Abstract
This chapter addresses the nature and scope of intuitive knowledge, Spinoza’s emphasis on its superiority over reason, and the knowledge of essences of which it is capable. With the help of a geometrical example modeled on, but more suggestive than, Spinoza’s fourth proportional example, I argue for a “method interpretation” of the distinction between reason and intuitive knowledge, according to which they differ only in their respective methods of arriving at the same knowledge content. According to my particular version of the method interpretation, intuitive knowledge is best understood as the perfection of reason. I conclude that although adequate knowledge of the individuating essences of singular things is impossible for finite intellects, we can aspire, nevertheless, to know common essences and species essences.
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Notes
- 1.
See, for instance, TIE 29/G 2:13; KV 2.4.9–10/G 1:61; E2p47s/G 2:128.
- 2.
Soyarslan 2016. Soyarslan defends a content interpretation. Other adherents of a content interpretation include Curley (1973, 57), Allison (1987, 116–19), Wilson (1996, 117–18), and D. Garrett (2009, 107). Primus (2017) also seems to defend a version of the content interpretation, but unlike the other content interpretations cited, she does not believe that the distinction between reason and intuitive knowledge reflects the difference between knowledge of non-essential properties and knowledge of essences. Instead, Primus argues that whereas reason knows how its objects would be if they were formally real, intuitive knowledge adds the certainty that its objects are, in fact, formally real. (Allison expresses something similar at one point (1987, 117–18).) Adherents of a method interpretation include Carr (1978), Sandler (2005), and Nadler (2006, 178–85).
- 3.
See Spinoza’s definition of imagination, or the first kind of knowledge, at the beginning of E2p40s2/G 2:122. My distinction between direct and indirect forms of sensory experience, or imagination, reflects Spinoza’s distinction between perceiving things and forming universal notions “from singular things which have been represented to us through the senses in a way that is mutilated and confused,” on the one hand, and “from signs, e.g., from the fact that, having heard or read certain words, we recollect things, and for certain ideas of them, which are like them, and through which we imagine the things,” on the other.
- 4.
For a helpful analysis of the relevant demonstration in Euclid, see Matheron 1986.
- 5.
Cf. D. Garrett (2009, 109): “Although [Spinoza] indicates that this inference may not proceed ‘adequately,’ this does not entail that the resulting ideas are themselves inadequate and false ones in his later technical sense; since he claims in the Ethics that all ideas constituting reason are adequate and true, he presumably means only that the inference fails to show exactly what the essence of the cause is and how that essence produces the effect.” Garrett’s appeal to the Ethics’ notions of reason and adequacy assumes that Spinoza’s account of reason (and adequacy) does not change from the TIE to the Ethics—an assumption about which I raise some doubts below.
- 6.
As a number of commentators have noted, the phrase “formal essence of certain attributes” is puzzling, since attributes are themselves expressions of divine essence, so ‘the formal essence of certain attributes’ sounds like ‘the formal essence of certain essences’ (i.e., as Garrett puts it, “seemingly redundant” (2009, 105)). It will be recalled that in Chap. 6 I suggested that the qualifier “formal” contrasts with “objective” in certain contexts (à la Suárez and Descartes) and with “actual” in others. In the present context, I suspect that the contrast must be with “objective,” since there can be no formal-actual distinction for attributes (since that distinction depends on the durational existence of finite modes). In that case, Spinoza may have wished to emphasize that in beginning with a knowledge of attributes, intuitive knowledge begins not with knowledge of how attributes are perceived by us (i.e., merely as objective essences), but as they are in themselves (i.e., as formal). This suggestion is, admittedly, speculative. In any case, the elision of the phrase “formal essence” in E5p25dem suggests that probably not much rides on it.
- 7.
According to Deleuze (1988, 56), the theory of common notions, which does not appear before the Ethics, “transforms the entire Spinozan conception of Reason, and defines the status of the second kind of knowledge.”
- 8.
