Abstract
In the Stoic view, perception (aisthanesthai, antilēpsis), positive and negative non-indifference (oikeiōsis and allotriōsis) and care (epimeleia, syntērēsis) are not exactly the same. But this does not prevent them from being inseparably connected with each other, like different aspects of the same thing. As it turns out, they cannot take place independently from one another: (a) all perception is intrinsically non-indifference-related and care-related, (b) all positive and negative non-indifference is intrinsically perception-related and care-related, and (c) all care is intrinsically perception-related and non-indifference-related. Secondly, perception has nothing to do with a multiplicity of isolated fragments – with an ‘archipelago’ of unconnected ‘perceptual patches’ scattered across a ‘sea’ of non-perception. And pretty much the same holds true for positive viz. negative non-indifference and for care: there is no such thing as an ‘archipelago’ of isolated ‘enclaves’ of non-indifference – or, for that matter, of isolated ‘enclaves’ of care – scattered across a ‘sea’ of total indifference and carelessness. All three – perception, positive viz. negative non-indifference and care – work as an uninterrupted, unified, complete and coherent whole. In other words, all three have the structure of what might be termed a field: the field-of-perception-non-indifference-and-care. Thirdly, this field has the shape of what might be described as a centred multiplicity or a centred manifold: a series of concentric circles, as it were, revolving around a focal point and constituted in such a way that everything in them is intrinsically related to the focal point and defines itself in terms of its connection with it. Put another way, the field-of-perception-non-indifference-and-care has the structure of Hierocles’ well-known circles. The latter do not describe a particular phenomenon (the specific network of ‘intersubjective’ relationships): in the final analysis they highlight the structure of the whole field – i.e. at the same time (a) its invariable form and (b) the very form of its variability.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Seneca, Ad Lucilium, 108, 23.
- 2.
Sudelbücher F 879, in: Lichtenberg (<CitationRef CitationID="CR20" >1968</Citation Ref>), 585.
- 3.
Cf. Hierocles, Elementatio Ethica, Col. I, 37ff. See von Arnim (<CitationRef CitationID="CR236" >1906</Citation Ref>) and Bastianini and Long (<CitationRef CitationID="CR4" >1992</Citation Ref>). For the English translation, see Ramelli and Konstan (<CitationRef CitationID="CR25" >2009</Citation Ref>). Cf. also Aoyz et al. (<CitationRef CitationID="CR2" >2014</Citation Ref>).
- 4.
So that there is something bearing the stamp of the self or playing the role of a self-referential perceptum. The point is (a) that the self is a particular kind of perceptum, (b) that perception always includes this particular kind of perceptum, and indeed in such a manner that (c) the perceptum in question always takes centre stage and puts everything else in relation to itself. In this context, it is important to differentiate between the perspective we have when we speak of a living being’s “self” (viz. of its self-perception and relation to itself) and the immanent perspective all this ultimately refers to. When we speak of a living being’s self-perception or self-relation, (a) we tacitly represent it from outside, as an object among others (i.e. as an object in the realm of external perception) and (b) we endow the object in question with the power of perceiving itself and relating to itself. At the end of the day, the “self” we are referring to is a third-person self (and its self-relation viz. self-perception is a third-person self-relation and self-perception). But when all is said and done, that is not what the texts we are referring to have in mind. They draw our attention to the fact that for the living being in question the whole thing must take the form of a first-person perspective. And this means that it is all a question of “immanent” components of perception viz. of percepta – and indeed so much so that everything depends on (a) a self-referential perceptum or perceptual self (a perceptual content responsible for first-person self-reference) and (b) the all-encompassing relation between this first-person self-referential perceptum (or perceptual self) and all other percepta.
- 5.
And this situation assessment is what the two aforementioned subfields and their inseparable connection are all about.
- 6.
In what Greek Grammar terms the middle voice.
- 7.
Each part of one’s own body, etc.
- 8.
As Hierocles puts it, perception of self-related percepta grasps “καὶ ὅτι ἔχει καὶ πρὸς ἣν ἔχει χρείαν” (Col. I, 54–55); that is, it perceives both the παρασκευή and the ἐπιτηδειότης (Col. I, 52–53) – both one’s μέρη and their respective ἔργα (Col. ΙΙ, 2–3: “ἡ τῶν μέρων καὶ τῶν ἔργων, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐδόθη τὰ μέρη, συναίσθησις”).
- 9.
Cf. Hierocles, Elementatio Ethica, Col. II, 18ff.
- 10.
Cf. Hierocles, Elementatio Ethica, Col. III, 20.
- 11.
This is not the place to examine all the examples given by Hierocles. But a single instance, Elementatio Ethica, Col. III, 20–22, illustrates this complex interaction in a few lines: “(…) τὰ ζῷα καὶ τῶν ἐν ἑτέροις ἀσθενειῶν καὶ δυνάμεων ἀντίληψιν ἔχει, καὶ τίνα μὲν αὐτοῖς ἐπίβουλα, πρὸς τίνα δε αὐτοῖς ἀνοχαὶ καὶ οἷον σύμβασις ἀδιάλυτος”. These lines underscore the fact that (a) perception assesses both actio and passio (so that percepta in both subfields appear both as subjects and as objects of action), (b) more importantly, each perceptum defines itself in terms of “actiones” and “passiones” (that is, both active and passive qualities), (c) the actiones and passiones in question cross the borders between the two subfields (ἀντίληψις ἑαυτοῦ and ἀντίληψις τῶν ἐκτός), and indeed in such a manner that (d) each perceptum defines itself in terms of “actiones” and “passiones” that cross the border between the two subfields. On this topic, see notably Carvalho (<CitationRef CitationID="CR79" >2010</Citation Ref>), 118f.
- 12.
To be sure, the perceptual field is subject to almost continuous change both (a) in the sense that perceptual contents enter and leave the “stage”, and (b) in the sense that the focus moves from one perceptual content to another. But the point is that, despite this variability, the main pattern we are talking about – namely “aroundness” or “surroundingness” – remains unchanged. First, what appears is always a perceptum surrounded by percepta, which in turn are surrounded by percepta, and so on and so forth. Secondly, “surroundingness” itself (viz. the fact that it occupies a certain place in the chain of surrounded and surrounding contents fanning out around a focal point) is a major trait of each perceptum. Finally, it should be added that, in the final analysis, perceptual “surroundingness” is always intrinsically self-related: the perceptual self takes centre-stage; and, even when they become a focus of attention, all other percepta bear the imprint of self-related surroundingness (in such a manner that this is one of their main features, and indeed one that shapes all the others). In other words, all percepta but the self (and whatever is equated with it) surround the self either immediately or more or less mediately.
- 13.
Pretty much the same holds true for the Latin equivalents used to express the idea of οἰκείωσις, οἰκειοῦσθαι and the like (commendatio, conciliatio, amor, caritas, conciliari, commendari, applicari, diligere, appetere, etc.). See, for example, Fischer (<CitationRef CitationID="CR99" >1914</Citation Ref>), 62–71, 91f., 109, Lislu (<CitationRef CitationID="CR151" >1930</Citation Ref>), 72ff, 255, Gantar (<CitationRef CitationID="CR107" >1966</Citation Ref>–1967), Hartung (<CitationRef CitationID="CR123" >1970</Citation Ref>), 134ff., 142ff., Gantar (<CitationRef CitationID="CR108" >1976</Citation Ref>), Fuchs (<CitationRef CitationID="CR106" >1977</Citation Ref>), 38, Moreschini (<CitationRef CitationID="CR170" >1979</Citation Ref>), 127ff., Gantar (<CitationRef CitationID="CR109" >1980</Citation Ref>), Armisen-Marchetti (<CitationRef CitationID="CR50" >1989</Citation Ref>), 213f., Lévy (<CitationRef CitationID="CR150" >1992</Citation Ref>), 378–387, Inwood (<CitationRef CitationID="CR14" >2007</Citation Ref>), 339, Citti (<CitationRef CitationID="CR81" >2012</Citation Ref>), 21f., Byers (<CitationRef CitationID="CR78" >2016</Citation Ref>), 61, 67, Klein (<CitationRef CitationID="CR140" >2016</Citation Ref>), 150, and Tsouni (<CitationRef CitationID="CR228" >2019</Citation Ref>), 78. Moreschini is perhaps right in holding that the manuscript reading “sibimet ipsi intimatum” in Apuleius’ De Platone et ejus dogmate II, 2, 222, is sound and shows another possible way of translating οἰκείωσις into Latin. Cf. Moreschini (<CitationRef CitationID="CR169" >1978</Citation Ref>), 102ff., Moreschini (<CitationRef CitationID="CR170" >1979</Citation Ref>), 127, note 49 and Moreschini (<CitationRef CitationID="CR171" >2016</Citation Ref>), 301ff.
- 14.
Ἄλλοτρίωσις viz. ἀλλοτριοῦσθαι denotes abhorrence, repulsion, repugnance and aversion. And pretty much the same holds true for its Latin equivalents (aspernatio, abalienari, etc.). Cf. Voelke (<CitationRef CitationID="CR234" >1961</Citation Ref>), 108–109: “Pour mieux caractériser l’oikeiôsis, nous pouvons également envisager son contraire, l’allotriôsis. Il faut entendre par là une répugnance fondamentale de l’être vivant à l’égard de ce qui lui est étranger et hostile (ἀλλότριος). Lorsqu’il s’agira de trouver un équivalent latin, Cicéron emploiera le verbe alienare (De Fin. III, 5, 16, S.V.F. III, 182). Il y a là une indication linguistique précieuse: pour que le vivant ne soit pas au sens propre un aliéné, c’est-à-dire un étranger par rapport à lui-même, il faut que l’oikeiôsis lui permette de se posséder lui-même ou, comme le dit Sénèque, de ne pas « se manquer à lui-même ». (Sibi non deesse, Ep. 121, 4. Cf. aussi Cicéron, De Fin. IV, 13, 32: Omnis enim est natura diligens sui. Quae est enim quae se unquam deserat? …).” See also Moreschini (<CitationRef CitationID="CR170" >1979</Citation Ref>), 128, and Citti (<CitationRef CitationID="CR81" >2012</Citation Ref>), 22f.
- 15.
On this connection, see, for example, Hierocles, Elementatio Ethica, col. VII, 46–48 (“καὶ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ σωτήριον ἑαυτοῦ συναίσθησίς ἐστιν ἡ λελεγμένη οἰκείωσις”), Plutarch, De Stoicorum repugnantiis, 1038b11-c2, (“ἀλλ’ οὔτ’ αἴσθησίς ἐστιν οἷς μηθὲν αἰσθητὸν οὔτ’ οἰκείωσις οἷς μηδὲν οἰκεῖον· ἡ γὰρ οἰκείωσις αἴσθησις ἔοικε τοῦ οἰκείου καὶ ἀντίληψις εἶναι”), Porphyrius, De abstinentia III, 19, apud Nauck (<CitationRef CitationID="CR23" >1886</Citation Ref>), 209, (“τοῖς δὲ οὐθέν ἐστιν αἰσθητόν, οὕτως δὲ οὐδὲ ἀλλότριον οὐδὲ κακὸν οὐδὲ βλάβη τις οὐδὲ ἀδικία. Καὶ γὰρ οἰκειώσεως πάσης καὶ ἀλλοτριώσεως ἀρχὴ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι.”), and Cicero, De finibus III, 18, SVF III, 182 (“fieri autem non posset ut appeterent aliquid, nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligerent.”)
