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Arbitral Tribunals Upholding Corruption and Fraud Arguments

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Corruption and Fraud in Investment Arbitration

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EYIELMONO,volume 22))

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Abstract

This chapter provides overview of a number of investment arbitration disputes, in which arbitral tribunals upheld the allegations of fraud or corruption. A reader will be taken through the decision-making process of various arbitral tribunals in highly quoted ISDS cases, each of which will be completed with analysis from the author.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Odumosu (2011), p. 88 referring to Africa News, “Kenya: Genesis of an Extraordinary Case”, the East African Standard, 3 April 2005.

  2. 2.

    See for instance, Odumosu (2011); Lamm et al. (2014); Nappert (2013); Betz (2017), Chapter 5.1.1.

  3. 3.

    Clouet (2018), p. 29.

  4. 4.

    World Duty Free Company Limited v. The Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, 4 October 2006, para. 66.

  5. 5.

    Id., para.19.

  6. 6.

    Id., para. 110: “Mr. Ali made a payment to President Moi that he believed lawful. At that time, it was routine practice to make such donations in advance of doing business in Kenya; said practice had cultural roots and was buttressed by the “Harambee” system, one which mobilized resources through private donations for public purposes.”

  7. 7.

    Id.

  8. 8.

    Id., paras. 105–107. In that application, the Respondent states that “it is the Claimant’s case that the Contract upon which its claims in these proceedings are based was procured by paying a bribe of US$2 million to the then President of Kenya, Daniel arap Moi… The Respondent further submits that “Bribery of the type that the Claimant has now affirmed is contrary to international public policy.”

  9. 9.

    Id., para. 136.

  10. 10.

    Id., para. 134. It has also noted the report of the Task Force on Public Collections or “Harambees” presented in December 2003 to the Minister of Justice of Kenya. According to this report “the concept of Harambee had its root in the African culture where societies made collective contribution toward individual or communal activities” and this practice became popularised by President Kenyatta just after Kenyan independence. However, the report adds that “over the years, the spirit of Harambee has undergone a metamorphosis which has resulted in gross abuses. It has been linked to the emergence of oppressive and extortionist practices and entrenchment of corruption and abuse of office.”

  11. 11.

    Id., para. 138.

  12. 12.

    Id., para. 141.

  13. 13.

    The Tribunal made note of the following international instruments: Inter-American Convention against Corruption of 29 March 1996, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions of 21 November 1997, Criminal Convention on Corruption of 27 January 1999, African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption of 11 July 2003, United Nations Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions of 16 December 1996, United Nations Convention against Corruption of 31 October 2003, etc.

  14. 14.

    World Duty Free Company Limited v. The Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, 4 October 2006, para. 157.

  15. 15.

    Id., para. 179.

  16. 16.

    Nappert (2013).

  17. 17.

    These particular issues will be further analysed in details on the basis of the findings of an Arbitral Tribunal in Sistem v. Kyrgyz Republic case.

  18. 18.

    World Duty Free Company Limited v. The Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, 4 October 2006, para. 140.

  19. 19.

    Id., para. 141.

  20. 20.

    See, Hwang, M. S.C. and Lim, K., Corruption in Arbitration — Law and Reality, available at https://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/4/97929640279647/media013261720320840corruption_in_arbitration_paper_draft_248.pdf; Kreindler (2002), p. 253.

  21. 21.

    See, Odumosu (2011), Lamm et al. (2014); Nappert (2013).

  22. 22.

    Kulkarni (2013), available at www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1957, p. 19.

  23. 23.

    See, Llamzon (2008), p. 81; Kulkarni (2013), available at www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1957, p. 26.

  24. 24.

    In the World Duty Free case, the arbitral tribunal dealt with claims arising out of an investment contract.

  25. 25.

    Lamm et al. (2014), p. 329. See also, Losco (2014a), pp. 37–52, available at https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1004&context=dlj_online, p. 38.

  26. 26.