Commentators have wondered if the termination of intuitive knowledge in the knowledge of singular things per the definition rules out intuitive knowledge of non-singular things, such as attributes and infinite modes. (See D. Garrett 2009, 110.) I addressed the question of the kind of knowledge (reason or intuitive knowledge) responsible for our knowledge of common notions and attributes in a note to a previous chapter. See n. 27 in Chap. 4.
- 9.
One problem this raises is: what to make of the difference between a Spinozist’s grasp of the nature of a rock as essentially extended and, say, a Cartesian’s, for whom extension is not a divine attribute (at least not formally)? The answer, I think, is that the difference is very significant indeed. As we saw in Chap. 5, Spinoza forcefully rejects the Cartesian understanding of extension on the grounds that it lacks the immanent causal power of a divine essence, and thus fails to explain the individuation of extended modes. This suggests that to have even a minimal adequate understanding of an extended mode such as a rock as essentially extended requires an adequate understanding of extension, which, in turn, requires an adequate understanding of God. In other words, it requires an understanding of some of the most basic aspects of Spinoza’s monistic philosophy. This should come as little surprise, however, given what we have already discussed regarding the foundational role of God in Spinoza’s methodology in Chap. 2. All knowledge (of the robust kind) in Spinoza depends upon an adequate understanding of God (as self-caused, absolutely infinite, etc.). I return to this point in Sect. 7.4 of this chapter.
- 10.
In order for there to be knowledge unique to the human mind, there would have to be (among other things) a discrete (shared) human essence, but I cast doubt on this possibility in Chap. 4. In any case, I think it is clear that in talking about the “knowledge” (cognitio ) that constitutes the essence of our mind, Spinoza is talking about the fact that the human mind consists of ideas, which are modes of God’s attribute of thought (as he states explicitly in E2p11dem). All minds, however (not just human), consist of ideas.
- 11.
See E2p13s/G 2:96–7.
- 12.
Sandler 2005 is a good example, I think, of the common essence interpretation. He argues that the third kind of knowledge yields only knowledge that the essences of singular things follow from (or form part of) God’s nature, but does not yield any knowledge of the essences of singular things, since knowledge of is beyond our cognitive capacities (2005, 88–90).
- 13.
See De Dijn 1990, 151–55.
- 14.
Gueroult 1968, 9.
- 15.
Cf. Matheron 1986, 139. Matheron entertains the possibility of alternatives to the fourth proportional example, including the “algebraic resolution of a geometrical problem.” While he seems to concede that alternative mathematical examples might be less trivial (as he says) than the fourth proportional example, he does not appear to consider that they might better illuminate the kinds of knowledge by being translatable into the terms of Spinoza’s ontology. I suspect this is because Matheron adopts the common essence interpretation of the content of intuitive knowledge, which is, as discussed, a minimal epistemic achievement, and for which the fourth proportional example suffices. On this last point, see Matheron 1986, 149.
- 16.
Heath 1956, Vol. 2, 215.
- 17.
Steiner 1842.
- 18.
For the evolution of mathematical approaches to the problem, see Blåsjö 2005.
- 19.
This example is supposed to provide only a rough illustration, and I ignore the issue that would arise if the string is laid over only a part of one of the lens-shaped candies.
- 20.
Aristotle 1984, Vol. 1, 129.
- 21.
This example is taken from Blåsjö 2005.
- 22.
Presumably, the child could be more or less aware of her grasp of the relationship between surface area and volume. Colloquially, when we say, for example, “Sally has a good intuition about these things,” we mean to imply that she naturally grasps these relationships without being fully aware of what she is grasping. Spinoza himself does not distinguish between degrees of awareness, and I think it best to leave this distinction to the side, assuming that for Spinoza one has to be aware of the relationship to count as knowing it adequately.
- 23.
This, again, raises the question of the extent to which cognition of extension is explicitly or only implicitly involved in all cognition of bodies. On this, see previous note.
- 24.