- 16.
Hierocles, Elementatio Ethica, Col. VI, 27ff., speaks of the alternative between εὐαρεστεῖν, δυσαρεστεῖν and ἀρρεπῶς ἴσχειν. D. Konstan translates: being “pleased”, being “displeased” or remaining “indifferent”. See Ramelli and Konstan (<CitationRef CitationID="CR25" >2009</Citation Ref>), 17. Hierocles is, of course, referring to three “absolute” possibilities: generally, a percipient can perceive a perceptum either (a) with οἰκείωσις, or (b) with ἀλλοτρίωσις, or (c) with neither. However, we should not forget that “(c)” can actually mean two very different things.
First, it can mean that a given percipient is completely devoid both of “(a)” and “(b)” (viz. that perception of a given perceptum has nothing whatsoever to do with οἰκείωσις or ἀλλοτρίωσις). In general, animals could be constituted in such a way that they lacked all οἰκείωσις and ἀλλοτρίωσις. But this is the possibility the Stoics exclude, both because it would be “dysfunctional” and because it is disproved by the facts – cf. Diogenes Laertius, Vitae, VII, 85 (SVF III, 178): “οὔτε γὰρ ἀλλοτριῶσαι εἰκὸς ἦν αὑτῷ τὸ ζῷον, οὔτε ποιήσασαν αὐτὸ, μήτ’ ἀλλοτριῶσαι μήτε {οὐκ} οἰκειῶσαι. ἀπολείπεται τοίνυν λέγειν συστησαμένην αὐτὸ οἰκειῶσαι πρὸς ἑαυτό. οὕτω γὰρ τὰ τε βλάπτοντα διωθεῖται καὶ τὰ οὶκεῖα προσίεται”
Secondly, “(c)” can also mean that some percepta are neither οἰκείωσις-dyed nor ἀλλοτρίωσις-dyed for a very different reason, namely because they are deemed to be neutral with regard to the prevailing flow of non-indifference (i.e. to the prevailing direction of οἰκείωσις/ἀλλοτρίωσις); in which case, as pointed out above, “(c)” is intrinsically οἰκείωσις/ἀλλοτρίωσις-related (it is, as it were, one of the three possible main “labels” in the field of tension between οἰκείωσις and ἀλλοτρίωσις). In other words, the percipient is steeped in οἰκείωσις/ἀλλοτρίωσις, but some of its percepta are marked with this particular kind of οἰκείωσις/ἀλλοτρίωσις-related “label”.
- 17.
Col. V, 22–24. Cf. Diels and Schubart (<CitationRef CitationID="CR10" >1905</Citation Ref>), 5, and Bastianini and Sedley (<CitationRef CitationID="CR5" >1995</Citation Ref>), 276.
- 18.
Anonymous Commentary, Col. VII, 2f.
- 19.
Anonymous Commentary, col. VI, 3ff. (emphasis added). Translation borrowed from Long and Sedley (<CitationRef CitationID="CR21" >1987</Citation Ref>), 350. See also Stobaeus, Anthologium, II, cap. 7, sec. 13, Cicero, De officiis, I, XVII, 53ffs., Laelius, V, 19.
- 20.
Cf. Wachsmuth and Hense (<CitationRef CitationID="CR37" >1884–1912</Citation Ref>), IV, ch. 27, sec. 23. Translation borrowed from Long and Sedley (<CitationRef CitationID="CR21" >1987</Citation Ref>), 349–350, and Ramelli and Konstan (<CitationRef CitationID="CR25" >2009</Citation Ref>), 91, with changes.
- 21.
Incidentally it should be noted that in this single field of οἰκείωσις/ἀλλοτρίωσις, the remotest circles of οἰκείωσις (the circles of least intense οἰκείωσις) and the remotest circles of ἀλλοτρίωσις (the circles of least intense ἀλλοτρίωσις) are confusingly similar to what might be termed the circles of neutral percepta (of what is deemed not to interfere one way or the other).
- 22.
See notably Hierocles, Elementatio Ethica, Col. IX, 1ff. The Anonymous Commentary to Plato’s Theaetetus, Col. VII, 26ff., highlights the contrast between οἰκείωσις κηδεμονική and οἰκείωσις αἱρετική – i. e. (a) οἰκείωσις relative to living beings (viz. to people: πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πλησίον) and (b) οἰκείωσις relative to things. The former can be taken in a narrower and a more extended sense: it can either apply just to a given animal species (i. e. τὰ ὁμοειδῆ) or cross the boundaries between species. Hierocles seems to combine this distinction with the contrast between (c) self-related οἰκείωσις (πρὸς ἑαυτό, ἑαυτῷ, Col. IX, 3, 8) and (d) non-self-related οἰκείωσις (πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς πράγματα, Col. IX, 5f., 7f.). It is easy to see that the latter can be either κηδεμονική or αἱρετική.
In addition, these texts also include a few remarks on specific topics. First, they mention the special case of οἰκείωσις ἐκλεκτική – a self-related οἰκείωσις concerning one’s own σύστασις (that is, one’s own constitution or one’s proper composition) viz. one’s own preservation and well-being – see, for example, Alexander of Aphrodisias, De animi libri mantissa, 150.32, Sharples (<CitationRef CitationID="CR30" >2008</Citation Ref>), 96 (who speaks of “πρὸς τὴν σύστασιν καὶ τήρησιν ᾠκειῶσθαι”[viz. οὶκειῶσθαι (Sharples)]), Seneca, Ad Lucilium 121, 21 (who speaks of “conciliari saluti suae” – the result being that the living being “et iuvatura petit, laesura formidat”) and Hierocles, Elementatio Ethica, Col. IX, 1, and 9–10 (who speaks of an οἰκείωσις relative to the “σωτήρια τῆς συστάσεως” – i. e. to the things that preserve one’s constitution). Secondly, these texts also highlight the connection between οἰκείωσις αἱρετική and οἰκείωσις κηδεμονική, on the one hand, and self-related οἰκείωσις (i.e. both the οἰκείωσις εὐνοητική and the οἰκείωσις ἐκλεκτική), on the other. Or, more precisely, they draw attention to the fact that the latter derives from the former: both the οἰκείωσις αἱρετική and the οἰκείωσις κηδεμονική have to do with the role played by exterior percepta in the realm of one’s self-related οἰκείωσις. Or, as Hierocles, col. IX, 9–10, puts it: these two derivative forms of οἰκείωσις create bonds between a living being (viz. the perceptual self) and whatever is deemed to serve the preservation of its σύστασις (viz. its own proper composition): “οἰκειοῦσθαι τοῖς πρὸς τήρησιν τῆς συστάσεως συμφέρουσιν”. In short, these texts highlight the dynamic character of οἰκείωσις: the fact that it “emanates” from a source, flows in different directions and resembles – sit venia verbo – a “chain reaction”. Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, De anima libri mantissa, apud Bruns (<CitationRef CitationID="CR6" >1887</Citation Ref>), 101–186, in particular 162, and Sharples (<CitationRef CitationID="CR30" >2008</Citation Ref>), 112.
- 23.
Hierocles’ Elementatio Ethica and the fragment from his Πῶς χρηστέον τοῖς γενεῦσιν (Stobaeus, Anthologium II, 640, 4ff.) provide a good sample of Stoic care-related terminology: τήρησις, συντήρησις συντηρεῖν, ἐπιμέλεια, προθυμία, προνοεῖν, πρόνοια, κηδεμονία and θεραπεία.
- 24.
Cf. von Clausewitz (<CitationRef CitationID="CR34" >1832</Citation Ref>), 28: “Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln”.
- 25.
See Evans (1956), 44.
- 26.
Viz. the idea of tueri, custodire, conservare, etc.
- 27.
More about this later.
- 28.
See, for example, Hierocles, Elementatio Ethica, Col. III, 5, Col. VI, 15, 39, 58, Col. VII, 4, 44f, and Col. IX, 1.
- 29.
This is what Cicero’s “conservandi sui custodia” (De natura deorum, II, XLVIII, 124) is all about. His image of the “self-safeguarding” – self-protecting and self-cultivating – vine in De finibus, IV, 38 (of the vine playing itself the role of a viticultor and taking care of itself) vividly illustrates this particular kind of custodia viz. the idea of the tutela sui. Seneca, too, speaks of the tutela sui – see notably Ad Lucilium 58, 30, 85, 28, 104, 4, 121, 23f., De beneficiis, IV, XVIII, 2 – viz. of the tutela salutis suae (Ad Lucilium 104, 10).
- 30.
And in no way an agent of its own fate.
- 31.
I.e., this being charged with the said “each-timeness” and with the task of assuring that the object of care makes it through “each-timeness” unscathed.
- 32.
Ad Lucilium 121, 18: “Producit fetus suos natura, non abicit. Et quia tutela certissima ex proximo est, sibi quisque commissus est.” (Nature brings forth her offspring, she does not toss them aside. And because the most reliable form of protection comes from what is closest, each one is entrusted to itself). Translation borrowed from Inwood (2007), 88.
- 33.
The following two points deserve special attention here. First, it cannot be excluded that this perceptual “being in charge” is but a deeply ingrained illusion – that it, too, results from some kind of conditioning, owing to which, as Horace puts it (Saturae, I, 7, 82), we are “like puppets pulled by alien strings” (“duceris ut nervis alienis mobile lignum”). In other words, it cannot be excluded that the perceptual “being in charge” is itself a form of “duci ut nervis alienis mobile lignum” (and therefore the opposite of its face value: a mere mirror of alien events). But neither can it be ruled out that it is not an illusion. At the end of the day, there is no Archimedean point of certitude in these matters. And on the other hand, it should be borne in mind that perception itself (viz. life itself) constantly takes the form of this “being in charge” – and indeed so much so that, even when one is convinced that we are not really “in charge” and that “being in charge” is only an illusion, none of this changes the fact that we must continuously play the role of “being in charge” (we must continuously navigate life and steer the course of events); for that is the way life presents itself and impinges itself upon us. In other words, one cannot avoid “playing the game” of “being in charge”; for trying not to play the game is itself a way of playing it (a way of steering the course of events, etc.). So that it is impossible to avoid the said “perceptual being in charge”: to take one’s hands from the helm and escape Seneca’s “sibi commissum esse”. Secondly, the “being in charge” we are talking about has nothing to do with being endowed with power over everything around us. It does not mean that we “run the place”. The point is that even if we are very far from having this kind of power, there is at least some scope for intervention (and we are charged and entrusted with at least some possibility of steering the course of events). In other words, the point is that there is what might be described as an intermediate power (something between unlimited power, on the one hand, and utter impotence, on the other). At the end of the day, the intermediate power in question is perhaps nothing more than the sheer fact that we must “play the game” of steering the course of events, even if it is just an illusion, and even if we lack all real power. As the Stoics never tire of emphasising, this “irreducible core” – namely the fact that we are charged and entrusted with the task of attempting to steer the course of events and cannot avoid trying to steer one way or the other – is a form of intermediate power and more than enough to constitute the “being in charge” (and having to act accordingly) we are talking about. In short, it may well be that we are just impotent agents; but the point is that even in this case we are still agents. Put another way, it may well be that all our care is impotent and helpless – but the point is that it is nonetheless care, and we cannot give up this responsibility.