    For this reason, the case had been analyzed by other scholars previously, such as Betz, Llamzon, Lamm, Greenwald and Young. See, Betz (2017); Llamzon (2014); Lamm et al. (2014).

  27. 27.

    Metal-Tech Ltd. v. The Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, 4 December 2013, para. 7.

  28. 28.

    Id., para. 37.

  29. 29.

    Id., para. 29.

  30. 30.

    Id., para. 197.

  31. 31.

    Perry (2013).

  32. 32.

    Metal-Tech Ltd. v. The Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, 4 December 2013, para. 237.

  33. 33.

    Id., para.239.

  34. 34.

    Metal-Tech Ltd. v. The Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, 4 December 2013, para. 241.

  35. 35.

    Losco (2014a), pp. 37–52, available at https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1004&context=dlj_online, p. 41.

  36. 36.

    See for instance, Fathallah (2010), p. 73; Clouet (2018). Mills and Born also discussed the possibility of drawing adverse inferences if a party refuses to produce specific evidence – see, Mills (2003), p. 295; and Born (2014), p. 2311.

  37. 37.

    Losco (2014a), pp. 37–52, available at https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1004&context=dlj_online, p. 46.

  38. 38.

    Alekhin and Shmatenko (2018), p. 161.

  39. 39.

    Metal-Tech Ltd. v. The Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, 4 December 2013, para. 293.

  40. 40.

    Woolf Committee Report on Business Ethics, Global Companies and the Defence Industry: Ethical Business Conduct in Bae Systems Plc 25–26 (2008), prepared at the request of the Board of Directors of Bae Systems Plc. The Woolf Committee was chaired by the Rt Hon Lord Woolf, former Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales.

  41. 41.

    Metal-Tech Ltd. v. The Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, 4 December 2013, para. 293 with reference to Woolf Committee Report on Business Ethics, Global Companies and the Defence Industry: Ethical Business Conduct in Bae Systems Plc 25-26 (2008).

  42. 42.

    Id., para. 293.

  43. 43.

    Id.

  44. 44.

    Malik and Kamat (2018), December 2018, available at https://paperity.org/p/185990736/corruption-in-international-commercial-arbitration-arbitrability-admissibility, p. 18.

  45. 45.

    Metal-Tech Ltd. v. The Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, 4 December 2013, para. 193.

  46. 46.

    Id., paras. 199–203.

  47. 47.

    See, Karkey v. Pakistan case, where the tribunal had a different approach in assessing similar facts under similar allegations.

  48. 48.

    Metal-Tech Ltd. v. The Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, 4 December 2013, paras. 208–212.

  49. 49.

    Id., paras. 225–227.

  50. 50.

    Id., paras. 219–224.

  51. 51.

    Id., para. 218.

  52. 52.

    Id., paras. 278–371.

  53. 53.

    Id., para. 372.

  54. 54.

    Id., para. 373.

  55. 55.

    It has been argued that the ICSID jurisdiction has ‘outer limits’, and that the parties cannot engage ICSID jurisdiction without sufficient regard for the objective core of its subject matter jurisdiction. See, Waibel (2014), p. 50, and Broches (1972), pp. 331–410.

  56. 56.

    Metal-Tech Ltd. v. The Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, 4 December 2013, para. 165.

  57. 57.

    Id., para. 422.

  58. 58.

    Losco (2014a), pp. 37–52, available at https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1004&context=dlj_online, p. 51.

  59. 59.

    Clouet (2018), p. 29.

  60. 60.

    See, Wiebecke (2018), p. 97 and Scherrer (2002), pp. 34–35.

  61. 61.

    See, Schreuer et al. (2009), p. 669. See also, Fathallah (2010), p. 73; Clouet (2018).

  62. 62.

    The role and weight of the circumstantial evidence has been studied by Scherrer and Partasides. See, Scherrer (2002); and Partasides (2010).

  63. 63.

    Metal-Tech Ltd. v. The Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, 4 December 2013, para. 293.

