Abstract
This chapter analyzes the role of the military’s position in the outcomes of civilian uprisings and revolutions. Civilian protest campaigns (or revolutions) that appear to drive autocrats from office are dramatic affairs. However, in most cases it is not civilian protestors alone who can be credited for the regime change outcome. The military are significant veto players. They can work to keep autocrats in office, they can support the civilian uprisings, or they can participate in some negotiated compromise that may be worked out. Whatever the case, the authors contend that the more significant and overt the military role in these affairs, the less likely it is that the post-revolutionary outcome is democratic in nature. How and to what extent they play a role is assessed through an investigation of 36 nonviolent, civilian revolts that brought about successful regime change since 1945. In each case, we measure, albeit crudely, the breadth of civilian participation and the nature of the military involvement. These indicators are then compared with democratization levels five and ten years after the nonviolent, civilian revolt. We find that protest campaigns can certainly bring down regimes, but in most cases, only if the military permits it. When the military is least involved in toppling the regime, the new subsequent regime is likely to be more democratic. When the military is highly involved, the nature of the new regime is predictably less democratic.
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Notes
- 1.
This paper was initially written in 2012 (and subsequently updated) for a Michigan State University conference on the Arab Spring organized by Michael Colaresi. Thanks to Jack Snyder and Jack Goldstone for their comments and editorial intervention. Other cases of the Arab Spring that followed different (less than successful) trajectories are: Bahrain, Libya, and Syria. Foreign military interventions played a key role in toppling these regimes, one of which (Bahrain) resulted in regime maintenance, while the other two devolved into civil wars (Brownlee et al., 2015).
- 2.
On the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen see Chapter “The Arab Spring: Causes, Conditions, and Driving Forces” (Grinin & Korotayev, 2022b), Chapter “The Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and the Birth of the Arab Spring Uprisings” (Kuznetsov, 2022), Chapter “Egypt’s 2011 Revolution. A Demographic Structural Analysis” (Korotayev & Zinkina, 2022), and Chapter “The Arab Spring in Yemen” (Issaev et al., 2022, in this volume). On the recent revolutions in Sudan and Algeria see Chapter “Introduction. Changing yet Persistent: Revolutions and Revolutionary Events” (Goldstone et al., 2022, in this book).
- 3.
Protest campaigns are also referred to as protest waves, nonviolent civilian resistance revolts, strategic nonviolent popular revolts and/or mass revolts. The prevailing definition is that a nonviolent resistance campaign exhibits observable, continuous political tactics (without the use of arms or terrorism) for political objectives. Such tactics include demonstrations, boycotts, and strikes. Campaigns can be short (a matter of days or weeks) or long (months or years), with an identifiable leadership. Protest campaigns do not involve random or spontaneous mass action (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011 for more details). On the point that the terms “nonviolent resistance campaigns” and “non-violent revolutions” denote the same phenomena and can be regarded as synonyms see Chapter “Revolutions, Counterrevolutions, and Democracy” (Grinin & Korotayev, 2022a).
- 4.
- 5.
Shama (2019) reminds us that quiet acquiescence on the part of the military can work just as well in overthrowing an autocratic regime.
- 6.
On the other hand, one should never assume that military organizations are motivated by corporate instincts. When they are highly integrated into a country’s economic or ideological subsystem (see, for instance, Korotayev et al., 2015) other sources of motivation may be more likely.
- 7.
The major exceptions are situations in which the military seeks to withdraw from a period of what is perceived as an excessive involvement in the political system—a “return-to-the-barracks” syndrome.
- 8.
In addition, Kim (2017) examines the relationship between mass revolts and the emergence of electoral authoritarianism. In contrast to the emphasis on democratization, Kim investigates the extent to which closed authoritarian regimes transition to what he calls electoral authoritarianism.
- 9.
They operationalize democratic transitions as one of two conditions: (a) an autocratic regime collapses or (b) a democratic regime is installed. Their anti-regime protests variable is obtained from the 2013 NAVCO dataset.
- 10.
They also compare these three cases with Libya’s regime breakdown which is associated with foreign military intervention. We concentrate on the results of Brownlee et al.’s (2015) analysis for Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen because all three experienced mass protest campaigns and leadership changes with post-regime changes. However, see Holmes and Koehler (2020) for an argument opposed to comparing the Egyptian and Tunisian cases.
- 11.
We choose to highlight military support and defection but it is true that other sources of regime support can be important as well. The more general process, sometimes called the “authoritarian bargain” (Haggard & Kaufman, 1995; but see also O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Schock, 2005), is summarized by Teorell (2010: 153) as: “ authoritarian regimes..[,] forged on the basis of certain support groups, … are mostly hurt either when those groups defect from the regime or when dissension spreads among them.”.