- 34.
E.g. my occasional and restricted care for someone else is always embedded in the framework of my permanent and continuous care for myself. See note 38 below.
- 35.
Hierocles, Elementatio Ethica, Col. IV, 54 – V, 11: “πιθανὸν μὲν γάρ, εἴπερ ὅλως ποθ’ ἑαυτοῦ γίνεται τὸ ζῷον ἀνεπαίσθητον, ἐν τῷ ὕπνου πάντως χρόνῳ μάλιστα τοῦτο συμβαίνειν. ὁρῶμεν δ’ ὡς καὶ τότε, οὐ μάλα μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς εὐπαρακολουθήτως, συναισθάνεται δ’ οὖν ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ζῷον. ἀπόχρη δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὑπὲρ παντὸς τοῦ γένους διάληψιν τὰ ἐφ’ ὃν διάγομεν βίον ἀπαντῶντα παραθέσθαι· καὶ γὰρ περὶ χειμῶνος ὥραν παραγυμνωθέντες μέρη τινὰ τοῦ σώματος, εἰ καὶ βαθυτάτῳ πεπιεσμένοι τύχοιμεν ὕπνῳ, ὅμως ἐφελκόμεθα τὰ ἐνεύναια καὶ περισκέπομεν τὰ ψυχόμενα, τά τε ἕλκη φυλάττομεν ἀπρόσκρουστα καὶ ἄθλιπτα κοιμώμενοι βαθέως, ὡς ἂν ἐγρηγορυίᾳ, ἵν’ οὕτω φῶ, χρώμενοι τῇ προσοχῇ, τῇ τε προτεραίᾳ συνταξάμενοί τισι νύκτωρ ἐπαναστήσεσθαι διεγρόμεθα τῆς ὡρισμένης ὥρας ἡκούσης. ἴδοις δ’ ἂν καὶ τὰς σπουδὰς τὰς περί τινα μέχρι τῶν ὕπνων ἐπακολουθούσας· ὁ μέν γε φίλοινος καταδαρθάνει πολλάκις οὐκ ἀφιεὶς ἐκ τῆς χειρὸς τὴν λάγυνον· ὁ δὲ φιλάργυρος ἀπρὶξ ἐχόμενος τοῦ βαλλαντίου κοιμᾶται·” Translations borrowed from Ramelli and Konstan (2009), 13, with slight changes.
- 36.
And here, too, the remotest circles of οἰκείωσις-related care (i. e. the circles of least intense οἰκείωσις-related care) and the remotest circles of ἀλλοτρίωσις-related care (i. e. the circles of least intense ἀλλοτρίωσις-related care) are confusingly similar to what might be termed the circles of less vigilant monitoring of “neutral” percepta (that is, of what is deemed not to interfere one way or the other). It should be added that in this respect the field of perception-οἰκείωσις/ἀλλοτρίωσις-and-care has something resembling what J. von Uexküll terms the farthest plane (die fernste Ebene). Von Uexküll reminds us that beyond a certain point we lose our ability to locate percepta at various distances. In other words, beyond a certain point, all differences in terms of near and far simply disappear – and very remote visual percepta, regardless of the fact that the corresponding objects are very distant from one another (and indeed much more distant from one another than everything we are able to locate at various distances), appear on the same farthest plane, with no difference in depth. The result being that they seem equally far away, as if scattered over the inside of an immense sphere. And this is the origin of the so-called “sky vault” (or “vault of heaven”). Now the point here is that there is something similar in the field of perception-οἰκείωσις/ἀλλοτρίωσις-and-care. For in this case, too, we are able to perceive differences (viz. the contrast between “concentric circles”) only within a limited range. Beyond a certain point, all percepta are sweepingly relegated to the very same farthest circle – which stretches far out of sight in every direction. And this in turn means that the majority of percepta are placed in this farthest circle of neutral percepta (of what is deemed not to interfere one way or the other). In other words, the majority of percepta appear with no difference in οἰκείωσις/ἀλλοτρίωσις-related viz. care-related “depth”. The result being that they belong, as it were, to an οἰκείωσις/ἀλλοτρίωσις-related viz. care-related “sky-vault”. On the “fernste Ebene” and the role it plays in visual space, see notably von Uexküll (1928), 20f., 53f., 59, 186, 323, 335, von Uexküll (1934), 28ff., and Buytendijk (1956), 49f.
- 37.
The “compass rose” with the cardinal directions in which the “winds” of care blow.
- 38.
I.e. various relations of forces between care and neglect, etc. Incidentally it should be noted that Hierocles’ circles also draw attention to something else, namely to the fact that care for other human beings can be, as it were, “astigmatic” (and indeed strongly so). For, if the object of care belongs to the third, fourth or fifth (and a fortiori to a further) circle, there is a lack of correspondence between (a) how the person who is the object of care appears to the caring subject and (b) what the person in question is for himself or herself. For the caring subject, the other human being belonging to the third, fourth or fifth (and a fortiori to a further) circle is more or less peripheral, while in his or her own view the person in question is nothing less than the focal point. And there is a world of difference between being the centre of Hierocles’ concentric circles and being something peripheral (even if only slightly peripheral). In other words, when one takes care of someone “peripheral”, the very identity of the object of care is relative to its peripheral place in one’s own set of concentric circles. And there is a close connection between this (a merely peripheral position viz. distance from the focal point) and the said combination of care and neglect. After all, caring for the “focal point” as something peripheral is eo ipso neglect. This can also be expressed in terms of Pirandello’s Uno, Nessuno, Centomila. Pirandello points out that, contrary to what might seem to be the case, if two people are talking to each other, there are four “identities” (or four “characters”) involved, namely (1) A for him or herself, (2) A for B, (3) B for him or herself and (4) B for A. But the point here is that the differences in question are also due to the fact that (1) and (2) viz. (3) and (4) correspond to very different places in the circles of care (or, more precisely, to very different places in the circles of perception-οἰκείωσις/ἀλλοτρίωσις-and-care).
- 39.
It should be noted that even this “revised” version is a bit too simple and does not do justice to the intricate fabric of οἰκείωσις/ἀλλοτρίωσις and care. Let us briefly see why.
1. We are still assuming that at any given moment each of us moves in a global set of οἰκείωσις/ἀλλοτρίωσις-related concentric circles (and in the corresponding global set of care-related concentric circles). But it should be borne in mind (a) that, as pointed out above, life is marked by “each-timeness”: it unfolds as a succession of specific situations and care-related tasks, and indeed so much so that (b) each of these specific situations and care-related tasks gives rise to its own specific set of οἰκείωσις/ἀλλοτρίωσις-related and care-related concentric circles. The fact is that each specific situation or care-related task has its own “take” on the perceptual field – and organizes all percepta according to its own perspective (to what is at stake in each case). In other words, each specific situation or care-related task has its own “plot”, its own “characters”, its own “closeness and distance” – its own “concentric circles”. The result being that the very same perceptum can play a major role (say as a main helper) with regard to a specific situation or care related-task A, act as a relatively unimportant opponent with regard to another specific situation or care-related task B, while it is no more than a background element with regard to a third specific situation or care-related task C.
2. However, this is only one side of the coin. One should not forget that every specific situation and care-related task is itself embedded in a larger framework: it is just a link in a chain of many other specific situations and care-related tasks. On the one hand, as long as it remains the situation or the main task at hand, it occupies a prominent place and plays, as it were, a leading role. It acts as the centre-point or focus of its own set of οἰκείωσις/ἀλλοτρίωσις-related and care-related concentric circles. And all other specific situations and tasks (with their own sets of concentric circles) are relegated to the background. But the fact remains that, on the other hand, (a) each specific situation or task is itself just a situation or task among many others, and (b) some specific situations and tasks are overall much more important than others. That is: specific situations and tasks are themselves part of an anisotropic field. This can also be expressed by saying that specific situations and tasks, too, are dramatis personae of one’s life. And the point is that they, too, are assigned a position in a scale of “closeness” and “distance” (of importance and lack thereof, etc.) in an overarching set of concentric circles – for they are always perceived by us either as “protagonists”, or as “deuteragonists” (“tritagonists”, and so on and so forth) in the framework of life’s overall “plot”.
This results in a fairly complex picture; for what we are dealing with here is an overall set of οἰκείωσις/ἀλλοτρίωσις-related and care-related concentric circles, in which each component has, as it were, its own set of οἰκείωσις/ἀλλοτρίωσις-related and care-related concentric circles. In other words, a distinction must be made between the transient sets of concentric circles of “each-timeness” (with the corresponding succession of ephemeral “protagonists”), on the one hand, and the global set of life’s “characters”, on the other. The former is itself part of the latter. In short, the field of οἰκείωσις/ἀλλοτρίωσις-related and care-related concentric circles is multi-layered. It comprises both (a) the more superficial layer (the kaleidoscopic variation of the concentric circles corresponding to “each-timeness” and its specific situations and tasks) and (b) the more stable set of the overarching concentric circles, which are the ones Hierocles seems to have in mind.
3. This multi-layered structure paves the way for what might be described as a complex interplay of different roles: overall less important specific situations and tasks (and the corresponding less important specific sets of concentric circles) can be given momentary prominence, while the more important components are momentarily side-lined. In short, the “first violins” can play a “second-fiddle role” and vice versa. And it is tempting to press the metaphor and say: the “first violins” can momentarily play a “second”-, “third”-, “eighth”- and “twelfth-fiddle” role, etc., while the “second-”, “third”-, “eighth”- and “twelfth violins” momentarily play the first fiddle.
Hence, each perceptum plays not just one role, but indeed several different roles at the same time – i. e. each perceptum is placed not only in one οἰκείωσις/ἀλλοτρίωσις-related and care-related set of concentric circles: it is in many different places (in the framework of the said multi-layered sets of concentric circles) at the same time. As a result, each perceptum defines itself both (a) according to the role it plays in the specific situation or specific task at hand, and (b) according to the place it occupies in the concentric circles corresponding to other specific situations and tasks. On the one hand, the former tends to carry more weight than the latter. But on the other hand, it all depends on the role played by the specific situations and tasks in question within the framework of life’s overall “plot”. If a given perceptum belongs to the second circle of an overall less important specific situation or task (say one belonging to the ninth or tenth circle within the overall framework), it is bound to be less important than percepta belonging to the fifth circle of other more important specific situations or tasks (say those belonging to the fourth circle within the overall framework). And this applies even if the former is the situation or task at hand; for momentary (“each-timeness”-related) importance can be outweighed by overall importance (by the role each perceptum plays in the framework of life’s overall plot). The point is that the complex structure we are talking about resembles a system of forces. There is no such thing as a simple οἰκείωσις/ἀλλοτρίωσις-related and care-related perceptual “identity”. What defines each perceptum in terms of its position in the framework of the οἰκείωσις/ἀλλοτρίωσις-related and care-related circles is rather like the resultant force of a system of forces: it combines and expresses each and every one of the forces involved, but at the same time the particular correlation of forces between them (between their magnitude, etc.).
