned by Arsyad al-Banjari (1957) in his introduction of this work. Aswadie Syukur (2016) points out that this work has been well known and read by Muslim communities in Southeast Asia where the people use Malay language in their daily conversations, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam and some regions in Thailand, Philippines and Cambodia, since there was no other book in Malay language that discuss Islamic law comprehensively and profoundly as Sabīl al-Muhtadīn. Arsyad al-Banjari began writing the manuscript in 1193H/1779 and finished it two years later, in 1195H/1781. It was edited for the first time by Ahmad ibn Muhammad Zain al-Fathani and published almost simultaneously in Mecca and Istanbul around 1882. Munadi (2020) indicates that the manuscript was also edited by Muhammad Ilyas al-Azhari and published in Cairo in 1307H/1889. In fact, Sabīl al-Muhtadīn was translated into Indonesian language by Aswadie Syukur and has been published by Bina Ilmu Surabaya since 1985. In Malaysia, it was transcribed by Mohamad Haidzir bin Hussin bin Ibrahim, edited by Fuad Ismail and has been published by Telaga Biru since 2010; and it was also transcribed by Jahabersa Team and has been published since 2013 by Jahabersa, Johor Baru.

  3. 3.

    As information circulated in the Banjarese society, this issue is mentioned by Arsyad al-Banjari in his work Kitāb al-Faraid which deals with Islamic law of inheritance. Unfortunately, this treatise has never been found. Guru Irshad Zein, Arsyad al-Banjari’s descendant who use nom de plume of Abu Daudi, told that the original book is probably saved by Abd al-Rahman Siddiq, one of Arsyad al-Banjari’s offspring, who was appointed Mufti in Siak Sultanate, Indera Giri (Sapat) Riau (Dakhoir, 2010; Irfan Noor, 2015). Aswadie Syukur, as mentioned by Dakhoir et al. (2017), reported that in his visit to Malaysia he found the book Kitāb al-Farāiḍ mentioning Abd al-Rahman as the author. It is possible that when published the name of Abd al-Rahman is mentioned as the author, even though the book is originally written by Arsyad al-Banjari. In addition, it is reported that this concept of marital property was likely to be delivered orally by Arsyad al-Banjari to his students who then became Qadis (Judges); and they applied it in the society so that it becomes the tradition of the Banjarese society (Zamzam, 1979).

  4. 4.

    See al-Shīrāzī (1986, 1987, 1988, 1995, 2003).

  5. 5.

    See also Rahman and Iqbal (2018) and Rahman et al. (2019).

  6. 6.

    See Marmura (1965). Peter Adamson (2019, April 1), who has a slightly less occasionalist reading as the one of Marmura expresses the point as follows:

    his [Al-Ghazālī] critique here imputes a very strong notion of causality to the philosophers: namely that given the existence of a cause, the existence of its effect is necessary. Al-Ghazālī holds that, on such a notion of causality, only God is a cause. This is because, given the existence of miracles, and accepting the proposition that God can do anything, no cause other than God can necessitate its effect. It is always possible that God might will the expected effect not to proceed, or will an entirely different effect to proceed. Al-Ghazālī defends this view against both philosophers who claim that a natural cause, such as the fire which causes the burning of cotton, is the sole and sufficient cause for its effect.

  7. 7.

    Notice that the rulings leading to naqḍ are not always based on producing two contradictory rulings or sanctions, it is sufficient to bring forward two incompatible ones. Let us recall the example of this form of objection in Chap. 2 – though this example involves qiyās al-ʿilla rather than qiyās al-shabah, some forms of homicide neither lead to jail nor to being set free but to the obligation of carrying out certain specific social services.

  8. 8.

    This, in fact, can be seen as countering the criticisms of the anti-analogists that say that it is always possible to find some property to distinguish two cases (or some general one to make them similar).

  9. 9.

    More precisely lahang is made from the juice of Arenga pinnata.

  10. 10.

    See the discussion on this issue in Chapter 5, specifically on what we call explicative qiyās.

  11. 11.

    In relation to the contamination of wine-vinegar al-Benjari refers to Tuḥfat al-Muḥtāj fī Sharḥ al-Minhāj by Ibn Hajar al-Haytamī (909–974H/1504–1567), re-printed 1983 and Nihāyat al-Muḥtāj ilā Sharḥ al-Minhāj by al-Ramlī (919–1004H/1513–1596), re-printed 1984. Both of these jurists were Shāfi’īs.

  12. 12.

    The word perpantangan is originated from the word pantang or pintang in Banjarese language that means to coincide or to face. See Zamzam (1979, p. 73).