- 12.
For this reason, military intervention at the end of a revolutionary situation is sometimes referred to as an “endgame coup” (Koehler & Albrecht, 2021). Albrecht and Koehler (2020) caution that modelers should be careful to differentiate the revolutionary situation from the final endgame coup. The problem with this advice is that the two processes are inter-related and interact with one another.
- 13.
Militaries will be motivated to defect in the context of mass protests for a variety of interests associated with corporate, institutional and economic interests or international pressures or perceptions of state strength. See Brooks (2013), Nepstad (2013), Pion-Berlin et al. (2014), Lee (2015), Barany and Albrecht and Oh (2016) for most recent works. In addition, see Brooks (forthcoming) for an extensive review of the literature on why militaries defected in the context of the Arab Spring.
- 14.
- 15.
See, for instance, Lipset, Ruschemeyer et al. (1992), or Londegran and Poole (1996) for different interpretations of this relationship. Another school of thought argues that democracies can emerge but are unlikely to be sustained in political systems characterized by low levels of gross product per capita (Przeworski et al., 2000). But economic development, of course, is not the only factor in the set of variables considered to be impediments to democratization in more recent years. Teorell (2010: 145) lists Muslim population, country size, oil, trade volume, economic fluctuations, socioeconomic modernization, and economic freedom as the most robust determinants for third wave democracies. He also lists another ten variables that were less than robust.
- 16.
The partial exception to this generalization is a period of extreme emergency in which the military are critical defenders of societies at war. Military preferences can become integral to the national political economy and these types of settings can help retired military elites be elected to public office after the emergency conditions fade from view. Alternatively, military officers may be motivated to change the civilian leadership to avert defeat as in Germany just prior to and during World War II or as in Japan in the 1930s. But none of these situations resemble the settings in which military organizations come to govern political systems.
- 17.
For instance, both Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) and Nepstad (2011) have binary variables for military participation (yes/no) in their nonviolent protest cases. Despite the fact that Chenoweth and Stephan call regime loyalty shifts to be the most significant factor in predicting successful outcomes in protest campaigns, they still emphasize the role of the civilian protestors. We prefer to move beyond a dummy variable approach and to give the military role more prominence. Basically, we are arguing that one of their central variables deserves even more centrality.
- 18.
On this possibility, see also Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003).
- 19.
Bolivia was a Nepstad case, but was later dropped from the analysis due to an inability to find figures for the number of participants involved in the protest campaign. We are still pursuing this information in order to add Bolivia to the sample. Meanwhile, Nepstad also listed Burma (2007), Armenia (2008), Tunisia (2011) and Egypt (2011), but these cases were excluded due to the lack of Polity IV data on regime changes for five and ten years later.
- 20.
- 21.
Chenoweth’s notion of a civil resistance campaign is very similar to Tarrow (1998) and Almeida’s (2008) “protest wave” concept in which a broad based coalition of non-governmental actors participate in largely nonviolent demonstrations, strikes, protests and boycotts in a heightened and sustained period of political activity. It is also reminiscent of Beissinger’s concept of “mobilizational cycle” (Beissinger, 2002).
- 22.
Some of Chenoweth and Stephan’s successful cases were ignored because to bring them into our study would create incompatibilities with the type of events Nepstad selected.
- 23.
Sources utilized are identified in the appendix table.
- 24.
We do not claim that our cases capture every case of possible interest. We know of at least one case (Sudan, 1964; ironically, the first Middle Eastern nonviolent civilian revolution) that is overlooked by Chenoweth and Shepherd and that is too early for Nepstad. However, we thought it best to proceed with the two data bases already created to encompass nonviolent, civilian overthrows. We also wanted to make use of the Chenoweth and Shepherd “peak membership” indicator. Our approach leaves somewhat open the question of whether we are working with a sample or the universe of cases since 1945. We believe it approximates the universe of appropriate cases. For detail on many cases in Table 1 see Chapter “Revolutionary Waves and Lines of the Twentieth Century” (Grinin & Grinin, 2022, in this volume).
- 25.