- 40.
Stobaeus, Anthologium, 84, 23, von Arnim (1906) 61, 23ff.: “τούτων οὖν τεθεωρημένων, κατὰ τὸν ἐντεταμένον ἐστὶ περὶ τὴν ἑκάστων δέουσαν χρῆσιν τὸ ἐπισυνάγειν πως τοὺς κύκλους ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ κέντρον καὶ τῇ σπουδῇ μεταφέρειν ἀεὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῶν περιεχόντων εἰς τοὺς περιεχομένους. (…) πρόσκειται δ’ὅτι καὶ τούτοις μὲν ὁμοίως τιμητέον τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ τρίτου κύκλου, τούτοις δ’αὖ πάλιν τοὺς συγγενεῖς. ἀφαιρήσεται μὲν γάρ τι τῆς εὐνοίας τὸ καθ’ αἷμα διάστημα πλέον ὄν· ἡμῖν δ’ ὅμως σπουδαστέα περὶ τὴν ἐξομοίωσίν ἐστιν. ἥκοι μὲν γὰρ ἄν εἰς τὸ μέτριον, εὶ διὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας αὐτῶν ἐνστάσεως ἐπιτεμνόμεθα τὸ μῆκος τῆς πρὸς ἕκαστον τὸ πρόσωπον σχέσεως. Τὸ μὲν οὖν συνέχον καὶ πραγματικώτερον εἴρηται· χρὴ δ’ἐπιμετρεῖν καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν προσηγοριῶν χρῆσιν, τοὺς μὲν ἀνεψιοὺς καὶ θείους καὶ τηθίδας ἀδελφοὺς ἀποκαλοῦντας πατέρας τε καὶ μητέρας, [τῶν δὲ συγγενῶν τοὺς μὲν θείους, τοὺς δὲ ἀδελφιδοῦς, τοὐς δὲ ἀνεψιούς, ὡς ἄν καὶ τῆς ἡλικίας παρείκῃ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐκτενείας.] Οὗτος γὰρ τῆς προσρήσεως ὁ τρόπος ἅμα μὲν ἄν σημεῖον οὐκ ἀμαυρὸν εἴη τῆς οὔσης ἡμῖν σπουδῆς περὶ ἑκάστους, ἅμα δ’ἄν ἐποτρύνοι καὶ προσεντείνοι πρὸς τὴν ὑποδεδειγμένην οἷον συνολκὴν τῶν κύκλων.” Translation borrowed from Long and Sedley (1987), 350. We leave out the question of how κατὰ τὸ ἐντετάμενον is to be interpreted and translated.
- 41.
It should be noted that here we are speaking of equation with the self in a second sense: not (a) in the sense that something else bears the imprint of the self in such a manner that it is deemed to be part of it, but rather (b) in the sense that, as far as οἰκείωσις/ἀλλοτρίωσις and care are concerned, the perceptum in question is given a role similar to the self (namely the leading role: the role of the focal point around which everything else revolves in the field of perception-οἰκείωσις/ἀλλοτρίωσις-and-care).
- 42.
And therefore at least a certain amount of “drawing the circles together towards the centre”, of “transference from the enclosing circles into the enclosed ones” – of “assimilation” (ἐξομοίωσις) or “contraction of the circles” (συνολκὴ τῶν κύκλων).
- 43.
Cf. Appendix I. The Anonymous Commentary to Plato’s Theaetetus, Col. V, 24–32, refers to this complete assimilation in the following terms: “ὅσοι τοίνυν ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκειώσεως εἰσάγουσι τὴν δικαιοσύνην, εὶ μὲν λέγουσιν ἴσην αὑτοῦ τε πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἔσχατον Μυζῶν, τεθέντος μὲν τούτου σώζεται ἡ δικαιοσύνη (…).” (“So those people who derive justice from οἰκείωσις, if on the one hand they are saying that a man’s οἰκείωσις in relation to himself is equal to his οἰκείωσις in relation to the very last of the Mysians, their assumption preserves justice (…)”) – translation borrowed from Long and Sedley (1987), 350, with slight changes. The author of the commentary is, of course, alluding to Plato’s Theaetetus 209b – see notably Greene (1938), on Theaet. 209b, p. 39, and Campbell (1861) on 209b, p. 207. “The very last of the Mysians” (“ultimus Mysorum” viz. “Mysorum postremus”) seems to mean two things: (a) the most distant, and (b) the last of the last in the sense of the worst of the worst (the meanest of the meanest). It appears that the Mysians were deemed very vile, mean and contemptible (or, as Anthony Trollope puts it in his Life of Cicero, “the lowest type of Humanity”). Therefore, in the words of Cope and Sandys (1970), 236, if somebody is “the last and lowest – even of the Mysians”, “worthlessness can go no further”. For this idiomatic expression, cf. Magnes, Fr. 5, apud Kock (1880), 8, Philemon, Fr. 77, apud Kock (1884), 499, Menander Fr. 55, apud Koerte (1959), 175, Cicero, Pro Flacco, 27, Schwartz (1891), on Rhesus 251, p. 232, Leutsch and Schneidewin (1839), 411 (Appendicis II 85), Leutsch and Schneidewin (1851), 25, (DV II 47), Porson (1882), 23–24, Adler (1928), E 3254, and Throllope (1880), 357. See also Cope and Sandys (1877), 235f., Pearson (1917), 58ff., Dobesch (1962), 192ff. and 305–311, Moorhouse (1965), 31f., Wankel (1976), on § 72, p. 433, Bäbler (1998), 90, and Bagordo (2014), 105. The equation of the ultimus Musorum with the focal point amounts to an assimilation of the very last circle with the first – and therefore to Hierocles’ complete συνολκὴ τῶν κύκλων (N. B.: in the realm of “intersubjective relations”). Moreover, if “ὁ ἔσχατος Μυζῶν” stands for “the worst of the worst”, then the Anonymus’ wording seems to suggest nothing less than the complete suppression of ἀλλοτρίωσις in the realm of “intersubjective” relations. For the idea of “complete assimilation, cf. Plutarch, De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute, 329a8-b 5: “καὶ μὴν ἡ πολὺ θαυμαζομένη πολιτεία τοῦ τὴν Στωικῶν αἵρεσιν καταβαλομένου Ζήνωνος εἰς ἓν τοῦτο συντείνει κεφάλαιον, ἵνα μὴ κατὰ πόλεις μηδὲ κατὰ δήμους οἰκῶμεν ἰδίοις ἕκαστοι διωρισμένοι δικαίοις, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἡγώμεθα δημότας καὶ πολίτας, εἷς δὲ βίος ᾖ καὶ κόσμος, ὥσπερ ἀγέλης συννόμου νόμῳ κοινῷ συντρεφομένης. τοῦτο Ζήνων μὲν ἔγραψεν ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἢ εἴδωλον εὐνομίας φιλοσόφου καὶ πολιτείας ἀνατυπωσάμενος (…)”. See also Cicero, De finibus, V, 65: “In omni autem honesto, de quo loquimur, nihil est tam illustre nec quod latius pateat quam coniunctio inter homines hominum et quasi quaedam societas et communicatio utilitatum et ipsa caritas generis humani. quae nata a primo statu, quod a procreatoribus nati diliguntur et tota domus conjungio et stirpe coniungitur, serpit sensim foras, cognationibus primum, tum affinitatibus, deinde amicitiis, post vicinitatibus, tum civibus et eis, qui publice socii atque amici sunt, deinde totius complexu gentis humanae. quae animi affectio suum cuique tribuens atque hanc, quam dico, societatem coniunctionis humanae munifice et aeque tuens iustitia dicitur (...)”. Epictetus, Dissertationes ab Arriano digestae, II, xxii, 15ff. is also important in this regard.
- 44.
Col V, 18-VII, 14. Cf. Diels and Schubart (1905), 5–7, and Bastianini and Sedley (1995), 274–278. This is not the place to examine the Anonymous’ views. But it should be borne in mind that 5.18ff. presents several arguments against the possibility of complete assimilation. First, the Anonymous stresses the fact that one’s οἰκείωσις in relation to oneself is both natural and completely independent of reason (φυσικὴ καὶ ἄλογος), whereas one’s οἰκείωσις to one’s neighbours (and a fortiori to distant fellow human beings), while also natural, is by no means independent of reason: it must be awakened by rational reflection – and fuelled, as it were, by it. Secondly, the Anonymous claims that even if we are capable of a considerable degree of the said assimilation, there is no way assimilation can remove the difference between what might be termed the “first-person” and the “second-person” (or “third-person”) perspective: if other people misbehave, this gives rise to ἀλλοτρίωσις (we are alienated from them); but the persons in question, even if they realize that they have misbehaved, are not equally alienated from themselves (that is: the “self,” even if it realizes that it has misbehaved, does not become equally alienated from itself). Thirdly, the Anonymous presents the above-mentioned general argument that there is no such thing as completely equal οἰκείωσις (equally intense οἰκείωσις) in relation to all percepta – and that even in the case of one’s relation to oneself οἰκείωσις is ἀνόμοια. Each of us is, of course, globally attached to his or her body; but the ties of οἰκείωσις that bind us to different parts of our body (to our eyes, our fingers, our hair or our nails) are of different intensity. As the Anonymous puts it: “our relationship to our own parts is not one of equal οἰκείωσις (μηδὲ πρὸς τὰ ἑαυτῶν μέρη ἐπ’ ἴσης ᾠκειώμεθα); for we are not disposed in just the same way relative to our eyes and our fingers, let alone to our nails and hair”. Fourthly, the Anonymous refers to “threshold situations” viz. to the anti-Stoic topos of two shipwrecked people, who find themselves in a situation in which only one of them can survive and each of them must choose between saving his own life and saving the other’s. All these arguments try to show that any attempt at complete “assimilation” is inevitably stopped by an irreducible margin of unequal οἰκείωσις. On “social” (“intersubjective”) οἰκείωσις viz. on the connection between οἰκείωσις/ἀλλοτρίωσις, complete “assimilation”, “impartiality” and “justice” (whether orthodox Stoic authors did or did not claim the possibility of complete “assimilation” and advocated the corresponding notion of “justice”), see notably Praechter (1901), 9f., 13, 61f. (323f., 327, 375f.), Sigdwick (1907), 502f., Praechter (1909), 545 (279), Mancini (1913), 69ff., Lorenz (1914), Praechter (1916), 517ff., Mühl (1928), Elorduy (1936), Fisch (1937), Bolkenstein (1939), 121ff., 310ff., Pohlenz (1940), 10, 31ff., 45, 46ff., Reijnders (1954), Baldry (1965), 151ff., Voelke (1961), 110ff., Giusta (1967), 499f., Zampaglione (1967), 158ff., Pembroke (1971), Isnardi Parente (1972), Kerferd (1972), Mingay (1973), Janda (1973), Fraisse (1984), 348–373, Williams (1976), den Boer (1979), 62ff., Inwood (1983), Inwood (1984), Vander Waerdt (1988), Engberg-Pedersen (1990), 122ff., Blundell (1990), Magnaldi (1991), Annas (1992), Bastianini and Long (1992), 444ff., Annas (1993), 262ff., 302ff., Lesses (1993), Long (1993), Pizzolato (1993), 80ff., Vander Waerdt (1994), Bastianini and Sedley (1995), 490ff., Schofield (1995), Inwood (1996), Nussbaum (1997), Brown (1997), Pangle (1998), Boys-Stones (1998), Schofield (1999a, b), Winkel (2000), Pagden (2000), Nussbaum (2000), Radice (2000), 63ff., 222ff., Striker (2000), Banateanu (2001), Lee (2002) 122–136, Nussbaum (2002), Reydams-Schils (2002), Algra (2003), Schofield (2003), in particular 251ff., Berges (2005), Laurand (2005), Reydams-Schils (2005), 3f., 143ff., McCabe (2005), Zagdoun (2005), Gueye (2006), Sellars (2007), Sorabji (2007), Alesse (2008), Ramelli (2009), XLIIIff., LVff., LXIIff., 120ff., Piatesi (2010), Kühn (2011), Richter (2011), Sedley (2012), Boeri (2013), Berthelot (2013), Laurand (2014), Schmitz (2014), Alesse (2016), Veillard (2016) Konstan (2016), Ramelli (2016), Klein (2016), 157ff., Mirguet (2017), 193ff., Magrin (2018). On the connection between the arguments presented in the anonymous Commentarium in Platonis Theaetetum 5.18ff. and ancient topoi of anti-Stoic polemics, in particular the “shipwrecked-topos”, cf. Cicero, De officiis, III. 89–90, De re publica III, 30, Lactantius, Divinae institutiones V 16.10, and see notably von Arnim (1906), Pohlenz (1934), 25f. viz. 277f., Fisch (1937), Croissant (1939), Weiglin (1942), Ferrary (1977), Inwood (1984), 182f., Blundell (1990), 230, Hruschka (1994), Wright (1995), 185f., Dyck (1996), 612f., Schofield (2003), 251ff., Aichele (2003), Berthelot (2013), and Bonazzi (2008).