  13. 13.

    Concepts of marital property in fact can be found in other Indonesian society, such as Harta Seuharkat in Aceh; Harta Gono Gini in Java; Harta Seguna Sekaya in Sunda, Harta Seugrabe in Bali; and Harta Suarang in Jambi. See Dakhoir (2010).

  14. 14.

    Such a definition of shirkat al-abdān is pointed out, for instance, by Abū Bakr al-Rāzī al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370H/980), a prominent Ḥanafī jurist, in his Sharh Mukhtaṣar at-Ṭaḥāwī. See al-Jaṣṣāṣ (2010, vol. 3, p. 250).

  15. 15.

    It presupposes that Arsyad al-Banjari concedes the legality of shirkat al-abdān. It is interesting as the Shāfi’īs mostly refute the legality of such a partnership because it has the potential for deception and injustice, see Ibn Rushd (2004, vol. 4, p. 38). However, it should be noticed, although Arsyad al-Banjari does not follow some legal decisions of Shāfi’ī scholars, he consistently follows their methods of legal reasoning, particularly qiyās.

  16. 16.

    See Dakhoir et al. (2017).

  17. 17.

    http://riadybarna.blogspot.com/2009/02/harta-seuhareukat-seharkat.html, accessed 14 January 2020. Some scholars hold that the original reasons for the differences of inheritance between men and women are the responsibilities that are allotted to spouses. A husband in Islam must use his inheritance to support his family while a wife has no support obligation. The same reason was used in Java regarding the distribution of marital property, a husband obtained 2/3 and a wife 1/3 of the total of marital property based on the principle of sakgendong sakpikul, that is, the principle that men are more likely than women to have more responsibility for the family finance. Such principle is known in Bali with sasuhun sarembat (Hasibuan, 2017).

  18. 18.

    It is the ancient name of Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce. See Reid (1988).

  19. 19.

    It is the Arabic name of Transoxania, historical region of Turkistan in Central Asia east of the Amu Darya (Oxus River) and west of the Syr Darya (Jaxartes River), roughly corresponding to present-day Uzbekistan and parts of TurkmenistanTajikistan, and Kazakhstan. See the Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica (2018, October 5). See also Svat Soucek (2000, p. 25).

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Appendix: The Original Texts

Appendix: The Original Texts

6.1.1 The Text on Manyanggar and Mambuang Pasilih

O students! You should know that some deeds that have become a custom in some “lands below the wind” (Malay: negeri bawah angin)Footnote 18 such as mambuang pasilih, manyanggar and the like are innovations (bid‘a) which are in opposition to the quran, the hadith, companion’s opinion (qawl ṣaḥāba) and consensus of jurists (ijmā‘). Thus, they are heretical innovations (bid‘at al-ḍalāla), so that it is obligatory for those who carried them out to repent. It is also obligatory for kings and leaders to abolish them since they are immoral acts in which some evils are present; and every evil act must be interdicted and eliminated as [we find in] the command of Allah and His messenger in some verses of quran and hadith.

Question: how much evil is present in the act of mambuang pasilih and manyanggar?

Response: well, there are many evils contained in that act. One of them is called tabdhīr that means wasting by spending money/resources improperly; and a person that wastes and spends money/resources is called mubadhdhir. This is the evil that Allah and His Prophet prohibit in certain verses of quran and hadith as Allah’s word: “wa lā tubadhdhir tabdhīrā. inna al-mubadhdhirīna kānū ikhwān al-shayāṭīn. It means: “Do not spend wastefully. Surely, the wasteful [people] are brothers of the devils”. That is to say, do not spend your money/resources for forbidden acts, because those who spend their money/resources for a forbidden act become nothing but brothers of the devils by the fact that they are deceived and together with devils they do what is prohibited by Allah and His Messenger.

O intelligent brothers, listen to the prohibition of Allah to do tabdhīr; and [recall that] Allah strongly condemns those who do it so [tabdhīr] that they are likened to devils that are the evillest creatures. Should we appreciate the tabdhīr, but Allah prohibit and condemn it?

One of the evils present in the act of mambuang pasilih and manyanggar is “ittibā‘ al-shayāṭīn wa ghurūrihim” that means following the footsteps of Satan’s by doing what they [the devils] ask and expecting what they promised. That is a heinous evil act that Allah and His Messenger prohibits it in certain verses of quran and hadith as Allah’s word: “wa lā tattabi‘ū khuṭuwāt al-shayṭān innahu lakum ‘aduwwun mubīn. Innamā ya’murukum bi-l-sū’ wa al-faḥshā’ ”. That means, do not follow the footsteps of devil, namely his deceit because he is to you a clear enemy. He only orders you to evil acts and immorality. As well, Allah’s word: “wa man yattakhidhu al-shayṭāna waliyyan min dūnillāh faqad khasira khusrānan mubīnā”. That means, whoever takes devil as an ally that he/she follow instead Allah has certainly sustained a clear loss. Devil promises humans and arouses desire in them. But devil does not promise them except delusion.

