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The “Dilemma” of Criminal Compliance for Multinational Enterprises in a Fragmented Legal World

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Corporate Compliance on a Global Scale

Abstract

This paper deals with the need for a specific legal analysis, from a criminal law perspective, concerning multinational enterprises (MNEs), given their involvement in illicit conducts that transcend the territorial boundaries of any single State and generate negative effects of enormous dimensions. The topic presents a high degree of complexity in terms of territorial and material scope: indeed, MNEs face a “dilemma” between undercompliance and overcompliance, since even the most cooperative entity, honestly seeking to fulfil its legal duties, is confronted with a fragmented and uncoordinated legal and regulatory scene. The risk thus arises of setting an insufficient standard for compliance, or vice versa, making an effort that is counterproductive in terms of efficiency while being supererogatory from the legal point of view. The present analysis thus addresses how MNEs might strike the right balance in combining the different sets of regulations, first of all by fulfilling the requirements applicable in the "home country" as well as those applicable in the "host country": to do this, the need arises for an MNE to compare the legislative requirements it has to abide by under the legislation applicable to the mother company and the ones applicable to the foreign entities it controls. A further layer of complexity relates to the extensive reach of certain pieces of criminal legislation issued by “third countries,” especially concerning anticorruption policies. Moreover, other emerging elements have to be taken into account by MNEs: on the one hand, private bodies and organizations increasingly define the compliance standards, the main example being represented by the ISO standards; on the other, international or transnational soft law and hard law rules are in the process of being elaborated, as the field of human rights clearly shows. In conclusion, the analysis reveals a progressive tendency among MNEs to comply with the higher legal standards set in home countries or at the international level, instead of the lower ones provided at the local level. Yet this tendency is far from general and admits a large number of exceptions, in particular where the procedural and institutional dimensions of compliance rules are concerned.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    “Surprisingly, there is no legally precise and universally accepted definition of the multinational enterprise. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises […] even now employ only a minimalist conception: ‘They [MEs] usually comprise companies or other entities established in more than one country and so linked that they may coordinate their operations in various ways. While one or more of these entities may be able to exercise a significant influence over the activities of others, their degree of autonomy within the enterprise may vary widely from one multinational enterprise to another’ …” (Ruggie 2018, p. 318; concerning the legal framework, see Wallace 2002; for a definition, see also Mayrhofer and Prange 2015).

  2. 2.

    Art. 25, para. 1 ICC St.: “The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute.”

  3. 3.

    “Here it is worth asking why public-sector spending is so dedicated to street-level enforcement, while the hard and soft costs of self-regulation are increasingly, and now disproportionately, borne by businesses” (Laufer 2018, p. 395).

  4. 4.

    Even though many differences can also be highlighted, particularly its role in “restorative compliance,” widely acknowledged in practice (Braithwaite 2002; Spalding 2015)

  5. 5.

    The issue has been highlighted by the OECD: “The Principles extend to enterprise groups, although boards of subsidiary enterprises might have obligations under the law of their jurisdiction of incorporation. Compliance and control systems should extend where possible to these subsidiaries. Furthermore, the board’s monitoring of governance includes continuous review of internal structures to ensure clear lines of management accountability throughout the group” (OECD 2011, para. 9).

  6. 6.

    For instance, within the Japanese legal order, following the guidelines issued by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, among others, “small facilitation payments given in order to expedite a routine administrative service” were considered as not being an “improper business advantage” (OECD 2007, p. 48). Today, under the pressure of the OECD, this exception and some others have been overcome.

  7. 7.

    Critically, the symbolic aspects of the process of preparing for and acquiring ISO certificates have been highlighted by examining it from the perspective of “degree purchasing syndrome” (DPS) theory, known from the field of education. “The DPS refers to the pervasive effects—notably concerning the process of preparing for and passing exams—that result from the tendency of many students to be more interested in acquiring a diploma than the learning that it represents” (Boiral 2012).

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    Stefano Manacorda

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Manacorda, S. (2022). The “Dilemma” of Criminal Compliance for Multinational Enterprises in a Fragmented Legal World. In: Manacorda, S., Centonze, F. (eds) Corporate Compliance on a Global Scale. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81655-1_4

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