References
Adler, Ada (ed.). 1928, 1967. Suidae lexicon, vol. II Δ-Θ. Leipzig: Teubner.
Aoyz, Javier, Deyvis Deniz-Machín, and Blas Bruni-Celli (ed.). 2014. Elementos de ética, extractos de Estobeo y glosas de la Suda de Hierocles el Estoico. Edición bilingüe griego-español. Traducción, introducción y comentario. Salamanca: Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca. (= Helmantica 65: 9–195).
Bagordo, Andreas (ed.). 2014. Fragmenta Comica. Leukon-Xenophilos. Einleitung, Übersetzung, Kommentar. Heidelberg: Verlag Antike.
Bastianini, Guido, and Anthony A. Long (ed.). 1992. Hierocles 1 Elementa Moralia. In Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici Greci e Latini (CPF) Testi e Lessico nei Papiri di Cultura Greca e Latina. Parte I: Autori Noti, vol. 1, 268–245. Firenze: Olschki,.
Bastianini, Guido, and David N. Sedley (ed.). 1995. Commentarium in Platonis « Theaetetum ». In Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici Greci e Latini Testi e lessico nei papiri di cultura greca e latina III: Commentari, 227–562. Firenze: Olschki.
Bruns, Ivo (ed.). 1887, 1961. Alexandri Aphrodisiensis praeter commentaria scripta minora (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, suppl. 2.1). Berlin: Reimer, repr. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Buytendijk, Frederik J.J. 1956. Allgemeine Theorie der menschlichen Haltung und Bewegung als Verbindung und Gegenüberstellung von physiologischer und psychologischer Betrachtungsweise. Berlin: Springer.
Campbell, Lewis, ed. 1861. The Theaetetus of Plato. Oxford: University Press.
Cope, Edward M., and Sandys, John E. (ed.). 1877, 1970. The Rhetoric of Aristotle, vol. I. Cambridge: University Press, Hildesheim/New York: Olms.
Diels, Hermann, and Wilhelm Schubart (ed.). 1905. Anonymer Kommentar zu Platons Theaetet (Papyrus 9782) nebst 3 Bruchstücken philosophischen Inhalts (Pap. N. 8, P. 9766, 9569). Berlin: Weidmann.
Dorandi, Tiziano, ed. 2013. Diogenes Laertius Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.
Evans, Ernest, ed. 1956. S. F. F. Tertulliani De carne Christi Liber/Tertullian’s Treatise on the Incarnation. London: S.P.C.K.
Greene, William C., ed. 1938. Scholia platonica. Harverford: American Philological Association.
Inwood, Brad, ed. 2007. Seneca Selected Philosophical Letters. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kock, Theodor (ed.). 1880. Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta, vol. 1. Leipzig: Teubner.
——— (ed.). 1884. Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta, vol. 2. Leipzig: Teubner.
Koerte, Alfred (ed.).19592. Menandri quae supersunt. Leipzig: Teubner.
Leutsch, Ernst, and Friedrich G. Schneidewin (ed.). 1839, 1965. Corpus Paroemiagraphorum Graecorum, vol. I. Gottingae: Vandenhoeck et Ruprecht, repr. Hildesheim: Olms.
——— (ed.). 1851, 1965. Corpus Paroemiagraphorum Graecorum, vol. II. Gottingae: Vandenhoeck et Ruprecht, repr. Hildesheim: Olms.
Lichtenberg, Georg C. 1968. In Schriften und Briefe, ed. W. Promies, vol. I. München: Carl Hanser.
Long, Anthony A., and David N. Sedley (ed.). 1987, 1997. The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol 1: Translations of the Principle Sources, with Philosophical Commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Martha, Jules, ed. 1967. Cicéron des termes extrêmes des biens et des maux. De finibus bonorum et malorum. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Nauck, August (ed.). 18862, 1963. Porphyrii philosophi Platonici opuscula selecta. Leipzig: Teubner, repr. Hildesheim: Olms.
Porson, Richard E., ed. 1882. Φωτίου τοῦ Πατριάρχου λέξεων συναγωγή, I. Cambridge/London: Trinity/Mawman.
Ramelli, Ilaria, and David Konstan, eds. 2009. Hierocles the Stoic: Elements of Ethics, Fragments, and Excerpts. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Culture.
Reinolds, Leighton D., ed. 1998. M. Tulii Ciceronis De finibus bonorum et malorum libri quinque. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Reynolds, Leighton D., ed. 1965. L. Annaei Senecae ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schwartz, Eduard (ed.). 1891, 1906. Scholia in Euripidem, vol. II. Berlin: Reimer, repr. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Sénèque. 1970. Des bienfaits. Texte établi et traduit par Franoṃis Préchac. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Sharples, Robert W. (ed.). 2008. Alexander Aphrodisiensis De anima libri mantissa. A New Edition of the Greek Text with Introduction and Commentary. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter.
Throllope, Anthony. 1880. Life of Cicero, vol. 1. London: Chapman & Hall.
von Arnim, Hans (ed.). 1903, 1964. Stoicorum veterum fragmenta III Chrysippi fragmenta moralia. Fragmenta successorum Chrysippi. Stuttgart: Teubner.
von Arnim, Hans, and Wilhelm Schubart, eds. 1906. Hierokles Ethische Elementarlehre (Papyrus 9780) nebst den bei Stobäus erhaltenen ethischen Exzerpten aus Hierokles. Berlin: Weidmann.
von Clausewitz, Carl. 1832. Hinterlassene Werke des Generals Carl von Clausewitz über Krieg und Kriegsführung, I, Vom Kriege 1. Berlin: Dümmler.
von Uexküll, Jakob. 1928, 1973. Theoretische Biologie. Berlin: Springer, repr. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
von Uexküll, J., and Georg Kriszat. 1934, 1983. Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen: ein Bilderbuch unsichtbarer Welten. Berlin: Springer, repr.: Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen: ein Bilderbuch unsichtbarer Welten/Bedeutungslehre. Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verlag.
Wachsmuth, Curt, and Otto Hense (ed.). 1884–1912, 1958. Ioannis Stobaei anthologium. Berlin: Weidmann.
Wankel, Hermann (ed.). 1976. Rede für Ktesiphon über den Kranz, vol. I. Heidelberg: Winter.
*
Aichele, Alexander. 2003. Was ist und wozu taugt das Brett des Karneades. Wesen und ursprünglicher Zweck des Paradigmas der europäischen Notrechtslehre. Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik/Annual Review of Law and Ethics 11: 245–268.
Alesse, Francesca. 2008. La teoria delle forme di appropriazione nello stoico Ierocle. In Anthropine Sophia. Studi di filologia e storiografia filosofica in memoria di Gabriele Giannantoni, ed. Francesca Alesse, Francesco Aronadio, Maria C. Dalfino, et al., 441–457. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
———. 2016. La représentation de soi et les différentes formes de l’appropriation chez Hiéroclès. In L’éthique du stoïcien Hiéroclès, ed. Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, 65–85. Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
Algra, Keimpe. 2003. The Mechanism of Social Appropriation and Its Role in Hellenistic Ethics. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 25: 265–296.
Algra, Keimpe, Jonathan Barnes, et al., eds. 1999. The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Annas, Julia E. 1989. Cicero on Stoic Moral Philosophy and Private Property. In Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society, ed. Miriam T. Griffin and Jonathan Barnes, 151–173. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Annas, Julia. 1992. The Good Life and the Good Lives of Others. Social Philosophy and Policy 9: 133–148.
———. 1993. The Morality of Happiness. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 1994. Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Aoiz, Javier. 2012. Οἰκείωσις y percepción de sí. In Oikeiosis and the Natural Basis of Morality, ed. Alejandro G. Vigo, 11–36. Hildesheim: Olms.
Arana Marcos, José R. 1999. La biología de los primeros estoicos. Veleia: Revista de prehistoria, historia antigua, arqueología y filología clásicas 16: 233–257.
Armisen-Marchetti, Mireille. 1989. Sapientiae facies. Étude sur les images de Sénèque. Paris: Belles Lettres.
Bäbler, Balbina. 1998. Fleissige Thrakerinnen und wehrhafte Skythen: Nichtgriechen im klassischen Athen und ihre archäologische Hinterlassenschaft. Stuttgart/Leipzig: Teubner.
Badalamenti, Guido. 1987. Ierocle Stoico e il concetto di συναίσθησις. Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia 3: 53–97.
Baldry, Harold C. 1965. The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought. Cambridge: University Press.
Banateanu, Anne. 2001. La théorie stoïcienne de l’amitié. Essai de reconstruction. Fribourg/Paris: Éditions Universitaires/Éditions du Cerf.
Barney, Rachel. 2003. A Puzzle in Stoic Ethics. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 24: 303–340.