Cf. Deleuze 1988, 57. Deleuze rejects the notion that the idea of God is a common notion, citing E2p47s in which Spinoza explicitly distinguishes between the idea of God and common notions. The relevant passage reads: “But that men do not have so clear a knowledge of God as they do of the common notions comes from the fact that they cannot imagine God, as they can bodies, and that they have joined the name God to the images of things which they are used to seeing” (G 2:128). This passage raises a number of interpretive difficulties. For instance, it might be read to imply that common notions can be imagined. This would conflict with Spinoza’s claim that common notions can only be conceived adequately. I have already addressed this difficulty in Chap. 4 and I discuss it further in Sect. 7.4 of this chapter. I think Deleuze’s point can be accepted, so long as a distinction (which Deleuze seems to elide) between the idea of God and the idea of an attribute is borne in mind. It is true that the common notions are not equivalent to the idea of God, if the idea of God is an idea of a substance consisting of infinite attributes. However, the common notions can be equivalent to a given attribute of God, such as extension.
- 25.
A text that appears to contradict this claim is the following from E5p20s: “From what we have said, we easily conceive what clear and distinct knowledge – and especially that third kind of knowledge (see IIP47S), whose foundation is the knowledge of God itself – can accomplish against the affects” (G 2:294). Since it is contrasted with the third kind of knowledge, “clear and distinct knowledge” here is seemingly the same as reason, or the second kind of knowledge. The passage appears to suggest that being based in “the knowledge of God itself” is a distinguishing feature of intuitive knowledge, thus contradicting my claim that reason and intuitive knowledge have the same basis. A closer inspection of the context of the comment mitigates its contradictory force, however. According to E5p4, we can form a “clear and distinct concept” of any affection of the body, due to our common notions of all corporeal objects. (This is the basis of the power that “clear and distinct knowledge,” or reason, has over the affects.) According to E5p14, by contrast, “The mind can bring it about that all the body’s affections, or images of things, are related to the idea of God.” As far as I can tell, this is the main referent of Spinoza’s mention in E5p20s of what the third kind of knowledge, “whose foundation is the knowledge of God itself,” can accomplish against the affects. That is, by conceiving affects as related to God, and thus, via the third kind of knowledge, we neutralize their power over us. However, when we look at the demonstration of E5p14, we find that the basis of our ability to “relate” (referre) affections to the idea of God is simply our ability to form some clear and distinct idea of them (and here we are referred back to E5p4). Although Spinoza does not reference E2pp45–47 in E5p14dem, he does reference E2p47s in E5p20s, as we saw above. In any case, E2pp45–47, which explains that all ideas are related to God, appears to be the most plausible basis of the connection between clear and distinct ideas and God that is affirmed in E5p14. If this is right, rather than contradicting my reading of E2p46dem, E5p20s simply brings us back to where we started.
- 26.
Cf. Sandler 2005. Sandler defends a method interpretation, but affirms a distinction between the common notions and ideas of God’s attributes as the respective bases of the second and third kinds of knowledge. Sandler’s version of the method interpretation centers on a rejection of a difference in the content yielded by the second and third kinds of knowledge. Insofar as my version of the method interpretation rejects a difference in content at both the starting and end points of the second and third kinds of knowledge, it is distinct from Sandler’s.
- 27.
- 28.
- 29.
See n. 22 in Chap. 4.
- 30.
A different line of objection rejects this assumption and argues that all of reason’s deliverances are merely true in form (i.e., those stemming both from PCNs and from UCNs). I address this alternative tack below.
- 31.
I am grateful to Sanem Soyarslan for pressing me on this objection.
- 32.
Primus (2017) appears to accept such a distinction between intuitive knowledge and reason.
- 33.
As many commentators have observed, the fact that scientia intuitiva is non-discursive or unmediated does not mean that it is non-inferential, contrary to what the received notion of “intuition” might lead one to think. Inasmuch as the third kind of knowledge proceeds from knowledge of God’s attributes to knowledge of the essences of singular things, there is, as it were, a movement of thought, though, as Bennett put it (1984, 364–65), it is more akin to an intellectual step than a walk. See Parkinson 1954, 183–84; Carr 1978, 245–46; and Melamed 2013, 110–13.
