Abstract
Some features of Smith’s theory can be better appreciated if compared with the theoretical developments that took place in the life sciences of his time. What Smith’s economic theory and coeval biological knowledge had in common was the shift from the analysis of observable interdependencies to the analysis of the order (or organization) engendered by invisible forces which account for social and economic coordination.
In some respects, the invisible hand was similar to the image adopted by Théophile Bordeu, who described the natural body as a “swarm of bees” which behaves as a unitary system, although it is formed by distinct insects. Buffon, Maupertuis, Diderot and scholars of the Medical School of Montpellier also maintained that life cannot be explained in mechanical terms, and the visible dimensions of biological phenomena must necessarily refer to unknown forces which fix the organization of living beings.
Smith’s notion of order had some elements in common with these medical and physiological conceptions, although economic theory and the sciences of life essentially revisited their analytical tools independently. This chapter discusses how these approaches changed the foundations of the two disciplines.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
This was related to the decline of preformation theory: “As long as living organisms were perceived as combinations of visible structures, preformation provided the simplest explanation for the persistence of those structures through succeeding generations. The linear continuity of the living world in space and time required a continuity of form through the actual process of generation” (Jacob, 1973: 74).
- 2.
More precisely, Buffon denied the idea of continuity among species, although he believed that there is a continuity within species (Reill, 2005: 49–50).
- 3.
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, J. F. Blumenbach (1752–1840) dealt with vital forces as a concept close to a Newtonian type of force. Haller (1708–1777) assumed that the physiology of fibers depends on irreducible vital forces such as irritability. In turn, Needham (1713–1781) suggested the existence of a “vegetative force”, as a principle of generation and development of living beings; Wolff (1733–1794) identified a “vis essentialis” as a vital principle that works on organic matter by coordinating simple parts into more complex structures. Prochaska (1749–1820) introduced the Newtonian method in the life sciences and compared attractive and nervous forces.
- 4.
On the nature of the reciprocal influence of the two approaches, the debate is still open. Demeter (2016, chap. 7) maintains that Hume provided a vitalistic account of human nature, and traces of a vitalistic outlook are present in Smith and Ferguson. By contrast, Wolfe (2018) criticizes the connection that some scholars identify between vitalist and Smithian/Humean notions of sympathy.
- 5.
These debates in part reflected the need to answer the mind-body problem developed by Descartes in his mechanistic approach (Bourke, 2012: 435–436).
- 6.
Hume , too, emphasized the relationship between sympathy and the body and metaphorically described it as a “contagion” of passions “in which the ideas of the mind become, in some unexplained way, impressions of the body” (Packham, 2012: 64).
- 7.
The “element of invisibility” expressed in the “invisible hand”, Foucault maintains, is rooted in the market system: “Invisibility is not just a fact arising from the imperfect nature of human intelligence which prevents people from realizing that there is a hand behind them which arranges or connects everything that each individual does on their own account. Invisibility is absolutely indispensable. It is an invisibility which means that no economic agent should or can pursue the collective good” (Foucault, 2008: 280).
- 8.
As Vigo de Lima and Guizzo (2015: 589–90) summarize , in “the classical episteme or ‘the age of representation’, the space occupied by things and their visibility (their surface) were privileged”, while in the episteme of the modern age the basic trait was that “representation could no longer provide the foundation of knowledge by itself”. See also Versieren (2016).
- 9.
Foucault argues that the differences between Quesnay and Smith can be examined by considering how they dealt with the problem of visibility. Quesnay conceived economic inquiry as an analysis which, by illustrating visible relationships, can be useful to the political authority. The Tableau offered “the sovereign a principle of analysis and a sort of principle of transparency in relation to the whole of the economic process” (Foucault, 2008: 285). By contrast, Smith’s invisible hand showed that the legislator does not possess this knowledge, because “the world of the economy must be and can only be obscure to the sovereign” (ibidem: 280).
References
Bourke, J. (2012). Pain, Sympathy and the Medical Encounter Between the Mid Eighteenth and the Mid Twentieth Centuries. Historical Research, 85(229), 430–452.
Buffon, G.-L. Leclerc de. (1749). Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière, nouvelle édition, tome I. Imprimerie Royale.
Buffon, G.-L. Leclerc de. (1750). Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière, avec la description du Cabinet du Roi, tome II. Pierre le Hondt.