  64. 64.

    Lund-Turner (2015), p. 5.

  65. 65.

    Losco (2014a), pp. 37–52, available at https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1004&context=dlj_online, p. 48.

  66. 66.

    Meshel (2013b).

  67. 67.

    On “zero tolerance” approach, see, Crivellaro (2003), p. 21. Interestingly, Torres-Fowler opined that by punishing only the investors, “zero tolerance” may actually trigger the rise of corruption, as the state agents would remain without consequences – Torres-Fowler (2012), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2322129.

  68. 68.

    “The Contracting Party in the territory of which a national or company of the other Contracting Party makes or intends to make an investment shall assent to any request on the part of such national or company to submit. For conciliation or arbitration, to the Centre established by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States opened for signature at Washington on 18 March 1965 any dispute that may arise in connection with the investment.”, Article 7 of the UK-Indonesia BIT.

  69. 69.

    Churchill Mining PLC and Planet Mining Pty Ltd v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14 and 12/40, Award, 6 December 2016, para. 5.

  70. 70.

    Id., para. 108.

  71. 71.

    “The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable”, Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention.

  72. 72.

    Churchill Mining PLC and Planet Mining Pty Ltd v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14 and 12/40, Award, 6 December 2016, para. 235.

  73. 73.

    Id., para. 236.

  74. 74.

    Kreindler (2002), p. 253. See also, Michael Hwang and Lim (2012).

  75. 75.

    Churchill Mining PLC and Planet Mining Pty Ltd v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14 and 12/40, Award, 6 December 2016, para. 238.

  76. 76.

    See, Haugeneder (2009), pp. 323–339; Lamm et al. (2010), pp. 699–731; Rosell and Prager (1999), pp. 329–348; Alekhin and Shmatenko (2018), pp. 157–158; Hunter (1992), pp. 204–211.

  77. 77.

    The same approach is advocated by some legal scholars. See, Partasides (2010).

  78. 78.

    Churchill Mining PLC and Planet Mining Pty Ltd v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14 and 12/40, Award, 6 December 2016, para. 237.

  79. 79.

    See, Catti (2013), pp. 36–38; and Clouet (2018).

  80. 80.

    Churchill Mining PLC and Planet Mining Pty Ltd v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14 and 12/40, Award, 6 December 2016, para. 240.

  81. 81.

    Id., para. 244.

  82. 82.

    Id., para. 488.

  83. 83.

    Id., para. 489, with reference to Venezuela Holdings B.V. and others v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction, 10 June 2010, para. 167.

  84. 84.

    Id., with reference to Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, 15 April 2009, para. 144.

  85. 85.

    See, Born (2014), p. 2705: “Inherent in the legally binding resolution of a dispute and the making of a legally binding award is the duty to consider and resolve public-policy issues and other mandatory legal objections.” See also, Clouet (2018).

  86. 86.

    Churchill Mining PLC and Planet Mining Pty Ltd v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14 and 12/40, Award, 6 December 2016, para. 492 with reference to Renée Rose Levy and Gremcitel S.A. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/17, Award, 9 January 2015, paras. 194–195 and Philip Morris Asia Limited v. Commonwealth of Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 17 December 2015, para. 585.

  87. 87.

    Id., the idea is derived from the tribunal's following statement: “That theory is another manifestation of the general principle that one does not benefit from treaty protection when underlying conduct is deemed improper.”

  88. 88.

    Id., para. 494 with reference to Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, Award, 18 June 2010, paras. 127, 129 (Exh. RLA-058); Quiborax S.A., Non Metallic Minerals S.A. and Allan Fosk Kaplún v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, 27 September 2012, paras. 192, 266, 271.

  89. 89.

    Id., paras. 510–515.

  90. 90.

    Id., paras. 516–527.

  91. 91.

    Id., para. 515.

  92. 92.

    Id., para. 532.

  93. 93.

    Id., para. 236.