Russell (1974: 74) presents a three part disloyalty scale. There is a 0–4 degree of disloyalty scale, a 0–4 time at which disloyal scale, and a 0–4 proportion of armed forces disloyal at a particular time scale. Russell advocates multiplying each separate scale score to obtain a composite score. We experimented with this three-scale approach but ultimately decided that only the first scale was useful for our problem. In our sample, there was little variation on the disloyal timing scale (usually toward the end of the protest period) and not too much more variation on the proportion disloyal scale. Multiplying the three scales created a range of scores that did not really provide us with the kind of information we needed. Relying exclusively on the first disloyalty scale, however, did give us information on the military role. We did elongate the scale slightly from 0–4 to 0–5 and adjusted some of the categorical description at each level to better suit our sample.
- 26.
For several cases that had missing values or were underestimated in the Chenoweth dataset, we looked at additional historical sources to find estimated counts of peak membership for Slovenia, Sudan, East Germany (underestimated), and Venezuela.
- 27.
For more detailed information, please refer to Chenoweth’s online appendix at: https://wesfiles.wesleyan.edu/home/echenoweth/.../WCRWAppendix.
- 28.
Gross domestic product per capita data are taken mainly from Angus Maddison’s dataset (Statistics on World Population, GDP, and Per Capita GDP, 1–2008 AD. Maddison’s data are found at http://www.ggdcnet/maddison/Maddison.htm. Maddison does not make data available for Haiti and East Germany. For Haiti, we substituted a value expressed in 2005 US dollars found at www.ers.usda.gov/data.../HistoricalRealPerCapitaIIncomeValues.xls. Sleifer (2006: 52) reports that East Germany’s GDP per capita in 1990 was about half of West Germany’s GDP per capita. Thus, we used the Maddison value for West Germany divided by 2.
- 29.
We rely on Geddes’ (1999a, 1999b) autocracy type codings found in the International Studies Compendium Project data collection. For a listing of the data, see http://www.isadiseussn.com/view/0/datasets.html.
We realize that there are shortcomings associated with the Geddes codings, mainly dealing with missing information on certain types of regimes (see Hadenius & Teorell, 2007) but we did not encounter many problems with our small sample (for instance, we have only one monarchy) and supplemented the Geddes information when necessary.
- 30.
We estimate control variables such as GDP per capita, Democratic Neighbors, European region, Single Party and Personalist Regimes and Cold War in separate models due to their collinearity with key independent variables. The variables in Equations (a) and (b) appear in every model.
- 31.
This outlier problem is also present when the dependent variable is the ten year post-campaign democratization level. In this situation, the correlation between logged peak membership and the Y variable is −0.01 while the correlation is 0.14 in the absence of the three outliers.
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Appendix: Sources for Sample Cases
Appendix: Sources for Sample Cases
Cases | Sources |
|---|---|
Venezuela 1958 | |
South Korea 1960 | |
Portugal 1974 | |
Greece 1974 | |
*Iran 1978–79 | Kurzman (2004), Schock (2005), Abrahamian (2011), Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) |
*Bolivia 1978–82 | Malloy and Gamera (1988) |
Argentina 1983 | |
*Philippines 1983–86 | Bresnan (1986), Ackerman and Duvall (2000), Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), Mendoza (2011), Nepstad (2011) |
*Chile 1985–88 | |
*South Africa 1983–90 | Zunes et al. (1999), Ackerman and Duvall (2000), Schock (2005), Peterson and Staniland (2008), Lodge (2011) |
Brazil 1985 | Mainwaring (1986) |
*Sudan 1985 | |
*Haiti 1985 | |
Uruguay 1985 | |
*Baltic states 1987–91 (3 cases: Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) | |
Bulgaria 1989 | |
*Czechoslovakia 1989 | Cipkowski (1991), Judt (1992), Glenn (1999), Shepherd (2000), Wolchik (2008) |
*East Germany 1989 | |
Hungary 1989 | |
Poland 1989 | |
*Mali 1989–92 | |
Slovenia 1990 | |
*Madagascar 1991–93 | Allen (1995) |
Slovakia 1992 | |
*Indonesia 1998 | |
Croatia 2000 | Bidelux and Jeffries (2006) |
Peru 2000 | Levitsky and Cameron (2003) |
*Serbia 2000 | |
*Philippines 2001 | Doronila (2001) |
Zambia 2001 | |
*Georgia 2003 | Jones (2011) |
*Ukraine 2004 | |
*Kyrgyzstan 2005 | |
*Lebanon 2005 | |
Thailand 2006 |
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Rasler, K., Thompson, W.R., Bou Nassif, H. (2022). The Extent of Military Involvement in Nonviolent, Civilian Revolts and Their Aftermath. In: Goldstone, J.A., Grinin, L., Korotayev, A. (eds) Handbook of Revolutions in the 21st Century. Societies and Political Orders in Transition. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_29
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