Casini, P. (1980). Introduzione all’illuminismo (2 vol.). Laterza.
Cassirer, E. (1968). The Philosophy of Enlightenment. Princeton University Press.
Cohen, B. I. (1980). The Newtonian Revolution. With Illustration of the Transformation of Scientific Ideas. Cambridge University Press.
Deleule, D. (1979). Hume et la naissance du libéralisme économique. Aubier Montaigne.
Demeter, T. (2016). David Hume and the Culture of Scottish Newtonianism: Methodology and Ideology in Enlightenment Inquiry. Brill.
Diderot, D. (1996 [1769]). Le Rêve de D’Alembert. In Il sogno di D’Alembert, facing French text. Rizzoli.
Diderot, D. (1999 [1753]). Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature. Clinamen Press.
Forget, E. L. (2003). Evocations of Sympathy: Sympathetic Imagery in Eighteenth-Century Social Theory and Physiology. History of Political Economy, Annual Supplement, 35, 282–308.
Foucault, M. (2005 [1966]). The Order of Things. An Archeology of the Human Sciences. Routledge.
Foucault, M. (2008). The Birth of Biopolitics In M. Senellart (Ed.), Lectures at the College de France, 1978-79. Palgrave Macmillan.
Jacob, F. (1973). The Logic of Life. A History of Heredity. Pantheon Books. Trans. from the French edition: La logique du vivant. Une histoire de l’hérédité. Gallimard, 1970.
Koyré, A. (1968). Newtonian Studies. The University of Chicago Press.
Lawrence, C. (1979). The Nervous System and Society in the Scottish. In B. Barnes & S. Shapin (Eds.), Natural Order: Historical Studies of Scientific Culture, 19–40. Sage.
Locke, J. (1997 [1690]). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Penguin Books.
Maupertuis, P. L. Moreau de. (1965a [1745]). Vénus physique In Oeuvres (Vol. II). Georg Olms.
Maupertuis, P. L. Moreau de. (1965b [1754]). Sistème de la Nature. Essai sur la formation des corps organisés. In Oeuvres (Vol. II). Georg Olms.
Mayr, E. (1982). The Growth of Biological Thought. Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Moravia, S. (1978). From Homme Machine to Homme Sensible: Changing Eighteenth-Century Models of Man’s Image. Journal of the History of Ideas, 39(1), 45–60.
Newton, I. (1999 [1687]). The Principia. Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. University of California Press.
Nicholson, D. J. (2014). The Machine Conception of the Organism in Development and Evolution: A Critical Analysis. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 48, 162–174.
Packham, C. (2002). The Physiology of Political Economy: Vitalism and Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations. Journal of the History of Ideas, 63(3), 465–481.
Packham, C. (2012). Eighteenth-Century Vitalism. Bodies, Culture, Politics. Palgrave Macmillan.
Prigogine, I., & Stengers, I. (1984). Order Out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with Nature. Bantam Books.
Reill, P. H. (2005). Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment. University of California Press.
Roe, S. A. (1981). Matter, Life, and Generation. Eighteenth-Century Embryology and the Haller-Wolff Debate. Cambridge University Press.
Roger, J. (1997). Buffon: A Life in Natural History. Cornell University Press.
Solinas, G. (1967). Il microscopio e le metafisiche. Epigenesi e preesistenza da Cartesio a Kant. Feltrinelli.
Versieren, J. (2016). The Moral Foundations of Adam Smith’s Transitional Society: Reappraising Foucault’s Representations of Wealth and Marx’s Reconstruction of Value Theory. Capital & Class, 40(3), 1–22.
Vigo de Lima, I., & Guizzo, D. (2015). An Archaeology of Adam Smith’s Epistemic Context. Review of Political Economy, 27(4), 585–605.
Voltaire. (1951 [1733]). Lettres philosophiques ou lettres anglaises. Garnier.
Wolfe, C. T. (2017). Models of Organic Organization in Montpellier Vitalism. Early Science and Medicine, 22, 229–252.
Wolfe, C. T. (2018). Smithian Vitalism? Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 16, 264–271.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2021 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Fiori, S. (2021). Organization and Invisible Forces in the Life Sciences of the Late Eighteenth Century. In: Machines, Bodies and Invisible Hands. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85206-1_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85206-1_8
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-85205-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-85206-1
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)