  94. 94.

    See for instance, Kreindler (2002), p. 253; Hwang, M. S.C. and Lim, K., Corruption in Arbitration — Law and Reality, available at https://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/4/97929640279647/media013261720320840corruption_in_arbitration_paper_draft_248.pdf.

  95. 95.

    At the time of the publication of this textbook, the decision of the arbitral tribunal has not yet been published. From the attended scientific conferences, it is my understanding that the award is not going to be made public. This section is, therefore, largely based on the information provided in open source articles at Investment Arbitration Review portal (https://www.iareporter.com/) and a detailed summary of the award in Betz (2017), pp. 128–136.

  96. 96.

    Spentex Netherlands, B.V. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/26, Award, 27 December 2016.

  97. 97.

    Alekhin and Shmatenko (2018), p. 151.

  98. 98.

    “Each Contracting Party hereby consents to submit any legal dispute arising between that Contracting Party and a national of the other Contracting Party concerning an investment of that national in the territory of the former Contracting Party to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes for settlement by conciliation or arbitration under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States opened for signature at Washington on 18 March 1965. A legal person which is a national of one Contracting Party and which before such a dispute arises is controlled by nationals of the other Contracting Party shall in accordance with Article 25 (2) (b) of the Convention for the purpose of the Convention be treated as a national of the other Contracting Party.”, Article 9 of the Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of Investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Uzbekistan.

  99. 99.

    See, corporate website of Spentex Industries Ltd. at http://www.clcindia.com/our_ethos.html.

  100. 100.

    See, Djanic (2017), available at https://www.iareporter.com/articles/indian-company-invokes-dutch-bit-rather-than-indian-treaty-in-new-arbitration-over-withdrawn-subsidies-in-uzbekistan/.

  101. 101.

    Id.

  102. 102.

    Id.

  103. 103.

    Spentex Netherlands, B.V. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/26, Award, 27 December 2016, para. 818 as referenced in Betz (2017).

  104. 104.

    Djanic (2017), available at https://www.iareporter.com/articles/indian-company-invokes-dutch-bit-rather-than-indian-treaty-in-new-arbitration-over-withdrawn-subsidies-in-uzbekistan/.

  105. 105.

    Id.

  106. 106.

    Id.

  107. 107.

    Id.

  108. 108.

    Id.

  109. 109.

    The legality requirement is usually being derived from the words “in accordance with host State law” in the definition of the “investment” in international investment agreements.

  110. 110.

    Ultimately, the tribunal settled on the understanding that “(a)ny promise, offering or giving to a (foreign) public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue financial or other advantage in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties, for the purpose of obtaining business advantages falls under the notion of corruption.” See, Djanic (2017), available at https://www.iareporter.com/articles/indian-company-invokes-dutch-bit-rather-than-indian-treaty-in-new-arbitration-over-withdrawn-subsidies-in-uzbekistan/.

  111. 111.

    Spentex Netherlands, B.V. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/26, Award, 27 December 2016, para. 856 as referenced in Betz (2017), p. 131.

  112. 112.

    Djanic (2017), available at https://www.iareporter.com/articles/indian-company-invokes-dutch-bit-rather-than-indian-treaty-in-new-arbitration-over-withdrawn-subsidies-in-uzbekistan/.

  113. 113.

    As we have seen, this approach also finds its support in legal literature. See, Partasides (2010); Malik and Kamat (2018), available at https://paperity.org/p/185990736/corruption-in-international-commercial-arbitration-arbitrability-admissibility, p. 17; Karadelis (2010), available at https://globalarbitrationreview.com/print_article/gar/article/1029476/corruption-and-the-standard-of-proof.

  114. 114.

    Gaillard (2019), p. 8 with reference to Betz (2017), pp. 128–136.

  115. 115.

    In particular, the First Finance Solutions was headed by the then 22-year-old brother of the President of the Kazakh British Chamber of Commerce.

  116. 116.