The other evils in the act of mambuang pasilih and manyanggar are shirk and bid‘a sayyi’a (heretical innovations). Those are the very heinous evils. If it is believed that sick people cannot be cured or danger cannot be avoided except only by carrying out manyanggar or mambuang pasilih, in the sense that those acts have the power (to cure or to avoid danger) in their own nature, so the one who has such belief is heathen (kāfir). There is no disagreement of jurists on that case because that is going against oneness of Allah’s deeds (tauhīd af‘āl). If it is believed that they [those acts] have no power in their nature, but it is believed that they have the power [to cure or to avoid danger] given by Allah to their nature, then the jurists agree that the one who believes so is the impious heretic (bid‘a fāsiq); and jurists disagree on his/her heathenism (kufr). According to the jurists of [the region] “what lies beyond the river” (Arabic: mā warā’ al-nahr)Footnote 19 he/she is also heathen (kāfir). If it is believed that they have no power [to cure or to avoid danger] either in their own nature or given by Allah to their nature, but it is believed that only Allah who has the power to cure and avoid danger by enacting that if those acts are carried out then Allah cures and avoids the danger in that time. It is said that analogy and comparison for that is like [the deployment of] fire and food. They do not have the power in their own nature to burn or to satiate, as well they do have neither the power [to burn or to satiate] given by Allah. It is only Allah who burns and satiates enacting that when fire touches something dry, then it becomes burned, and enacting that when we eat food then we are satisfied. It is said that this is the analogy and the comparison of manyanggar and mambuang pasilih. So, someone who believes so does not become heathen by merely such a belief, but they are still heretics. However, had he/she pronounced the permissibility of manyanggar and mambuang pasilih, he/she would have been heathen (kāfir) with such belief; and there is no disagreement of jurists on that case.

Concerning the analogy and the comparison, it is not legally valid to pronounce the permissibility of manyanggar and mambuang pasilih based on that analogy because they have a different nature. Indeed, fire and food are natural causes [in the sense that Allah enacts being burned and being satisfied by means of the natural beings, fire and food], whereas manyanggar and mambuang pasilih certainly are not the natural cause [of being cured and being prevented from danger; in other words, since manyanggar and mambuang pasilih are not present in nature, we cannot say therefore that these rituals are the natural causes of the effects of healing and prevention enacted by Allah]. If, saying, when they are carried out, then being cured or being avoided from danger happens, it is nothing but the deceit of Satan. So, this analogy and comparison could not be legally valid.

O intelligent brothers, you should be aware: is there any danger bigger than the danger of heathenism (kufr) and blameworthy innovation (bid‘a sayyi’a) so that those who perform them are cursed by Allah as [the] Prophet said: man ’aḥdatha hadathan fa‘alaihi la‘natullāh ta‘ālā. That means, whoever commits innovation which opposes to religion, so the curse of Allah to him. O student! You should know that manyanggar and mambuang pasilih are not part of religion (Islam), but they are blameworthy innovations which are [to be] forbidden. So, those who carried them out will be cursed by Allah as told in the hadith.

Question: if they said that we carry out manyanggar and mambuang pasilih not because to share Satan food and to follow his demand, but those whom we share are the invisible men who lived in the old days. Among of them are the ancestral kings and the followers who are still alive up to now, so we share them food as a tribute with the intention that they would relieve our troubles. It is similar to sharing food with (living) families and friends with the intention of helping each other. This act is permissible, not forbidden, because it is not tabdhīr (wasting by spending money/resources) nor following Satan nor shirk and bid‘a.

Response: that is simply invalid because that is purely delusion without evidence from the Quran, Hadith or what jurists say. How can we know that those who request the food are the invisible men living in the old days who are still alive up to now? So, every prejudice without evidence (dalīl) is not permitted to be relied upon and to be believed. Even if it is true that who request the food are the invisible men, the act (manyanggar and mambuang pasilih) is still forbidden and not permissible because it is committing tabdhīr and sinful innovation. Even if the food is eaten by human or animal, that does not eliminate the sin of tabdhīr and heretical innovation. It will be much more sinful if the food is given to Satan and its delivery containing some other evils.