- 34.
CSM 1:15.
- 35.
Cf. Manzini 2011, 68–70. Manzini argues against connecting Spinoza’s distinction between intuitive knowledge and reason with Descartes’ distinction between intuition and deduction in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind. Manzini’s chief argument is that whereas Descartes opposes intuition to deduction, for Spinoza, intuitive knowledge is a form of deduction, insofar as it is inferential. However, intuition can be inferential for Descartes as well, so long as the inference is encompassed in a single act of mind. I agree, nevertheless, that Spinoza’s distinction is not identical to Descartes’—even in form. (There are obvious differences in content, since Descartes does not define his distinction in terms of metaphysical categories like Spinoza does.) The primary contrast in Spinoza is between discursivity and non-discursivity (i.e., in the presence or absence of a middle term), rather than between encompassing an object in a single thought or not. As noted above, I see no reason why it would not be possible to encompass a discursive reasoning process in a single thought, for Spinoza, without that counting as intuitive knowledge. Nevertheless, a discursive reasoning process grasped in a single thought is presumably very close to being a non-discursive cognition (perhaps on the verge of so being), and the similarity here seems more important than any difference.
- 36.
E4p6/G 2:214; E5pref/G 2:280. See Viljanen 2011, 64.
- 37.
Soyarslan’s version of the content interpretation appears to draw on the line of reasoning I have laid out in this section, and thus may be an example of what I am calling the attenuated content interpretation. See Soyarslan 2016, 44.
- 38.
It is interesting in this connection to consider Thomas Nagel’s contention that there is something missing from the objective apprehension of one’s own death through the syllogism, “Everyone dies; I am someone, so I will die,” namely, “the internal fact that one day this consciousness will black out for good and subjective time will simply stop. My death as an event in the world is easy to think about; the end of my world is not” (1986, 225). An adherent of the attenuated content interpretation might wish to compare Nagel’s distinction between the objective (or external) and subjective (or internal) apprehensions of one’s own death and Spinoza’s distinction between the intuitive and rational apprehensions of one’s own dependence upon God. In both cases (the attenuated content advocate could argue), the external, syllogistic procedure fails to get at an intrinsic aspect of its object (despite the object being the same in both cases). The problem with this Nagelian interpretation is that it would push Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge in the direction of a peculiar kind of self-knowledge. While I have admitted that there may be some priority to self-knowledge in Spinoza (see n. 27 of this chapter), and while some commentators (referenced below in n. 44 of this chapter) have interpreted intuitive knowledge as a peculiar kind of self-knowledge, the interpretation is bedeviled by Spinoza’s clear indication that many things besides the self can be apprehended intuitively, as I argue later.
- 39.
The qualifier “formal,” at any rate, appears in the Nagelate Schriften. The important point is less the presence of the qualifier “formal” and more the absence of the qualifier “actual.” Although I argued in the last chapter that the difference between formal and actual essence is just a question of whether the thing (whose essence is under consideration) is considered as existing durationally or not, the qualifier “actual” is nevertheless clearly associated with the conatus of a mode existing in duration, so if Spinoza had meant to stress the knowledge of a thing’s conatus in defining intuitive knowledge, we would expect to see the use of the qualifier “actual” in this context. Cf. D. Garrett 2009, 111–12. Referring to the language in the Opera posthuma rather than the Nagelate Schriften, Garrett discusses why Spinoza might have refrained from qualifying the kind of essences known through intuitive knowledge, proposing that even if knowledge of actual (and formal) essences is not possible for human minds, it is possible for God. (I explained my disagreement with Garrett’s interpretation of the formal essence/actual essence distinction in the last chapter.)
- 40.
Schopenhauer 1969, 64.
- 41.