    According to the tribunal’s analysis the contracts only offered vague descriptions, such as “ensuring good support for the bid” and “ensuring good relations” with the Uzbek authorities.

  117. 117.

    Djanic (2017), available at https://www.iareporter.com/articles/indian-company-invokes-dutch-bit-rather-than-indian-treaty-in-new-arbitration-over-withdrawn-subsidies-in-uzbekistan/.

  118. 118.

    Spentex Netherlands, B.V. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/26, Award, 27 December 2016, para. 934 as quoted in Betz (2017), p. 134.

  119. 119.

    See, Kulkarni (2013), available at www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1957, p. 47; Alekhin and Shmatenko (2018).

  120. 120.

    Djanic (2017), available at https://www.iareporter.com/articles/indian-company-invokes-dutch-bit-rather-than-indian-treaty-in-new-arbitration-over-withdrawn-subsidies-in-uzbekistan/.

  121. 121.

    Id.

  122. 122.

    The conduct of the undisclosed public official who received the bribe seems to have been attributed to the conduct of the state. This is consistent with the general public international law norms. See, Crawford (2002), pp. 106–109; Shaw (2008), p. 786.

  123. 123.

    Craig et al. (2000), p. 451.

  124. 124.

    Djanic (2017), available at https://www.iareporter.com/articles/indian-company-invokes-dutch-bit-rather-than-indian-treaty-in-new-arbitration-over-withdrawn-subsidies-in-uzbekistan/.

  125. 125.

    Id. The expert of the respondent testified that no criminal proceedings were initiated at the time of arbitration in relation to the Claimant’s investment.

  126. 126.

    Spentex Netherlands, B.V. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/26, Award, 27 December 2016, para. 941 as referenced in Betz (2017), p. 134.

  127. 127.

    Id. with reference to para. 940.

  128. 128.

    Djanic (2017), available at https://www.iareporter.com/articles/indian-company-invokes-dutch-bit-rather-than-indian-treaty-in-new-arbitration-over-withdrawn-subsidies-in-uzbekistan/.

  129. 129.

    Id.

  130. 130.

    Id.

  131. 131.

    Article of the United Nation’s Development Program’s cooperation with Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Justice and General Prosecutor’s Office is available at http://www.uz.undp.org/content/uzbekistan/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2018/04/20/undp%2D%2Dministry-of-justice-and-general-prosecutor-office-launch-a.html.

  132. 132.

    Djanic (2017), available at https://www.iareporter.com/articles/indian-company-invokes-dutch-bit-rather-than-indian-treaty-in-new-arbitration-over-withdrawn-subsidies-in-uzbekistan/.

  133. 133.

    Id.

  134. 134.

    Spentex Netherlands, B.V. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/26, Award, 27 December 2016, para. 941 as referenced in Betz (2017), p. 134.

  135. 135.

    Alekhin and Shmatenko (2018), p. 151.

  136. 136.

    Teachout (2011), pp. 681–682.

  137. 137.

    See for instance, Alekhin and Shmatenko (2018), p. 162 with reference to Amerasinghe (2005), p. 138.

  138. 138.

    See, Born (2014), p. 2311; Mills (2003), p. 295; Lamm et al. (2010), pp. 704–705; Fathallah (2010), pp. 73–77; Clouet (2018).

  139. 139.

    See for instance, Cremades (2005); Wilske (2010); Meshel (2013a).

  140. 140.

    Kulick and Wendler (2010), p. 98; See also, Llamzon (2008), p. 81.

  141. 141.

    Fernández-Armesto (2015), p. 31: “Investment arbitration has initiated and led the movement of zero tolerance towards corruption.”

  142. 142.

    Losco (2014a), pp. 37–52, available at https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1004&context=dlj_online, p. 48.

  143. 143.

    Clouet (2018) with reference to Cremades and Cairns (2003), p. 85.

  144. 144.

    On the questions of confidentiality duties, see Lew (2011).