Bees, Robert. 2004. Die Oikeiosislehre der Stoa. I Rekonstruktion ihres Inhalts. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
———. 2011. Kosmische Selbsterhaltung: Soziobiologie und Oikeiosis. Prometheus 27: 23–46.
Benatouil, Thomas. 2006. Faire usage: la pratique du stoïcisme. Paris: Vrin.
Berges, Sandrine. 2005. Loneliness and Belonging: Is Stoic Cosmopolitanism Still Defensible? Res Publica 11: 3–25.
Berthelot, Katell. 2013. A Classical Ethical Problem in Ancient Philosophy and Rabbinic Thought: The Case of the Shipwrecked. The Harvard Theological Review 106: 171–199.
Besnier, Bernard. 2001. La proprioception de l’animal dans le stoicism. Anthropozoologica 34: 113–129.
Blundell, Mary W. 1990. Parental Nature and Stoic οἰκείωσις. Ancient Philosophy 10: 221–242.
Boeri, Marcelo D. 2013. Cuidado de si y familiaridad en el estoicismo: ¿cuán egoísta y cuán altruista es la ética estoica? Thaumázein 1: 225–255.
Bolkenstein, Hendrik. 1939, 1979. Wohltätigkeit und Armenpflege im vorchristlichen Altertum. Utrecht: A. Oosthoek, repr. New York: Arno Press.
Bonazzi, Mauro. 2008. The Commentary as Polemical Tool. The Anonymous Commentator on the Theaetetus Against the Stoics. Laval Théologique et Philosophique 64: 597–605.
Bonhoeffer, Adolf. 1890. Epictet und die Stoa. Untersuchungen zur Stoischen Philosophie. Stuttgart, Enke.
———. 1894. Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet. Stuttgart: Enke.
Boys-Stones, George. 1998. Eros in Government: Zeno and the Virtuous City. Classical Quarterly 48: 168–174.
Brandt, Reinhard. 2003. Selbsbewusstsein und Selbstsorge. Zur Tradition der oikeiosis in der Neuzeit. Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 85: 179–197.
Brennan, Tad. 2005. The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, and Fate. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brink, Charles O. 1956. Theophrastus and Zeno on Nature in Moral Theory. Phronesis 1: 123–145.
Brittain, Charles. 2002. Non-rational Perception in the Stoics and Augustine. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 22: 253–301.
Brown, Eric. 1997. Stoic Cosmopolitanism and the Political Life. Diss. University of Chicago.
Brunschwig, J. 1986. The Cradle Argument in Epicureanism and Stoicism. In The Norms of Nature. Studies in Hellenistic Ethics, ed. Malcolm Schofield and Gisela Striker, 113–144. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brunschwig, Jacques. 1995. Études sur les philosophies hellénistiques: épicurisme, stoïcisme, scepticisme. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
———. 2003. Stoic Metaphysics. In The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, ed. Brad Inwood, 206–232. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Buchanan, Brett. 2008. Onto Ethologies, the Animal Environment of Uexküll, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze. New York: State University of New York Press.
Byers, Sarah C. 2016. Augustine’s Debt to Stoicism in the Confessions. In The Routledge Handbook of the Stoic Tradition, ed. John Sellars, 56–69. London/New York: Routledge.
Carvalho, Mário J. de. 2010. Wahrnehmung und Selbstreferenz – Der selbstreferentielle Charakter der Wahrnehmung nach Hierokles. In Relations of the Self, ed. Edmundo B. Pires et al., 109–139. Coimbra: Coimbra University Press.
Citti, Francesco. 1998. Aspetti della cura sui in Seneca morale. In Cultura e promozione umana. La cura del corpo e dello spirito nell’antichità classica e nei primi secoli cristiani. Un magistero ancora attuale? Convegno internazionale di studi Oasi Maria Santissima di Troina, 29 ottobre – 1° novembre 1997, ed. Enrico Dal Covolo and Isidoro Giannetto, 115–122. Troina: Oasi.
———. 2012. Cura sui. Studi sul lessico filosofico di Seneca. Amsterdam: Hakkert.
Collette-Ducic, Bernard. 2015. Esistenza, sussistenza e identità dell’animale nella Stoa: familiarizzazione e coscienza di sé. Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 107: 103–110.
Corso de Estrada, Laura. 2012. Οἰκείωσις. The Ciceronian Reading and its 13th Century Receptions. In Oikeiosis and the Natural Basis of Morality, ed. Alejandro G. Vigo, 67–94. Hildesheim: Olms.
———. 2019. Conservatio sui: inclinación de la naturaleza hacia sí: una teoría finalista en la lectura de Cicerón y de Tomás de Aquino. Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía 57: 375–398.
Croissant, Jeanne. 1939. La morale de Carnéade. Revue internationale de Philosophie 1: 545–570 (= Eadem. 2000. Études de philosophie ancienne, 230–275. Bruxelles: Ousia).
den Boer, W. 1979. Private Morality in Greece and Rome: Some Historical Aspects. Leiden: Brill.
Dierauer, Urs. 1977. Tier und Mensch im Denken der Antike: Studien zur Tierpsychologie, Anthropologie und Ethik. Amsterdam: Gruener.
Dobesch, Gerhard. 1962. Die Sprichwörter der griechischen Sagengeschichte. Diss. Wien.
Doyle, Daniel. 2012. Preservative οἰκείωσις: Its Constitution and Consciousness. In Oikeiosis and the Natural Basis of Morality, ed. Alejandro G. Vigo, 37–62. Hildesheim: Olms.
Doyle Sanchez, Daniel. 2014. La doctrina estoica de la oikeiosis, reconstrucción sistemática de la fundamentación de la moral en el estoicismo. Hildesheim: Olms.
Dyck, Andrew R. 1996. A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Elorduy, Eleuterio. 1936. Die Sozialphilosophie der Stoa. Leipzig: Dietrich.
Engberg-Pedersen, Troels. 1990. The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis. Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic Philosophy. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.
———. 2006. Filling Pembroke’s Lacuna in the Oikeiôsis Argument. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 88: 216–220.
Erskine, Andrew. 1990. The Hellenistic Stoa: Political Thought and Action. London: Bristol Classical Press.
Ferrary, Jean-Louis. 1977. Le discours de Philus (Cicéron, De Republica III, 8-31). Revue des Études Latines 55: 128–156.
Fidalgo, Tomaz. 2015. The Multidimensional and Centred Structure of Our Interested Perception in Hierocles. Diss. Lisbon: UNL.
Fisch, Max H. 1937. Alexander and the Stoics I, II. The American Journal of Philology 58 (59–2): 129–151.
Fischer, Robert. 1914. De usu vocabulorum apud Ciceronem et Senecam graecae philosophiae interpretes. Wagner: Freiburg i. Breisgau.
Forschner, Maximilian. 1981. Die Stoische Ethik: Uber den Zusammenhang von Natur-, Sprach- und Moralphilosophie im altstoischen System. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
———. 2004a. Stoische Oikeiosislehre und mittelalterliche Theorie des Gewissens. In Was ist das für den Menschen Gute? What is Good for a Human Being? Menschliche Natur und Güterlehre, ed. Jan Szaif and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, 126–150. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter.
———. 2004b. Über die stoische Begründung des Guten und Wertvollen. Methexis 17: 55–69.
———. 2008. Oikeiosis: die stoische Theorie der Selbstaneignung. In Stoizismus in der europaischen Philosophie, Literatur, Kunst und Politik. Eine Kulturgeschichte von der Antike bis zur Moderne, ed. Barbara Neymeyr, Jochen Schmidt, and Bernhard Zimermann, vol. I, 169–191. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter.
Fortenbraugh, William W. (ed.). 1983, 2002. On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics. The Work of Arius Didymus. New Brunswick/London: Transaction Pub.
Fraisse, Jean-Claude. 1984. Philia: la notion d’amitié dans la philosophie antique. Essai sur un problème perdu et retrouvé. Paris: Vrin.
Fuchs, Hans-Jürgen. 1977. Entfremdungund Narzißmus. Semantische Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der ›Selbstbezogenheit‹ als Vorgeschichte von französisch »amour-propre«. Stuttgart: Metzler.
Gantar, Kajetan. 1966–67. Amicus sibi. Zur Entstehungsgeschichte eines ethischen Begriffs in der antiken Literatur. Živa Antika XVI: 135–175 and XVII: 48–80.
———. 1976. La préhistoire d’amicus sibi chez Horace. Les études classiques 44: 209–221.
———. 1980. Zur Verinnerlichung der Reflexivpronomina in der griechischen philosophischen Sprache. Wiener Studien 14: 40–55.
Giavatto, Angelo, and Marie-Odile Goulet-Caze, eds. 2011. Études sur la théorie stoïcienne de l’action. Paris: Vrin.
Gill, Christopher. 2006. The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 2015. Antiochus’ Theory of Oikeiosis. In Cicero’s De Finibus: Philosophical Approaches, ed. Julia Annas and Gábor Betegh, 221–247. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gill, C. 2016. La continuité de la perception depuis la naissance (Hiéroclès, Éléments d’Éthique col. III-IV). In L’éthique du stoïcien Hiéroclès, ed. Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, 47–63. Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
Giusta, Michelangelo. 1967. I dossografi di etica. Vol. II. Torino: Giappichelli.
Görgemanns, Herwig. 1983, 2002. Oikeiosis in Arius Didymus. In On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics. The Work of Arius Didymus, ed. William W. Fortenbraugh, 165–189. New Brunswick/London: Transaction Pub.
Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste, ed. 2016a. L’éthique du stoïcien Hiéroclès. Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
———. 2016b. La gestation de l’animal et la perception de soi (Hiéroclès, Éléments d’Éthique, Col. I-III). In L’éthique du stoïcien Hiéroclès, ed. Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, 15–46. Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
———. 2017. Les stoïciens et l’âme. Paris: Vrin.
———. 2020. Self-Knowledge, Self-Perception and Perception of One’s Body in Stoicism. In Self-Knowledge in Ancient Philosophy: The Eighth Keeling Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, ed. F. Leigh, 187–220. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste, and J. Barnes, eds. 2009. Lire les stoïciens. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Graver, Margaret. 2007. Stoicism and Emotion. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gueye, Cheikh M. 2006. Late Stoic Cosmopolitanism. Foundations and Relevance Heidelberg: Winter.
Hartung, Hans-Joachim. 1970. Ciceros Methode der Übersetzung griechischer philosophischer Termini. Diss. Hamburg.
Hebing, Josef. 1922. Ueber conscientia und conservatio im philosophischen Sinne bei den Römern von Cicero bis Hieronymus. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 35: 121–135, 215–231, 298–326.
Horn, Christoph. 2003. Die stoische oikeiôsis als Konzeption der gelingenden Lebensführung und als Moraltheorie. In Denkformen – Lebensformen. Tagung des engeren Kreises der Allgemeinen Gesellschaft für Philosophie in Deutschland, Hildesheim 3.-6. Oktober 2000, ed. Tilman Borsche, 95–114. Hildesheim: Olms.