Question: if they said that we have two evidences confirming that who demands the food are the invisible men: first, the elders tell us about that story from generations to generations; second, the words of a possessed person who at the moment of possession said: “O my descendants give me food so that I will help you to relieve your difficulties and to cure your illness”.

Response: the story that the elders tell about is not a legally valid justification of the permissibility of manyanggar and mambuang pasilih because it is merely prejudice and delusion without evidence (dalīl) confirming its truth. Moreover, the words of a possessed person are not a legally valid evidence for justifying that who possesses the possessed person is a man, but that is proof that who possesses the possessed person is Satan because some verses of Quran and Hadith, and what jurists say prove that only angels and Satan’s can enter into the body of a human because they are created by Allah with ability to do hard things so that they can enter into the body of a human. However, the difference between them is that angels only suggest (God’s) guidance and goodness while Satans only suggest the wrong path and evil.

It is mentioned further in the hadith that an angel called mulhim stays in the right side of human’s heart, by Allah’s command, suggesting goodness; and a Satan called waswās stays in the left side of human’s heart, by Allah’s command, suggesting evil. So, all good tendencies come from the suggestion of mulhim so his suggestion is called ilhām (inspiration); and all evil tendencies come from the suggestion of waswās so his suggestion is called waswās (evil thoughts). Therefore, if someone recites dhikr (remembrance) of Allah then the Satan will go far away and disappear from his heart, but if he neglects reciting dhikr of Allah the Satan will go back to his heart. This is the understanding of Allah’s words: min sharri al-waswās al-khannaās, alladhī yuwaswisu fī ṣudūr al-nās. That is, I seek refuge with Him from the evil of Satan named waswās. He will go far away and disappear if dhikr of Allah is recited. He is the one who gives the evil thoughts in the hearts of people. Such is what al-Ghazālī said in the Minhāj al-‘Ābidīn and the others.

Question: if someone says that whom we give the food in manyanggar and mambuang pasilih is indeed Satan, but our intention of carrying them out is only to cure. Otherwise, we suppose Satan similar to a dog, so we give the food to Satan as if we feed a dog. It was known that feeding a dog is permissible and there is no prohibition of such act. That is manyanggar and mambuang pasilih if we put them with such supposition and intention.

Response: such supposition and intention are simply not helpful because they do not eliminate the prohibition of tabdhīr, following Satan and heretical innovation. That comparison is similar to someone who kills someone else with the intention to cure heartache and while killing he does as if the victim is a mouse. It is also similar to someone who commits adultery with the intention to cure rheumatism and during the intercourse he does as if he is with his wife. So, those suppositions and intentions do not eliminate the prohibition of killing and adultery. Furthermore, concerning what they said that giving the food to Satan is like feeding a dog, in fact what they said is different from what is in their heart. Their hearts venerate Satan, this is indicated by the fact that they do not give Satan leftovers, but they provide beautiful foods, and they server them in decorated trays and by doing so they indicate their respect for Satan. O intelligent brothers, is it similar to feeding a dog? Mostly, you do not give a dog food but despicable and leftovers that are put haphazardly in any place. Finally, manyanggar and mambuang pasilih should not be called Medicine neither by the practice involved in these rituals nor by juridical indication [there is no evidence from the sources at all indicating that these practices should be called Medicine]. Medicine is practiced by treating the body of the sick person by inducing ingestion or by smearing or spraying it. This treatment impacts the body in such a way that it can be felt to be either cold or warm [But the contested rituals do not treat the body in that way]

6.1.2 The Text on Lahang

It is understood from what has been explained above that vinegar made from lahang or the like is pure on the whole either it becomes vinegar automatically or because of being added with another substance which is pure because lahang does not turn into wine even if it is left for one night or more. So, it is different from grape juice and the like because lahang that is left overnight is not intoxicating. This [the fact that it is not intoxication] has been observed several times even when it is drunk in a large amount. If wine is drunk in smaller amount than that, then it normally intoxicates. In the previous discussion, it was explained that the ʿilla of the impurity and the unlawfulness of wine lies in its intoxicating nature. Hence, if such ʿilla does not exist like in the case of lahang which is left overnight, then it is not impure and not unlawful. Likewise, vinegar made from it is pure and permissible to drink. Even though another substance is added within it, that does not change the ruling.

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Iqbal, M. (2022). Arsyad Al-Banjari’s Qiyās for Integrating Banjarese Traditions into Islamic Law. In: Arsyad al-Banjari’s Insights on Parallel Reasoning and Dialectic in Law. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, vol 25. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-91676-3_6

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