  145. 145.

    Sanum Investments Limited v. the Lao People's Democratic Republic, PCA Case No 2013-13, Award, 6 August 2019, para. 1.

  146. 146.

    Id.

  147. 147.

    Id., para. 2.

  148. 148.

    Id., para. 3.

  149. 149.

    Id., para. 86.

  150. 150.

    Id., para. 101.

  151. 151.

    Id., para. 95.

  152. 152.

    Id., para. 87 [emphasis added].

  153. 153.

    Sanum Investments Limited v. the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PCA Case No 2013-13, Award of Jurisdiction, 13 December 2013.

  154. 154.

    See for instance, Fathallah (2010)pp. 40–41 and 65-70, see also, Clouet (2018).

  155. 155.

    In this regard, see, Hunter (1992), pp. 204–211; Alekhin and Shmatenko (2018), pp. 157–158. See also, Haugeneder (2009), pp. 323–339; Lamm et al. (2010), pp. 699–731; and Rosell and Prager (1999), pp. 329–348.

  156. 156.

    Sanum Investments Limited v. the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PCA Case No 2013-13, Award, 6 August 2019, para. 107.

  157. 157.

    Id., para. 108.

  158. 158.

    Id. According to the Sanum tribunal, “[t]his approach reflects the general proposition that the “graver the charge, the more confidence there must be in the evidence relied on.”

  159. 159.

    Id., para. 103 [emphasis added].

  160. 160.

    Id., para. 104 [emphasis added].

  161. 161.

    Id., para. 103 with references to the UN Convention Against Corruption, Article 16(1), and Anti-Bribery Convention, Article 1(1): “Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence under its law for any person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of international business”; and ICC Dossier: Addressing Issues of Corruption in Commercial and Investment Arbitration, Chapter 11, at para. 34: “It is now undisputed that a finding of corruption when making or performing an investment will lead to dismissal of claimant's claims and to a loss of any protection afforded by the treaty.”

  162. 162.

    See for instance, Kreindler (2002), p. 253; Hwang, M. S.C. and Lim, K., Corruption in Arbitration — Law and Reality, available at https://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/4/97929640279647/media013261720320840corruption_in_arbitration_paper_draft_248.pdf.

  163. 163.

    Sanum Investments Limited v. the Lao People's Democratic Republic, PCA Case No 2013-13, Award, 6 August 2019, para. 138.

  164. 164.

    Id., para. 176.

  165. 165.

    Id., para. 176.

  166. 166.

    Id.

  167. 167.

    Id., para. 177.

  168. 168.

    Id., para. 175.

  169. 169.

    Id., paras. 109, 147, 166.

  170. 170.

    Id., para. 110.

  171. 171.

    Id., para. 111.

  172. 172.

    See for instance, Sanum Investments Limited v. the Lao People's Democratic Republic, PCA Case No 2013-13, Award, 6 August 2019, para. 122: “Moreover, no one was prosecuted in this affair. Even if Madam Sengkeo did not cooperate with the Government, why was her daughter (the owner of the bank account) not investigated? What is the daughter's explanation?”; para. 126: “There is no evidence that Madam Manivone (the presumed recipient) or anyone else was prosecuted.”

  173. 173.

    Losco (2014b), p. 2. See also, Haugender and Liebscher (2009).

  174. 174.

    See, Sharp (2006); Mills (2003), p. 295; and Born (2014), p. 2311.

  175. 175.

    See, Kulick and Wendler (2010), p. 98; Llamzon (2008), p. 81.

  176. 176.

    Alekhin and Shmatenko (2018), p. 151.

  177. 177.

    Losco (2014a), pp. 37–52, available at https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1004&context=dlj_online, p. 48.

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    Adilbek Tussupov

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Tussupov, A. (2022). Arbitral Tribunals Upholding Corruption and Fraud Arguments. In: Corruption and Fraud in Investment Arbitration. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(), vol 22. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90606-1_6

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