———. 2009. Zueignung (Oikeiosis). In Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, ed. Joachim Ritter, Karlfried Gründer, Gottfried Gabriel, Col, vol. 12, 1403–1408. Basel: Schwabe.
Hruschka, Joachim. 1994. On the History of Justification and Excuse in Cases of Necessity. In Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in Modern Legal Systems. Festschrift for R. Summers, ed. Werner Krawietz et al., 337–349. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
Ildefonse, Frédérique. 2011. La psychologie de l’action: représentation, impulsion et assentiment. In Études sur la théorie stoïcienne de l’action, ed. Angelo Giavatto and Marie-O. Goulet-Caze, 1–71. Paris: Vrin.
Inwood, Brad. 1983, 2002. Comments on Professor Görgemanns’ Paper. The Two Forms of Oikeiosis in Arius and the Stoa. In On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics. The Work of Arius Didymus, ed. William. W. Fortenbraugh, 190–201. New Brunswick/London: Transaction Pub.
———. 1984. Hierocles: Theory and Argument in the Second Century A.D. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2: 151–183.
———. 1985. Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
———. 1996. L’«oikeiôsis» sociale chez Épictète. In Polyhistor: Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy Presented to Jaap Mansfeld on His Sixtieth Birthday, ed. Keimpe A. Algra et al., 243–264. Leiden: Brill.
———, ed. 2003. The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Inwood, Brad, and P. Pierluigi Donini. 1999. Stoic Ethics. In The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Keimpe Algra and J. Basrnes, 675–738. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Isnardi Parente, Margherita. 1972. Ierocle Stoico: Oikeiosis e doveri sociali. In Aufstieg und Niedergang der Romischen Welt: Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung, 2, Principat, ed. Hildegard Temporini and Wolfgang Haase, 2201–2226. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Janda, Jan. 1973. Einige ethisch-soziale Probleme in der Philosophie des Zenon von Kition: Zur Politeia des Zenon. In Soziale Probleme im Hellenismus und im Römischen Reich. Akten der Konferenz, Liblice 10.-13. Okt. 1972, ed. Pavel Oliva et al., 99–116. Praha: ČSAV.
Kerferd, George B. 1972. The Search for Personal Identity in Stoic Thought. Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester 55: 177–196.
Kim, Seon Y. 2016. Paul and the Stoic Theory of οἰκείωσις. A Response to Troels Engberg-Pedersen. Novum Testamentum 58: 71–91.
Klein, Jacob S. 2010. Nature and Reason in Stoic Ethics. Diss. Cornell University.
Klein, Jacob. 2016. The Stoic Argument from oikeiōsis. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 50: 143–200.
Konstan, David. 2016. Hiéroclès, sur la famille et l’économie domestique (Stobée, Eclog. IV, 84, 20, p. 660, 15-664, 18 ET 84, 23, p. 671, 3-673, 18). In L’éthique du stoïcien Hiéroclès, ed. Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, 145–155. Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
Kühn, Wilfried. 2011. L’attachement à soi et aux autres. In Études Sur la théorie stoïcienne de l’action, ed. Angelo Giavatto and Marie-Odile Goulet-Caze, 237–366. Paris: Vrin.
———. 2014. L’attachement à soi face aux fins morales: une question stoïcienne. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 96: 360–388.
Labarrière, Jean-Louis. 1993. De la ‘nature phantastique’ des animaux chez les Stoïciens. In Passions & Perceptions. Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, Proceedings of the Fifth Symposium Hellenisticum, ed. Jacques Brunschwig and Martha C. Nussbaum, 225–249. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Laurand, Valéry. 2005. La politique stoïcienne. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
———. 2014. Stoïcisme et lien social: enquête autour de Musonius Rufus. Paris: Classiques Garnier.
Laursen, Simon. 1993. Self and Nature in Stoic Philosophy. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 28: 115–124.
Lee, Chang-Uh. 2002. Oikeiosis. Stoische Ethik in naturphilosophischer Perspektive. Freiburg/München: Alber.
Lesses, G. 1993. Austere Friends: the Stoics on Friendship. Apeiron 26: 57–75.
Lévy, Carlos. 1992. Cicero academicus. Recherches sur les Académiques et sur la philosophie de Cicéron. Rome: École française de Rome.
Lislu, Marin O. 1930. Étude sur la langue de la philosophie morale chez Cicéron. Paris: Belles Lettres.
Long, Anthony A. 1982. Soul and Body in Stoicism. Phronesis 27: 34–57.
———. 1991. Representation and the Self in Stoicism. In Companions to Ancient Thought 2: Psychology, ed. Stephen Everson, 102–120. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1993. Hierocles on oikeiosis and Self-Perception. In Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Konstantinos J. Boudouris, 93–102. Athens: International Centre for Greek Philosophy and Culture.
———. 1996a. Notes on Hierocles Stoicus apud Stobaeum. In ΟΔΟΙ ΔΙΖΗΣΙΟΣ: Le Vie della Ricerca. Studi in onore di Francesco Adorno, ed. Maria S. Funghi, 299–309. Firenze: Olschki.
———. 1996b. Stoic Studies. Berkley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press.
López Gómez, Catalina. 2016. Apuntes para una teoría estoica de la acción animal. Discusiones Filosóficas 17: 97–109.
Lorenz, Siegfried. 1914. De progressu notionis ΦΙΛΑΝΘΡΩΠΙΑΣ. Weidae Thuringorum: Thomas & Hubert.
Luciani, Sabine. 2015. L’homme et l’animal dans l’anthropologie cicéronienne. In Anthropologie in Antike und Gegenwart. Biologische und philosophische Entwürfe vom Menschen, ed. Diego de Brasi and Sabine Föllinger, 97–117. Freiburg/München: Alber.
Machin, Deyvis D. 2012. Hierocles y la génesis de la conciencia. Azafea Revista de filosofía 14: 145–164.
Magnaldi, Giuseppina. 1991. L’oikeiôsis peripatetica in Ario Didimo e nel De finibus di Cicerone. Firenze: Casa Ed. Le Lettere.
Magrin, Sara. 2018. Nature and Utopia in Epictetus’ Theory of Oikeiōsis. Phronesis 63: 293–350.
Mancini, Guido. 1913, 1940.. L’ etica stoica da Zenone a Crisippo. Arpino: Soc. Tipogr. Arpinate, Padova: Cedam.
Mansfeld, Jaap. 1984. Some Stoics on the Soul (SVF I 136). Mnemosyne 37: 443–445.
McCabe, M.M. 2005. Extend or Identify: Two Stoic Accounts of Altruism. In Metaphysics, Soul and Ethics in Ancient Thought: Themes from the Work of Richard Sorabji, ed. Ricardo Salles, 413–444. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mingay, Jean. 1973. Coniunctio inter homines hominum. Cicero De finibus V, 65 and Related Passages. In Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition. Essays Presented by His Friends and Pupils to R. Walzer on His Seventieth Birthday, ed. Samuel M. Stern et al., 261–275. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
Mirguet, Françoise. 2017. An Early History of Compassion. Emotion and Imagination in Hellenistic Judaism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Moorhouse, Alfred C. 1965. A Use of οὐδείς and μηδείς. Classical Quarterly 15: 31–40.
Moreschini, Claudio. 1978. Apuleio e il platonismo. Firenze: Olschki.
———. 1979. Osservazioni sul lessico filosofico di Cicerone. Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Classe di Lettere e Filosofia, S. III 9: 99–178.
———. 2016. Apuleius and the Metamorphoses of Platonism. Turnhout: Brepols.
Mühl, Max. 1928. Die antike Menschheitsidee in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung. Leipzig: Dietrich.
Muller, Robert. 2006. Les Stoïciens. Vrin: La liberté et l’ordre du monde. Paris.
Murgier, Charlotte. 2013. La part du propre (oikeion) dans la constitution du concept stoïcien d’appropriation (oikeiosis). Methodos 13: 1–37.
Nussbaum, Martha. 1997. Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism. Journal of Political Philosophy 5: 1–25.
———. 2000. Duties of Justice, Duties of Material Aid: Cicero’s Problematic Legacy. The Journal of Political Philosophy 8: 176–206.
———. 2002. The Worth of Human Dignity. Two Tensions in Stoic Cosmopolitanism. In Philosophy and Power in the Graeco-Roman World. Essays in Honour of M. Griffin, ed. Gillian Clark and Tessa Rajak, 31–50. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pagden, Anthony. 2000. Stoicism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Legacy of European Imperialism. Constellations 7: 3–22.
Pangle, Thomas L. 1998. Socratic Cosmopolitanism: Cicero’s Critique and Transformation of the Stoic Ideal. Canadian Journal of Political Science 31: 235–266.
Pearson, Alfred C. 1917. Some Passages of Greek Tragedy. The Classical Quarterly 11: 57–68.
Pembroke, Simon G. 1971. Oikeiosis. In Problems in Stoicism, ed. Anthony A. Long, 114–149. London/Atlantic Highlands: Athlone Press.
Philippson, Robert. 1932. Das erste Naturgemäße. Philologus 87: 445–466.
Piatesi, Andrea. 2010. L’oikeiôsis degli Stoici. Una lettura evolutiva. Diss. Bologna.
Pizzolato, Luigi F. 1993. L’idea di amicizia nel mondo antico classico e cristiano. Torino: Einaudi.
Pohlenz, Max. 1934, 1965. Cicero De officiis III, Nachrichten der Göttinger Gesellschaft, Fachgruppe I, N.F. 1: 1-40 (= Idem. 1965. Kleine Schriften, ed. H. Dorrie, 253–291. Hildesheim: Olms).
———. 1940. Die Grundfragen der stoischen Philosophie. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
———. 1959. Die Stoa, Geschichte einer Bewegung. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Praechter, Karl. 1901. Hierokles der Stoiker. Leipzig: Dietrich (= Idem. 1973. Kleine Schriften, ed. H. Dörrie, 311–474. Hildesheim. /New York: Olms).
———. 1909. Rev. of H. Diels, W. Schubart (ed.), Anonymer Kommentar zu Platons Theaetet. Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen 71: 530–547 (= Idem. 1973. Kleine Schriften, ed. H. Dörrie, 264–281. Hildesheim/New York: Olms).
———. 1916. Zum platonischen Gaios. Hermes 51:510–529 (= Idem. 1973. Kleine Schriften, ed. H. Dörrie, 81–100. Hildesheim/New York: Olms).
Radice, Roberto. 2000. Oikeiosis: Ricerche sul fondamento del pensiero stoico e sulla sua genesi. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
Ramelli, Ilaria. 2008. Transformation of the Household Theory between Roman Stoics, Middle Platonism, and Early Christianity. Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica 100: 369–396.
———. 2009. Ierocle neostoico in Stobeo: i kathekonta e l’evoluzione dell’etica stoica. In Deciding Culture: Stobaeus’ Collection of Excerpts of Ancient Greek Authors, ed. G. Reydams-Schils, 537–575. Turnhout: Brepols.
———. 2014. The Stoic Doctrine of Oikeiosis and Its Transformation in Christian Platonism. Apeiron 47: 116–140.