Whereas Curley translates acquiescentia in se ipso as “self-esteem,” I have opted for “self-satisfaction” in order to preserve its resonance with “acquiescentia animi” (E4app/G 2:267) and “acquiescentia mentis” (E5p27/G 2:297), both of which Curley translates as “satisfaction of mind.” For an excellent discussion of acquiescentia in se ipso, see Carlisle 2017. Carlisle draws attention to the translation difficulties to which Spinoza’s multifarious uses of “acquiescentia” give rise, stressing, in particular, the distinction between vana (vain, empty) and vera (true) forms of acquiescentia (Carlisle 2017, 213, 232). The former relates to the imagination and is caused by external factors, in particular, the praise of others. The latter, by contrast, follows from adequate understanding. It is the latter, of course, that is relevant to the cognitive-affective causal mechanism that leads to intellectual love of God. Carlisle goes further and also distinguishes forms of acquiescentia relating to reason and intuitive knowledge, respectively (such that there is a form of acquiescentia for each of the three kinds of knowledge). She bases this latter distinction on a content interpretation of the difference between reason and intuitive knowledge. Since I embrace the method interpretation, I do not agree with distinguishing two different kinds of acquiescentia for reason and intuitive knowledge. On my reading, while the affects related to intuitive knowledge can differ from those related to reason, it is only insofar as the latter do “not affect our mind as much” (E5p36s). The difference is a question of strength, then, in my view, not quality.
- 42.
For a more nuanced discussion of the distinction between intellectual and other kinds of love of God than I am able to provide here, see Nadler 2018, 302–8.
- 43.
- 44.
- 45.
See the first paragraph of Rule 7 of Descartes’ Rules (CSM 1:25).
- 46.
Although Spinoza proclaims that E5p28 is evident through itself, the demonstration that he goes on to give is not terribly clear. He says “the ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are related to the third kind of knowledge (see E2p40s2), cannot follow from the mutilated and confused ideas, which (by E2p40s2) are related to the first kind of knowledge; but they can follow from adequate ideas, or (by E2p40s2) from the second and third kind of knowledge” (E5p28dem/G 2:298). Spinoza’s talk of ideas “which are related to” the first and third kinds of knowledge respectively is vague and confusing. Nevertheless, I take him to be expressing a view he has expressed elsewhere: adequate (or clear and distinct) ideas are productive of other adequate ideas (but inadequate ideas are not productive of adequate ideas) (Ep. 37/G 4:188a). If so, then Spinoza is simply saying that since the second kind of knowledge consists of adequate ideas, and since adequate ideas can produce other adequate ideas, then the second kind of knowledge can produce the third kind of knowledge, which also consists of adequate ideas. If this is all he is saying, then we can see why he would say that the proposition is self-evident. But, it is hard to see how this could be true unless the content of reason and intuitive knowledge is interchangeable. So, as confusing as the demonstration of this proposition is, I think it is ultimately consistent with the Cartesian reading of the distinction between reason and intuitive knowledge.
- 47.
Cf. Malinowski-Charles 2004. Malinowski-Charles interprets reason and intuitive knowledge as “in reality the same knowledge, but simply under two different modalities” (2004, 142). Her interpretation of the sameness of reason and intuitive knowledge, if I understand it correctly, is, however, different from mine. She sees reason and intuitive knowledge as different moments in one process of adequate understanding. In particular, she proposes that the end point of reason is identical to the starting point of intuitive knowledge. Her reading provides a compelling explanation of how intuitive knowledge might arise out of reason, but it has trouble making sense of the examples of the distinction between reason and intuitive knowledge that Spinoza gives, in particular, the fourth proportional example and the example in E5p36s, which suggest parallel epistemic pathways, rather than complementary aspects of a single pathway. Malinowski-Charles recognizes this, but attributes it to a problem of coherence in Spinoza’s texts (2004, 161).
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Homan, M. (2021). Intuitive Knowledge: The Perfection of Reason. In: Spinoza’s Epistemology through a Geometrical Lens. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76739-6_7
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