———. 2016. Extraits du Traité sur le mariage (Stobée, Anth. IV, 67, 21–24, p. 502, 1–507, 5; IV, 75, 14, p. 603, 8–605, 16; IV, 85, 21, T. V, p. 696, 21–699, 15). In L’éthique du stoïcien Hiéroclès, ed. Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, 158–167. Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
Reijnders, Hendricus F. 1954. Societas generis humani bij Cicero. Groningen/Djakarta: J. B. Wolters.
Remes, Pauliina, and Juha Sihvola, eds. 2008. Ancient Philosophy of the Self. Berlin: Springer.
Reydams-Schils, G. 2002. Human Bonding and Oikeiosis in Roman Stoicism. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 22: 221–251.
Reydams-Schils, Gretchen. 2005. The Roman Stoics. Self, Responsibility, and Affection. Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press.
———, ed. 2011. Thinking Through Excerpts: Studies on Stobaeus. Turnhout: Brepols.
Richter, Daniel S. 2011. Cosmopolis. Imagining Community in Late Classical Athens and the Early Roman Empire. New York: Oxford University Press.
Romeyer Dherbey, Gilbert R. 2005. La naissance de la subjectivité chez les stoïciens. In Les stoïciens, ed. Gilbert R. Romeyer Dherbey and Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, 277–292. Paris: Vrin.
Romeyer Dherbey, Gilbert R., and Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, eds. 2005. Les stoïciens. Paris: Vrin.
Salles, Ricardo. 2012. Οἰκείωσις in Epictetus. In Oikeiosis and the Natural Basis of Morality, ed. Alejandro G. Vigo, 95–119. Hildesheim: Olms.
Sandbach, Francis H. 1975. The Stoics. London: Chatto & Windus.
———. 1985. Aristotle and the Stoics. Cambridge: Cambridge Philological Society.
Schmitz, Philip. 2014. Cato Peripateticus – stoische und peripatetische Ethik im Dialog. Cic. fin. 3 und der Aristotelismus des ersten Jh. v. Chr. (Xenarchos, Boethos und ‘Areios Didymos’). Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter.
Schofield, Malcolm. 1995. Two Stoic Approaches to Justice. In Justice and Generosity. Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy. Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Hellenisticum, ed. Andre Laks and M. Schofield, 191–212. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1999a. The Stoic Idea of the City. With a New Foreword by M. C. Nussbaum and an Epilogue by the Author. Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press.
———. 1999b. Social and Political Thought. In The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Keimpe Algra, 739–770. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2003. Stoic Ethics. In The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, ed. Brad Inwood, 233–256. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2012. Antiochus on Social Virtue. In The Philosophy of Antiochus, ed. David Sedley, 173–187. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schönrich, Gerhard. 1989. Oikeiosis – Zur Aktualität eines stoischen Grundbegriffs. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 96: 34–51.
Sedley (David). 2012. The Philosophy of Antiochus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Seiener, Gary. 2008. Das Tier bei Aristoteles und den Stoikern. Evolution eines kosmischen Prinzips. In Mensch und Tier in der Antike: Grenzziehung und Grenzüberschreitung, Symposium vom 7. bis 9. April 2005 in Rostock, ed. Annetta Alexandridis, Markus Wild, and Lorenz Winkler-Horacek, 27–46. Wiesbaden: Reichert.
Sellars, John. 2007. Stoic Cosmopolitanism and Zeno’s Republic. History of Political Thought 28: 1–29.
Sigdwick, Henry. 1907. The Methods of Ethics. London: Macmillan.
Sorabji, Richard. 1993. Animal Minds and Human Morals. The Origins of the Western Debate. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
———. 2007. What Is New on the Self in Stoicism After 100 BC? Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 50: 141–162.
Steinmetz, Peter. 1994. Die Stoa. In Die Philosophie der Antike, ed. Hellmut Flashar, 491–716. Basel: Schwabe.
Striker, Gisela. 1983. The Role of oἰκείωσις in Stoic Ethics. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 1: 145–167.
———. 1986. Antipater and the Art of Living. In The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics, ed. Malcolm Schofield and Gisela Striker, 298–315. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1996. Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2000. Following Nature: A Study in Stoic Ethics. In Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics, ed. Gisela Striker, 221–280. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Szlezák, Thomas A. 2010. Was Europa den Griechen verdankt. Von den Grundlagen unserer Kultur in der griechischen Antike. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Tilelman, Teun. 2003. Chrysippus’ on Affections. Leiden/Boston: Brill.
Togni, Paolo. 2010. Conoscenza e virtu nella dialettica stoica. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
Trudel, Vincent. 2018. Oikeiôsis: cohérence de la doctrine chez Épictète. Phares 18: 77–90.
Tsouni, G. 2019. Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vander Waerdt, Paul A. 1988. Hermarchus and the Epicurean Genealogy of Morals. Transactions of the American Philological Association 118: 87–106.
———. 1994. Zeno’s Republic and the Origins of Natural Law. In The Socratic Movement, ed. Paul A. Vander Waerdt, 272–308. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Veillard, Christelle. 2016. Hiéroclès, les devoirs envers la patrie et les parents (Stobée, Eclog. III, 39 34, p. 730, 17–731, 15; III, 39, 35, p. 731, 16–733, 6; III, 39, 36, p. 733, 7–734, 10; Eclog. IV, 25, 53, p. 640, 4–644, 15.). In L’éthique du stoïcien Hiéroclès, ed. Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, 105–143. Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
Vigo, Alejandro G., ed. 2012. Oikeiosis and the Natural Basis of Morality from Classical Stoicism to Modern Philosophy. Hildesheim: Olms.
Vimercati, Emmanuele. 2007. Tre studi recenti sull’oikeiosis e sul fondamento della morale stoica. Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 99: 573–608.
Voelke, André-J. 1961. Les rapports avec autrui dans la philosophie grecque d’Aristote à Panétius. Paris: Vrin.
Vogt, Katja M. 2006. Law, Reason, and the Cosmic City. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
von Arnim, Hans. 1906. Karneades. In Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft vol. X.2, cols, 1964–1985. Stuttgart: Metzler.
Weiglin, Ernst. 1942. Das Brett des Karneades. Der Gerichtssaal 116: 88–98.
White, Nicholas P. 1979. The Basis of Stoic Ethics. Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 83: 143–178.
Wildberger, Jula. 2005. Rec. Bees (2004). Philosophische Rundschau 52: 322–326.
Williams, Bernard. 1976. Persons, Character and Morality. In The Identities of Persons, ed. Amélie O. Rorty, 197–216. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Winkel, Laurens. 2000. Les origines antiques de l’« appetitus societatis » de Grotius. Revue d’histoire du droit 68: 393–403.
Wright, Maureen R. 1995. Cicero on Self-Love and Love of Humanity. In Cicero the Philosopher. Twelve Papers, ed. Jonathan Powell, 171–195. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Yu, Jiangxia. 2017. The Moral Development in Stoic oikeiôsis and Wang Yang-ming’s ‘wan wu yi ti’. Asian Philosophy: An International Journal of the Philosophical Traditions of the East 27: 150–173.
Zagdoun, Mary-A. 2005. Problèmes concernant l’oikeiôsis stoïcienne. In Les stoïciens, ed. Gilbert R. Romeyer-Dherbey and Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, 319–334. Paris: Vrin.
Zamora Calvo, José M. 2017. Los Estoicos e la cuestión de la familiaridad (ΟΙΚΕΙΩΣΙΣ). La proposta de Hierocles. Praxis Filosófica 45: 13–27.
Zampaglione, Gerardo. 1967. L’idea della pace nel mondo antico. Torino: ERI.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Appendix I (to Note 43)
Appendix I (to Note 43)
Incidentally, the episynagein (the exomoiōsis viz. the synolkē tōn kyklōn) we are talking about here should not be confused with what might be termed the pliability of the first-person plural (viz. of the circle of the “we”).
As a matter of fact, Hierocles’ circles draw our attention to the complex, flexible and dynamic structure of what might be termed the “we-perspective” viz. the “first-person-plural perspective” (as opposed to the “second-” and “third-person plural”). From the centre to the periphery, Hierocles’ circles highlight (a) the transition from singular to plural, (b) the transition from “first-person” to “second-” viz. “third-person”, and (c) the emergence of a new kind of “first-person”, namely the “first-person plural”. The latter is, of course, intrinsically oikeiōsis-related. It presupposes an oikeiōsis-bond between singular and plural (i.e. between the “first-person singular” and other people originally belonging to the realm of the “second-” or “third-person”). Oikeiōsis has the particular power to transform the “second-” and “third-person” into a specific kind of “first person” (namely the “first-person plural”).
But this is not all. Hierocles’ concentric circles also highlight the fact that the “first-person plural” can take the form either of narrower or of wider circles. For instance, it can include just the second circle. But nothing prevents it from also comprising the third, the fourth, the fifth, etc. For there is the “we” of one’s immediate family , the “we” of one’s wider family , the “we” of one’s friends, the “we” of one’s neighbourhood, the “we” of one’s profession, the “we” of one’s political or religious beliefs, the “we” of one’s football club, the “we” of one’s country, etc. And to these different “we”s correspond different “they”s”. That is, Hierocles’ concentric circles allow different first-person-plural settings (and this also means: different second- and third-person-plural-settings), depending on the specific circumstances.
To put it in a nutshell, the very same concentric circles can give rise to various “us-them divides”. Furthermore, very frequent changes of these settings are part and parcel of the normal operation of the “system” we are talking about. To give but one example, minutes after insulting each other over a traffic incident on the way to the stadium two people can share their common commitment to their club, their country, etc., and play their role as perfectly devoted members of the corresponding “we”. This can also be expressed by saying that, according to the circumstances, the emphasis can be placed either on the boundary between the first and the second circle, or on the boundary between the second and the third, or on the boundary between the third and the fourth, etc. In other words, the boundaries between the concentric circles can be either stressed or unstressed in various ways – and they can be variously connected with the divide between “us” and “them”. The result being that (a) there are wider and narrower “we-circles” (as opposed to narrower and wider “you-circles” viz. “they-circles”), (b) the latter are inversely proportional to the former, and (c) in the course of one’s life the “acting” “we” is almost constantly changing. And all this – namely both (1) the various “us-them divides” and (2) very frequent changes in this regard – is as much part of the structure in question as the concentric circles described by Hierocles.
Now, this means that, depending on the circumstances, the “we-circle” can become very wide – and indeed as wide as the outermost and largest circle. But the point is that none of this is what Hierocles’ episynagein, his exomoiōsis and his synolkē tōn kyklōn are all about. For all the changes we have been talking about leave untouched the varying intensity of oikeiōsis and care the concentric circles stand for; while Hierocles’ episynagein, his exomoiōsis and his synolkē tōn kyklōn stand for the exact opposite – namely for complete unification or assimilation: for the very same intensity of oikeiōsis and care throughout the whole perceptual field.
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2021 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
de Carvalho, M.J. (2021). The Circles of Care: A Stoic Approach. In: Braga, J., Santiago de Carvalho, M. (eds) Philosophy of Care. Advancing Global Bioethics, vol 16. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75478-5_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75478-5_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-71240-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-75478-5
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)